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Abstract 
In this thesis I examine the relationship between two key concepts in the 
'Critical Tradition' within German philosophy: social constitution and 
reconciliation (or social autonomy). The former stresses the importance of 
understanding all forms of social organisation as practically constituted by flesh- 
and-blood human beings and resists the tendency to reify particular social forms. 
The latter stresses the ethical value of types of social organisation that resist 
forms of estrangement and promote the recognition of human dignity. Both 
concepts can be essentially read as responses to the problem of alienation. 
I locate the origin of both notions in the thought of G. W. F. Hegel, albeit in an 
incohate form. I then move on to assess their development in the thought of 
Theodor W. Adorno. It is Adorno's use of Hegelian categories that allows him to 
articulate why the world that we practically create takes upon the appearance of 
something above and beyond our control. This, I believe, gives him a critical 
edge over his second generation Frankfurt School critics, whom tend towards the 
reification of the capitalist social form. 
What ultimately differentiates Adorno from both Hegel, on the one hand, and 
the second generation Frankfurt School, on the other, is the materialist turn in his 
thinking. This inflects both his commitment to a concept of social constitution 
which incorporates the natural as well as the cultural in addition to his 
conception of social autonomy (or solidarity) rooted in a bodily response to need 
and suffering. 
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1) Introduction 
1) After Auschwitz 
Theodor Adorno wrote against a backdrop of unimaginable barbarism. ' Those 
who had promised the liberation of mankind and mankind's liberation from 
philosophy had delivered uncompromising cruelty from Moscow to Beijing, 
whilst Western Europe emerged from the shadow of Nazi genocide. ' For 
Adorno, the atrocities of the twentieth century had made a mockery of the 
optimistic narratives of historical progress that had characterised the 
philosophical traditions of the previous two centuries. Equally, however, neither 
Auschwitz nor the Gulags could signal anything permanent or immutable about 
the human condition. Such absolute despair, for Adorno, would be heretical in 
light of the victims suffering. Instead, our overriding imperative in light of such 
barbarism was to arrange our 'thinking and conduct' so that that 'nothing similar 
ever happens again'. ' 
Adorno's response here is deeply aporetic, as he had nothing even approaching 
a political programme for delivering upon such an imperative. Indeed, the retreat 
' Theodor Wiesgrund Adorno (1903-1969). Principle works refered to in the thesis are Negative 
Dialectics (1973) translated by E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul), Minima 
Moralia (1974) translated by E. F. N Jephcott (London: Verso), Hegel: Three Studies (1993) 
translated by Shirley Weber-Nicholson (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Problems of 
Moral Philosophy (2000) translated by Rodney Livingstone (Oxford: Blackwell), Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (1997) (with Max Horkheimer) translated by John Cumming (London: Verso), 
Aesthetic Theory (1997) translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor (Athlone, London). Other texts and 
essays are referenced separately. 
2 Adorno (1973) p. I. Marx (1992) p. 57. 
3 Adorno (1973) p. 365. 
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into obscure works of 20' Century modernism for which Adorno was most 
famous appear to imply a supreme indifference towards the practical matters of 
politics. On the one hand, this is because of the depth at which Adomo takes the 
problem to lie. He does not take the holocaust, for example, to be a unique 
deviation from the otherwise triumphant march of reason and enlightenment but, 
instead, presents it as the apogee of a universal process of societal 
rationalisation, in which relationships between human beings become ever more 
instrumental. Auschwitz is the culmination of Enlightenment's dark side rather 
than the diametric opposite of enlightened reason. This is only part of the story, 
however, as Adorno is also comn-dtted to a highly radical notion of social 
constitution, of human beings as socially, self- determining beings. Such a notion 
refuses to confine the possibilities for the development of human societies to the 
terms of present social organisation. Indeed, it is in virtue of such a utopian 
moment in Adorno's thinking that the uncompromising nature of his politics is to 
be understood. Adorno's extreme negativism towards the society of Max 
Weber's 'iron cage" combined with his utopian commitment to the possibility of 
radically different forms of social organisation sits uncomfortably with our 
everyday understanding of politics as negotiating compromises between 
unsavoury options. 
' Sheldon Wolin offeres an exellent account of Weber's iron cage, defining it in terms of "legal 
codes and administrative organisations that promise order, predictable decisions, regularity of 
procedures, and responsible, objective and qualified officials; into economics that operate 
according to principles of calculated advantage, efficiency and means-end strategies; into 
technologies that promote standardisation, mechanical behaviours and uniform tastes. " Wolin, S. 
(1984) Max Weber: Legitimation, Method and the Politics of 71beory (Basil Blackwell, Oxford) 
p. 71. 
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This dialectic, between a utopian exploration of social possibility and an 
impotent pessimism in the face of barbarism, highlights a key problem in the 
critical tradition. How exactly can this radical commitment to a notion of social 
constitution be reconciled with our situatedness in a world we are apparently 
impotent to change? The key claim of critical theory is that, however much 
forms of social relations may have the appearance of immutability, existing 
above and beyond human social practice, the social and practical constitution of 
such abstractions can be unpacked. The closed discourse of 'economics', for 
example, is not a timeless set of rules and laws, against which societies can 
measure their success or failure, but a distillation of perverted social practices, 
already presupposing the commoditization and alienation of human labour. Key 
to this understanding is the notion of inversion. It is the labour of human subjects 
that is the material basis of the reproduction of capitalist society and yet, in the 
mechanism of exchange, we come to see value as a mystical property of the 
commodity itself rather than as an expression of a social relation between 
producers. For Adorno, this understanding of social processes being inverted or 
4passing into' their opposite is rooted in the Hegelian notion of dialectic. ' 
To appropriate Hegel's metaphysics for critical purposes is a risky business, as 
Hegel's central notion of Spirit is radically incompatible with materialist 
thinking. Firstly, Spirit qua god, is an autonomous source of content of which we 
' G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831). Principle works referred to in the thesis are Phenomenology of 
Spirit (1977) translated by AN. Miller (Oxford, OUP), Faith and Knowledge (1977b) (Albany, 
State University of NY Press), Encyclopaedia Logic (1991) tr. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, 
H. S. Harris (Hackett, Indianapolis), Science of Logic (1998) tr. AN. Miller (OUP, Oxford), The 
Philosophy of Right (1991) tarnslated by Allen Wood (OUP, Oxford), Early Theological 
Writings (1961) (University of Pennsylvania Press). Other texts are referenced separately. 
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humans are merely vehicles. Secondly, Spirit operates according to a strictly 
teleological sense of rational necessity, which undermines the notion of social 
constitution. Finally, grasping the movement of the Absolute from the inside 
requires access to an avowedly mystical form of experience. Despite this, 
however, there is an important sense in which an understanding of Hegel is 
essential to the theory of social constitution, which is best articulated in 
Adorno's Three Studies and Negative Dialectics. Reading Hegel's philosophy, 
not in its own terms but as a sedimentation of social relations, Adorno takes the 
operation of Spirit to be analogous to the operation of capital in its subsumption 
and incorporation of all heterogeneous qualities into the universal. Furthermore, 
Hegel's failure to recognise Spirit as an alienated form of human social practice, 
instead representing it as a manifestation of God, is analogous to the failure of 
human subjects to recognise capital as an alienated form of living labour. 
Understanding Hegel in this way gives us clues as to how to conceptualise this 
process of inversion. 
In addition, the idea of social constitution is not merely a tool for the critical 
theorist to unveil the socio-practical content of seemingly abstract and 
immutable categories. It also provides a powerful ethical critique of alienation 
and disempowerment. The object of critique is, in Adorno's words, a life that no 
longer lives, seemingly operating in accordance with a logic outside the practical 
activity of human subjects. The implicit ethical aim of critical theory is thus 
social autonomy, whereby subjects are able to collectively take control over their 
destiny. It is the connection between social constitution and social autonomy that 
is the focus of this thesis. 
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Again, it is to Hegel that we must initially turn to grasp the significance of this 
idea. In the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel develops the notion of mutual 
recognition, a radically egalitarian state of affairs in which each mutually 
recognises the moral worth of each other. ' This idea is strongly connected to the 
Hegelian idea of reconciliation, whereby the social world acts as the foundation 
and source of each individual's sense of value and self-determination.. 
Reconciliation, in its Hegelian guise, is a concept of human freedom which both 
builds upon and challenges the negative formulation of freedom found in much 
liberal thought (that is an idea of freedom restricted to discussion of the 
legitimate boundaries of state interference in the lives of individuals). It is not 
the case that Hegel thinks of the demands of negative freedom as unimportant. 
Such demands fall under the heading of "abstract right", a key component of 
ethical life. However, Hegel wants to broaden discussion to question why we 
take forms of social authority to be alien in the first place - such that we can only 
think of freedom as a conflict between the interests of the state and those of 
individuals. Freedom of a more comprehensive nature is attained within social 
forms that satisfy deep human needs (primarily the need for recognition) and, 
hence, with which subjects can identify. Reconciliation, thus, can be read as an 
antonym for alienation and, more generally, as a concept which connects the 
discussion of alienation to the question of human freedom. 
Hegel shifts from a more radical, egalitarian position in his later work, as 
reconciliation is deemed only to be possible within an institutional framework 
comprised of the nuclear family, a market economy and a strong state to crush 
Hegel (1977) pp. 104-110. 
to 
the 'penurious rabble" whose existence is a tragic but necessary consequence of 
the injustices of capitalism. For Adorno, this constitutes a cowardly capitulation. 
In many ways, the difference between Hegel's modest faith in the institutions 
of the modern world and Adorno's radical negativism can be explained 
historically. Hegel writes in the aftermath of a wave of revolutionary optimism 
across Europe and sees his task as convincing his contemporaries that there is a 
fundamental rationality to the institutions and practices of the modern world. 
Such institutions and practices are capable of instantiating an almost spontaneous 
sense of obligation and morality in modern subjects. In contradistinction, Adorno 
provides an account of a world 'after Auschwitz' in which the dominant 
institutional forms (and interlinked forms of consciousness) continually 
undermine any motivational basis for ethical action. In light of the horrors of the 
twentieth century, it is mutual indifference that is the predominant form of 
ethical relationship. 
However, the historical compulsion, after Auschwitz, to develop critique to a 
more radical point cannot alone explain the difference in Hegel and Adorno's 
positions. The difference is also philosophical. As I shall later argue, although 
Hegel begins with a critical procedure, determinate negation, this procedure is 
compromised by the limitations of his notion of the negation of the negation. In 
Hegel, negation always moves back to the positive. For example, the negation of 
one limited form of the market state (der Notstax) leads us to a more 
8 comprehensive idea of the rational state (der Staat). Adorno, however, takes as 
his starting point the negation of negative conditions and, as such, his thinking 
has far a more radical reach than Hegel's social theory. What allows Adorno to 
Hegel (1991) p. 267. 
'See, for example, Hegel (199 1) p. 275. 
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make this move, a move unavailable to Hegel, is that he is committed to the 
notion of social constitution. Critique, in Hegel, is always ultimately limited by 
the designs of Spirit, an autonomous source of content which is structured in 
terms of its formal-final cause. In Adorno, in contradistinction, critique is open- 
ended, as a consequence of his conunitment to social constitution.. 
As I have suggested, the idea of social constitution can be taken to express the 
simple idea that social forms owe their entire existence to the socio-practical 
activity of human beings. As a form of critique, it resists any tendency to view 
social forms as fixed, immutable or subject to laws outside the control of 
practical human activity. It identifies such tendencies with the condition of 
alienation - whereby the world is felt to operate in accordance with its own, 
independent logic. According to the idea of social constitution, however, the 
condition of alienation can itself be understood in terms of the societal 
mechanisms of inversion and reffication which characterise the capitalist social 
form. 
2) Social Autonomy and Liberal Autonomy 
Before proceeding, it is worth noting in more detail how such notions of social 
constitution and reconciliation sit in relation to the more dominant liberal 
tradition in political philosophy, in order to grasp what is at stake in a broader 
sense. On the one hand, it would appear that modern liberal thinking has been 
shaped by rejection of the very traditions (of German Idealism and Marxism) in 
which such notions are anchored. " This can be understood, in part, as a reaction 
against the grim record of 'really existing socialism' in the 20th Century. In the 
Two famous tracts in which such a rejection is made explicit are Berlin, 1. (1969) Four Essays 
on Liberty (Oxford, OUP) and Popper, K (1968) The Open Society and its Enemies (Routledge, 
London). 
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shadow of the gulags, all large-scale projects of societal transformation are cast 
as totalitarian. " Additionally, such a rejection must be understood against the 
backdrop of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the growing acceptance of 
economic liberalism and the lack of any apparent alternatives to global 
capitalism. 
If, negatively, liberalism has been characterised in terms of a suspicion of 
authoritarianism, positively, it has tended to be associated with a commitment to 
autonomy. Crudely understood, this has meant an understanding of freedom, as 
Hegel once remarked disapprovingly, as the freedom 'to do as one pleases'. " A 
free society is one in which governmental authority interferes as little as possible 
in the lives of its citizens and whereby individuals are able to pursue whatever 
lifestyle choices, desires or preferences they see fit, unless, of course, such 
actions cause readily identifiable damage to persons or property. 
This, of course, would be to oversimplify grossly. Firstly, the commitment to 
autonomy can be seen to overlap with the critical tradition via thinkers such as 
Kant and Fichte. If the claim of the minimal or negative notion of freedom is that 
it best allows people to spontaneously pursue their own desires and inclinations, 
then it must provide an account of whether or not such actions genuinely stem 
from the individual herself. There are many instances where we act not 
independently on the basis of our own authority but on the basis of social 
pressures, for example, the demands made upon us by the mass media, marketing 
strategists, advertisers, religious authorities, new age mystics and celebrity role 
'0 See, for example, Zizek, S. (2001) Did somebody say totalitarianism? : Five interventions in 
the (mis)use of a Notion (Verson, London) for a good account of the liberal manipulation of the 
cocnept of totalitarianism. 
" Hegel (199 1) The Philosophy ofRight (OUP, Oxford) p. 48. 
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models. Indeed, in a world in which we are constantly surrounded by such 
pressures, we must have reason to think that the desires and inclinations we 
pursue are 'our own' and that we act upon them for good reasons which we can 
make intelligible to ourselves and others. What we require is some form of 
reasoning process or a series of thought experiments that help us to determine 
whether or not we are the source of authority of our actions. Hence, freedom 
cannot be so easily separated from an account of rationality and we begin to push 
in the direction of a Kantian-Fichtean' notion of autonomy, if we think that it is 
something worth taking seriously. 
This commitment can be developed further: If freedom requires self- 
determination, or a certain critical orientation towards our impulses, desires and 
the social world in general, then an account must be given as to how social 
institutions and practices best nurture such a capacity in individuals. To take 
freedom seriously as a valuable (perhaps the most valuable) social goal, one 
must give a thicker account of the form of social organisation best placed to 
procure it. Such social forms must not only maintain and protect the practical 
operation of our freedom, for example, providing protection for civil liberties, or 
upholding due legal procedure. They must also provide a cultural environment in 
12 Kant and his successor Fichte share an understanding of autonomy that involves taking a 
particular stance towards ones contingent desires and inclinations. One is free only when on acts 
on the basis of reason, as to act on the basis of desire and inclination is a form of heteronomy. 
For Kant's account of freedom see Kant, 1. (1993) The Critique of Practical Reason (trans L. W. 
Beck) (Macmillian, New York). See also Kant, 1. (1964) and The Groundwork for the 
Metaphysics of Morals (tr. H. Paton) (HarperCollins, New York). For Fichte's account of 
autonomy see Fichte, G. (1982) The Science of Knowledge (tr. Heath and Lacks) (CUP, 
Cambridge). 
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which the goal of self-determination is socially and culturally instantiated. " At 
this point we are not far from a Hegelian account of social autonomy. 
Furthermore, many liberals envisage a fundamental role for society in 
guaranteeing the autonomy of individuals in that it must distribute wealth and 
resources such that people are not merely 'free' in the abstract (people are all 
technically 'free' to buy whatever is legally available on the market) but free in 
the sense that they can tangibly pursue their life projects on an equal footing. " 
However, such concerns tend to be confined to the sphere of distribution and 
circulation and do not touch the basis of production in alienated labour. Adopting 
the notions of social constitution and social autonomy allows us not only to 
" Much can be said by value pluralists to counter the idea that social institutions be responsible 
for nurturing such a thick notion of autonomy, particularly in that it does not recognise cultures 
or religious believers whose understanding of authority is incompatible with a strong notion of 
autonomy. I do not fully address this question in the thesis for a couple of reasons. Firstly, I take 
something of a Marxist view that such cultural or religious determinations are fluid and 
contingent upon relations of power and should never be essentialised. Marxists tend to treat the 
problem of cultural difference from the point of view of its potential transcendence - as 
something to be dissolved in the realisation of a common humanity. What this thesis is largely 
concerned with is how freedom is so integral to grasping what this common humanity might 
mean. Secondly, as I will argue, I take the Hegelian notion of freedom to be far richer and more 
inclusive than more narrowly liberal understandings of autonomy. 
14 Much can be said regarding the libertarian challenge to such egalitarian comn-titments as being 
illiberal, although the vast discussion of the relationship between social justice and freedom falls 
outside the scope of this thesis. For an important Libertarian critique of egalitarianism see 
Nozik, R. (1977) Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books, New York). For the classic liberal 
defence of egalitarianism see Rawls, J. (1972) A Theory of Justice (OUP, London). See also 
Barry, B. Justice as Impartiality. For a Marxist critique of Liberal egalitarianism see Calinicos, 
A. (2000) Equality (Malden, MA). 
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envisage possibilities beyond the relationship of wage labour but also underlines 
the ethical imperative for doing so. It is this concern with alienation in addition 
to social justice as a presupposition of autonomy that can be seen to a distinctive 
feature of the critical tradition. The claim is that freedom requires the existence 
of universally available meaningful and flourishing life projects through which 
we can freely establish our identities. If the roles we occupy are alienating and 
degrading then we will always see the world as a barrier to our sense of 
autonomy. If the social world provides us with a sense of recognition or self- 
worth then we take such a world to be facilitating our sense of autonomy. 
Thus, the idea of social autonomy can be taken to be a development of many of 
the themes of the liberal account of autonomy. Social autonomy requires (a) the 
legal and constitutional guarantee of our basic freedoms (b) a material basis for 
being able to pursue our life-projects (c) a capacity for identifying our drives and 
inclinations as our o" and (d) a form of social organisation that ethically 
engenders such a capacity but also that we have (e) the existence (and 
recognition) of meaningful goals, activities and exercises in self- development 
and creativity. If the world confronts us as degrading and alienating then we lose 
something very important in terms of human freedom. These various 
components go some way towards defining what an idea of social autonomy 
might look like, contra the minimal notion of negative liberty. However, if 
treated seriously, they also constitute a powerful ethical rejection of many 
16 
features of what has become Marxist orthodoxy. " The idea of social autonomy is 
as opposed to crude Marxist-Leninist collectivism as it is to liberal atomism. 
Firstly, the idea of social constitution excludes the possibility of substituting 
the self-activity of those in struggle with the operation of a revolutionary 
vanguard. Societal transformation cannot be imposed upon subjects, as it is only 
in self-activity that the 'spell' of reification is broken. Secondly, the ethical idea 
of social autonomy excludes the possibility of instrumentally suspending the 
commitment to self-determination in the name of revolution, for example, 
through 'democratic centralism' or calculated acts of terror or brutality. If we 
trace the origin of the concept from the Kantian Kingdom of Ends, through 
Hegel's commitment to the mutual acknowledgement of moral worth to Marx's 
critique of the devaluation of human dignity, a sharp contrast should be obvious 
to the trajectory of Marxist-Leninism. " 
3) Recent Developments in the Interpretation of Hegel 
Having given an initial outline of the problem and its relationship to the 
broader concerns of political philosophy, I now want to examine the relationship 
of this thesis to existing scholarship on both Hegel and Adorno, starting with 
Hegel. The interpretation and appropriation of Hegel's work is perhaps 
" For an examination of the role of ethics in orthodox Marxism see, for example, Lukes, S. 
(1985) Marx and Morality (OUP, Oxford), Buchanan, A. (1982) Marx and Justice: The Political 
Critique of Liberalism (Rowman and Littlefields, London), Plamenatz, J. (1975) Karl Marx's 
Philosophy of Man (OUP, Oxford), Wood, A. (1981) Karl Marx (Routledge, Keegan and Paul, 
London) and Geras, N. (1985)'Ibe controversy over Marx and Justice (New Left Review 158). 
16 See, for example, Lenin, V. I. (1966) 1920 Speech at the 3rd Komosal Congress, 2 Oct 1920 in 
Collected Worls Vol. 31 (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Progress Publishing, Moscow) 
and Trotsky, L., Dewey, J. And Novach, G. (1982) Their Morals and Ours (New York, 
Pathfinder). 
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unparalleled in the level of contention and controversy it arouses. Even in 
Hegel's own times, his adherents were split into conservative monarchists and 
theologians, on the one hand, and radical reformists, on the other, both of which 
saw Hegel as 'their man'. Since the emergence of Marxism, Hegel has largely 
been seen as a political reactionary whose most radical contribution to political 
thought was found in his contribution to logic (the dialectic) and not in his 
political philosophy. By the mid 20th Century, Hegel had been re-invented as a 
totalitarian menace, strongly attacked in two tracts that were to become 
canonical in the liberal response to totalitarianism. These are Berlin's 'Two 
concepts of Liberty' and Popper's 'Open Society and its Enemies'. " Such an 
interpretation, however, finds few adherents amongst Hegel scholars. " 
Furthermore, the image of Hegel as an apologist for Prussian despotism has now 
become something of a myth in the light of recent historical work. " As a 
consequence of this and of the decline of Marxism, interest has re-emerged in 
Hegel in his own right, particularly in the ethical foundations of his thinking. In 
terms of the re-introduction of Hegel into political philosophy we can think of 
Charles Taylor's Hegel and Modem Society and Allen Wood's Hegel's Ethical 
Thought" as ground breaking works. Both, instead of treating Hegel's political 
'7 Berlin, 1. (1969) For Essays on Liberty (Oxford, OUP). Popper, K. (1968) The Open Society 
and its Enermies (Routledge, London). 
" See Franco, P. (2000) Hegel's Philosophy of Freedom (Yale University Press, New Haven) p. 
180-82, Beiser (2005) Hegel (Routledge, London) p. 202-5 and Patten (1999) Hegel's Idea of 
Freedom (OUP, Oxford) p73-82 for some good responses to Berlin 
'9 See Beiser (2005) p219-223 
'0 Wood, A. (1990) Hegel's Ethical Thought (CUP, Cambridge). Taylor, C. (1979) Hegel and 
Modem Society (CUP, Cambridge). 
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philosophy as some sort of throwback from nineteenth century Prussia, treat the 
ethical foundations of Hegel's thinking seriously and analytically. 
Within the last decade, a number of important contributions have been made to 
the understanding of Hegel's political philosophy, particularly focusing on the 
notions of reconciliation and freedom. Hardimon's Hegel's Social Philosophy : 
The Project of Reconciliation" takes on the widespread belief that the idea of 
reconciliation is inherently conservative, with the project of making us feel 'at 
home in the world' being simply a means of adjusting us to existing structures of 
power instead of providing us with a basis for criticism. Hegel is, instead, 
presented as being engaged in a type of inu-nanent critique, holding institutions 
and practices up to account in terms of the conspicuous ethical standards to 
which they appeal. That Hegel refuses to posit any basis for ethical criteria 
outside actually lived social practices does not mean that he is a political 
reactionary. 
Following from this work, a number of others have attempted to grapple with 
Hegel's understanding of reconciliation, only strategically choosing to adopt the 
language of freedom due to the conservative connotations of the idea of 
reconciliation. 22 Alan Patten's Hegel's Idea of Freedom' adopts a strongly 
Kant ian-Fichtean interpretation of Hegel, although he also stresses Hegel's 
uniqueness in terms of the emphasis he places on recognition and Bildung as 
necessary pre-requisites for freedom. Furthermore, Patten's 'civic humanist' 
reading of Hegel offers a direct challenge to more entrenched understandings of 
" Hardimon, Michael (1994) Hegel's Social Philosophy, The Project of Reconciliation 
(Cambridge, CUP) 
22 Neuhouser, F. (2000) Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory (Harvard, Cambridge) p. 3. 
23 Patten, Alan (1999) Hegel's Idea of Freedom (Oxford, OUP). 
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his work, namely readings of Hegel as a conventionalist, historicist or as a 
metaphysical mystic. Covering much of the same ground, although addressed 
more in terms of social theory, is Fredrick Neuhouser's Foundations of Hegel's 
Social Theory, Actualising Freedom. "' Neuhouser gives an impressive account of 
the ethical basis of Hegel's notion of freedom qua reconciliation, stressing the 
vital importance of our roles within social institutions as being a source of our 
identities and self-worth. Finally, and of particular interest, is Dudley Knowles' 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Right' a work which, written from more of a 
moral philosophy standpoint, manages to do a great deal of justice to the 
complexity of Hegel's conception of freedom. In such works, amongst others, 
Hegel is taken to have much to say in terms of debates in contemporary political 
philosophy, in areas such as the balancing of rights and social obligations, the 
relationship between particular identities and universal citizenship and civic 
participation and education. 
Whilst these texts have done much to promote Hegel from the realm of 
historical curiosity to a figure with much to add to contemporary debates in 
political philosophy, I still take there to be problems in terms of how Hegel can 
'speak' to us arising from the nature of the world in which he wrote. Firstly, 
when Hegel was writing, capitalism was very much in its infancy. This makes 
his insistence that the realm of civil society' could remain distinct and bounded, 
" Neuhouser, F. (2000). 
" Knowles, D. (2002) Hegel and the Philosophy of Right (Routledge, London). 
26 Hegel means something very different by 'civil society' compared to our contemporary 
understanding. Civil society essentially refers to the market, whereby individuals, whilst working 
on the basis of self-interest, come to meet common need. 71bis term contrasts with the state, 
which, for Hegel, is established upon the idea of citizenship. Citizenship, for Hegel, is based 
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alongside the distinct realms of the private sphere and the state, appear rather 
naYve. Since Hegel's day we have seen the emergence of mass industrial 
capitalism and a corresponding decline in traditional social bonds. This has 
created immense challenges for any ethical project of reconciliation. Secondly, 
the world in which Hegel lived was one of expectation and optimism, situated in 
the aftermath of a wave of revolutionary activity across Europe. In the world in 
which we find ourselves now, such faith is more ambiguous. We know that 
modernity has provided us with the means to cure previously incurable diseases, 
provide universal education, feed and shelter the global population etc. but also 
that such things are systematically denied to vast sections of the global 
population. Moreover, the 20' century is littered with examples of obscene 
brutality and violence, from the holocaust to the genocide in Rwanda. As I have 
suggested, it is the viability of the pursuit of reconciliation after Auschwitz that 
is the subject of this thesis, something which has not explicitly been addressed in 
the literature. 
4) Recent Developments in the Interpretation of Adorno 
The interpretation and appropriation of Adorno's work has also undergone a 
considerable shift. Initially, Adorno was regarded as inseparable from the 
Marxist Tradition in general and the Frankfurt School specifically. The work of 
the Frankftirt School responded to many of the challenges facing the progressive 
left of its time, situated in the context of the rise and fall of fascism in Europe, 
the horrors of 'really existing socialism' and the growing acceptance of 
consumer capitalism by the western populace. The interdisciplinary approach of 
the Frankfurt School, drawing upon disciplines which were hitherto not usually 
upon a self-conscious identification with the state as serving the public good. See Patten (1999) 
p. 167-76 for an interesting discussion of this distinction. 
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associated with Marxism, such as psychoanalysis, literary criticism and 
aesthetics, attempted to find new resources to face down such challenges. " 
Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment" was widely distributed 
around European universities during the political tumult of 1968 and is also 
credited with significantly influencing the US 'New-Left'. " However, such an 
appropriation should strike one as immediately odd. Is Adorno not the figure 
who once declared that he had no interest in political activity because he was 
'too fat'? 30 It is difficult to think of an individual less at home amid the political 
radicalism of 1968 than Adorno, who was often portrayed as a rather miserable, 
self-indulgent aesthete. Of all the members of the Frankfurt School, Adorno 
would appear to be the furthest removed from anything approaching the 
traditional left, given his trenchant critique of Enlightenment scientism, his 
27 For a seminal account of the history of the Frankfurt School see Wiggershaus, Rolf (1994) The 
Frankfurt School Its I-listory, Theories and Political Significance translated by Michael Robertson 
(Polity, Cambridge). 
2' Adorno, Theodor Wiesengrund and Horkheimer, Max (1997) Dialectic of Enlightenment 
translated by John Cumming (Verso, London). 
29 See Rorty, R. (2004) The Oversimplification of Politics in Delanty, G. (ed. ) Theodor W 
Adorno (Sage, London) 
30 'Adorno had a genius for finding general reasons for doing what he wanted to do and not 
doing things he wanted to avoid, although sometimes even he seemed to be scraping the bottom 
of the barrel of his theoretical imagination as when at one point in the 1960s he claimed he could 
not take part in a political demonstration because he was too fat' Geuss (1999) p. 103. 
31 Particularly Adorno (2004) and Adorno (1997). 
3032 See Hullot-Kentor, (1989) p372-377. Hullot-Kentor, in his historical account of the 
reception of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, accuses Habermas of being responsible for many 
misconceptions of the text and its authorship, largely in order to preserve his own self-perceived 
role as torch-holder of the enlightenment. 
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seemingly elitist dismissal of mass culture and his scepticism towards any form 
of political organisation. 
Indeed, we are confronted with a puzzle here as it is Adorno who seems to be 
the only Frankfurt school member who has enjoyed something of a renaissance 
in the past decade whilst figures such as Marcuse tend to be treated very much as 
'of their time'. I suggest that there are a number of reasons why interest in 
Adorno has increased. Firstly, better translations of texts into English have made 
Adorno more approachable by scholars outside the German speaking world, " 
contributing to the growth of Adorno scholarship in the US and UK. Secondly, 
better interpretative work and scholarship has helped to reclaim Adorno from the 
overly simplistic caricature of an obscurantist and elitist aesthete. Much of the 
blame for such a caricature lies with Jurgen Habermas and the second generation 
Frankfurt School, for whom it was important to mark out the communicative turn 
as the true inheritance of the aims of critical theory in contrast to the aestheticism 
of the first generation, for which the blame was left at Adorno's door. " Thirdly, 
much of the recent work on Adorno has focused on his contribution to 'ethics', 
an area of his thought which had been previously neglected. Adorno's work on 
ethics can be seen to have a great deal of import into contemporary ethical 
debates, dealing primarily with the predominance of mutual indifference. 
Adorno's ethics is always present yet rarely expressed systematically or 
directly. It is rumoured that Adorno intended to complete a volume on ethics 
alongside Negative Dialectics and aesthetic theory to create a trilogy to mirror 
Kants's three critiques, but the accuracy of such claims is unclear. His published 
31 
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Lectures on Moral Philosophy" discuss everything but moral philosophy and 
when Adorno is addressing explicitly moral questions, for example our response 
to Auschwitz, his argumentation is always suggestive rather than direct and the 
presentation seemingly chaotic and fragmented. " Recent work has focused on 
deciphering Adorno's ethics through an understanding of his epistemology rather 
than look for any explicit references in his work. " As I will latter argue, it is in 
33 
34 33 Adorno's style or means of philosophical intervention can only be understood in relation to 
his claim, in Negative Dialectics, that concepts as ordinarily used distort or mask social reality. 
Thus, his aim is to provide a mode of presentation that can properly articulate or at least strive to 
articulate a non-reffied relationship of thought with its object. This leads Adorno to prioritise this 
objective over and above ease of communication - 'Truth is objective, not plausible' Adorno 
(1973) p. 42. Perhaps one of the most commonly used devices in Adorno's presentation is 
parataxis - the positioning of often extreme propositions in a manner which does not indicate 
relations of integration or subordination between them. 'Ibis means of presentation evades or 
circumscribes the conceptual domination of the object by positioning concepts in a 
'constellation' whereby each exists unsubordinated to the other. 
" See Bernstein, J. (2001) Adorno - Disenchantment and Ethics (Cambridge: CUP), Bernstein, J. 
(2004) Negative Dialectic as Fate: Adorno and Hegel in The Cambridge Companion to Adorno 
(CUP, Cambridge), Finlayson, Gordon (2002) Adorno on the Ethical and the Ineffable in 
European Journal of Philosophy (Volume 10: Number 1), Menke, C. (2004) Genealogy and 
Critique - Two Forms of Ethical Questioning of Morality in The Cambridge Companion to 
Adorno (CUP, Cambridge), Schweppenhauser, G. (2004) Adorno's Negative Moral Philosophy 
in The Cambridge Companion to Adorno (CUP, Cambridge), Pritchard, E. (2004) Bilderverbot 
Meets Body in Adorno's Inverse 7heology in Delanty, G. (ed. ) Theodor W. Adorno (Sage, 
London). 
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the critique of identity thinking, a rigid and formalised imposition of concepts 
onto objects, that Adorno's ethics lies, for it is this form of conceptualisation that 
is responsible for undermining our ability to respond ethically to one another. 
This capacity, for Adorno, is located in bodily empathy for the suffering of 
others. In situating our capacity for ethical responses in a bodily, felt notion of 
Solidarity, Adorno is implicitly criticising rule based and formalistic notions of 
morality. Part of the object of this thesis is to make some of Adorno's ethical 
claims more explicit, especially in relationship to ideas of freedom and 
autonomy. 
5) Outline of Thesis 
I want to begin the thesis with a critical exegesis of Hegel's idea of 'Spirit'. 
Hegel's concept of 'Spirit' is key to grasping both his understanding of 
constitution and agency and his notion of freedom as reconciliation. I begin by 
outlining the problems that the concept of 'Spirit' is intended to address. These 
can be taken to be the wounds that have emerged in the process of modernity, the 
schism between human beings and nature, human reason and desire and 
individuals and society. In addressing Hegel's response to such schisms, I want 
to emphasise the metaphysical aspects of Hegel's thinking and cast doubt upon 
non-metaphysical interpretations of Spirit, which simply treat it as a synonym for 
society. I argue that Hegel's understanding of Spirit is, firstly, grounded in an 
idiosyncratic reading of Christianity, secondly, that it is rigidly teleological and, 
thirdly, that it relies upon a mystical form of experience in order to be 
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comprehended from the inside. In emphasising such aspects, I highlight some of 
the potential risks involved in Adorno's attempts to put Hegel back on his feet. 
In Chapter Two, I move more specifically to the ethical and political dimension 
of Hegel's thinking and examine the notion of reconciliation (or social 
autonomy). This chapter is broken down into examinations of subjective and 
objective freedom. Under the heading of subjective freedom, I examine what a 
'free attitude' entails in relation to both our desires and inclinations and the roles 
we fulfil in the world. Under the heading of objective freedom, I examine the 
formative processes embedded in Hegel's conception of 'ethical life', paying 
particular attention to the role of institutions and practices in securing and 
nurturing mutual recognition. According to Hegel, the key institutions of ethical 
life, the family, civil society and the state, in conjunction, allow for individuals 
to obtain recognition of different aspects of their personhood. 
This chapter develops three of the central themes running through the thesis, 
the relationship between impulse and reason, the notion of 'mutual recognition' 
and the concept of Bildung. If Chapter One highlighted some of the risks 
involved in appealing to Hegel, this chapter, operating at the level of his social 
and political thinking, presents Hegel as a more fruitful a resource for 
understanding human freedom. However, ultimately, Hegel's thinking can be 
seen to be compromised by the absence of a critique of capitalism. It is here 
where Adorno steps in. 
In Chapter Three, I begin to render problematic Hegel's schema, both at the 
political and metaphysical levels. Firstly, I want to claim that Hegel's inability to 
develop a critique of capitalism severely weakens his case that the institutions of 
ethical life can provide for freedom in a meaningful sense. Secondly, pace 
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Adorno, I want to claim that this is not merely a problem with Hegel's politics 
but a problem with his metaphysical starting point. As Adorno argues, the logic 
of the development of Hegel's Spirit is analogous to the logic of capital 
accumulation. Hegel's system is read as a sedimented expression of the labour- 
capital relationship, which is antithetical to human emancipation. However, it is 
precisely by modelling his understanding of capital relations upon Hegel's 
absolute that Adorno articulates his own critique of capitalism. Features which 
Adorno identifies with Hegel, for example, the inversion of constitutem. and 
constituems or the disavowal of particularity, " are not read simply as mistakes 
on Hegel's part but as insights into the mechanism of capital accumulation. More 
specifically, it is through this analogy that Adorno develops his own notion of 
social constitution. 
In Chapter Four, I develop Adorno's notion of social constitution more closely 
by focusing upon his critique of 'identity thinking'. I read this critique largely as 
a means to undermine reified forms of thought and understanding, which treat 
social relations as fixed and immutable. To begin with, I deal with some key 
objections to Adorno's critique of identity thinking from the second generation 
Frankfurt School. For such thinkers, the scope of Adorno's critique is so broad as 
to undermine its very foundation. To counter these claims, I defend Adorno's 
version of immanent critique (itself developed through Hegel) and take his critics 
to task for relying upon precisely the sort of transcendental claims that Adorno's 
thinking seeks to undermine. In the remainder of the chapter I examine some of 
the models Adorno develops to undern-dne identity thinking, with particular 
reference to the influence of Walter Benjamin. Although I argue that Benjamin is 
hugely influential upon Adorno in this respect, Adorno's Hegelianism ultimately 
36 See Chapter Three, section 3.2. 
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shines through in chastisement of Benjamin for lacking a Hegelian account of 
mediation. 
The final chapter attempts to more closely tie together the notions of social 
constitution and reconciliation with which I began. I do so by exarnining 
Adorno's response to the traditional philosophical oppositions of nature and 
culture (or reason and impulse). I argue that Adorno adds a materialist inflection 
to the idea of social constitution in seeking to undern-dne such oppositions. In 
one sense, this sets him apart from Hegel, although his dialectical understanding 
of nature and culture is of an Hegelian form. In 'bringing nature back in' Adorno 
also develops a notion of reconciliation qua solidarity, whereby our ethical 
responses to one another are rooted in an ability to somatically register the 
neediness and vulnerability of others. This idea of solidarity can be understood 
as tying together the ideas of social constitution and reconciliation. 
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Reconciliation and SpIffit 
1) Introduction 
This chapter begins to map out what is at stake for Adorno in developing a 
notion of social-constitution through the critique of Hegel's metaphysics. I focus 
here on the central concept of Hegel's metaphysics, Spirit, which is also the most 
contested notion in Hegel's thinking, interpreted as anything from God itself 
through to social relations. " Hegel scholars are faced with a dilemma in this 
respect. Either one can to try to make Hegel's thinking intelligible without the 
metaphysics, in which case the result is often something quite vacuous, or else 
one can embrace Hegel's system and run the risk of leaping into what Michael 
Rosen describes as a 'neo-platonic fantasy'. " The account I provide here is 
sceptical of non-metaphysical interpretations of Hegel and argues that Spirit is, 
firstly, irreducibly theological, secondly, restrictively teleological and, thirdly, 
reliant upon a mystical form of experience in order to comprehend it from the 
inside. By interpreting Hegel in this way, I highlight the risks of appropriating 
Hegel's metaphysical categories for Adorno's philosophy of social constitution. 
However, whilst stressing such risks, this chapter also has the function of 
introducing many of the Hegelian categories and concepts that I will later take to 
be essential to Adorno's own development of the notion of dialectic. How 
Adorno can reconcile the adoption of such critical tools with their mystical roots 
is the subject of later chapters. 
To begin with, I want to look at the problems which Hegel's ontological 
category of Spitit is intended to resolve. I want to contextualise the concept of 
37 See Taylor, C. (1975) for the former view and Patten (1999) for the latter view. 
38 Rosen, M. (1982) Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism Cambridge (CUP, Cambridge) p179. 
Spirit as a response to a number of conflicts facing modern subjects, namely 
conflicts between man and nature, reason and desire and individual and society. 
Each of these conflicts, as I will later argue, can be taken to be of equal concern 
to Adorno. Hegel's response to such schisms is to understand finite human 
subjects in terms of a wider framework, as vehicles of infinite Spirit. It is only at 
this level that the conflicts of modernity can be resolved. In order to provide a 
richer account of this notion I want to draw on its religious, romantic and 
organicist sources. Understanding such sources also highlights some of the more 
mystical underpinnings of Hegel's metaphysics. Following on from this 
discussion, I will focus upon Hegel's account of the development of Spirit 
towards full self-consciousness of itself by looking at the notions of 'deterrninate 
negation' and 'rational necessity'. Against many interpreters of Hegel, I argue 
that Hegel employs a restrictively strong sense of rational necessity. I move on to 
examine the retrospective character of Hegel's philosophy and its implications 
for an account of subjectivity, highlighting the difference between it and both 
Marxist and liberal notions of subjectivity. Next, I examine Rosen's claim that 
Hegel's system is only intelligible by an appeal to a decidedly mystical form of 
experience. " In conclusion, I look at the manner in which the notion of Spirit 
(properly understood) can be said to reconcile some of the conflicts I identified 
as facing the modern subject. 
2) Hegel's account of Subjectivity 
Essential to Hegel's project is a drive towards overcoming various oppositions 
that have emerged following the break up of the expressive unity of the ancient 
Greek polis. Given the ineluctable development of the principle subjectivity in 
and through the emergence of Christianity, we have become divided from nature, 
39Rosen (1982) p. 179. 
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both internal and external, from community and from cosmic Spirit (or fate). ' 
Hegel's project, broadly speaking, involves reconciling such oppositions whilst 
retaining the consciousness of differentiation, which is an inevitable 
consequence of the break down of ancient Greek ethical life. In his attempts to 
do so, Hegel weaves a course in between the romantic desire for unity and the 
Kantian-Fichtean trajectory of radical autonomy. 
What, then, are these oppositions? Firstly, external nature is no longer seen as 
possessing or expressing any purpose or idea. Instead, following Kant, it is the 
human mind that imposes any such form upon external nature. All we can know 
is things as experienced by the human mind, with nature in-itself placed in the 
noumenal realm. A schism thus opens up between the human mind on one side 
(which structures and organises a sensory manifold in accordance with its own 
necessary form) and raw nature itself. " This sets in motion a further opposition 
between the nature of the human mind as having to know its object thoroughly 
and its establishment of limits upon what is knowable, lirnits which can easily 
' Taylor (1975) Ch 1.2. 
"This schism is one of the prime concerns of the German romantics, whom sought reconciliation 
with sensuous nature. Take this example from Schiller's God's of Greece: 
When poetry's magic cloak, 
Still with delight enfolded truth, 
Life's fullness flowed through creation, 
And there felt what never more will feel, 
Man acknowledged a higher nobility in nature, 
To press her to loves breast; 
Everything to the initiates eye, 
Showed the trace of God. 
Taken from Ferber, M. (2006) European Romantic Poetry (Mishawaka, IN) 
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slip into a form of scepticism. ' Secondly, we experience a division between our 
own internal drives and desires (our internal nature) and the demands of reason. 
We want to pursue the noble ideals of the Enlightenment, coldly derived from 
logic and reason against the pull of obscurantism and irrationalism, yet we also 
want to do so on the basis of motives and desires that stem from ourselves. 
However, this would mean taking our own natural drives and desires as 
authoritative, being governed by nature and not by reason. " Thirdly, the demand 
for autonomy stands us against society and community, whose authority is no 
longer seen as immutable. However, given that such a notion of autonomy is 
itself a product of Bildung (the thick, cultural aspirations which are socially 
nurtured); the undermining of community authority is itself an undern-dning of 
the principle of autonorny. ' As I will later argue, we can understand Hegel's 
idea of Spirit as a response to these diremptions. 
In order to understand this move, it is necessary to understand more precisely 
how Hegel conceives of the subject more generally. Charles Taylor claims that 
"' This was the distinction drawn by Kant and a primary focus of Hegel's criticism. See Kant 
(1969) The Critique of Pure Reason translated by Norman Kemp-Smith (St. Martin, New York) 
p. 27. For Hegel's response to the noumena-phenomena distinction see, for example, Hegel 
(1977) plO. I elaborate this response in section 3.1. 
" Again, Kant is the focus here, this time the (1993) Critique of Practical Reason which deals 
with the practical operation of morality. Kant thinks that we act freely and morally only when 
following reason alone and raising ourselves above our contingent desires and inclinations. I deal 
with Hegel's response to this claim in detail in Chapter Two. 
" This tension was explored at great length by political philosophers of many persuasions of 
which Hegel was aware and eager to challenge. These include contractarians (for example 
Hobbes and Locke in the UK and Rousseau in France), German romantics (for example Schiller, 
and Novalis) in addition to Kant and Fichte. 
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Hegel draws upon both Aristotle and Herder in his conception of subjectivity. 
From Aristotle, he takes the notion of human beings as a 'self- organising, self- 
maintaining form', ' which can only operate in material embodiment. This is a 
radically anti-dualistic conception of human beings. It denies that there is any 
domain of 'the mind' into which we may withdraw, free from embodiment in our 
animality. However, whereas it may be plausible to think of human beings as 
material and yet, in adapting to particular surroundings, demonstrating features 
we normally associate with 'mind' (i. e. intelligence or merely purpose), the 
Aristotelian notion of form is very limited. It is difficult to think that 
mathematics, logic, or problems in moral philosophy, for example, could be seen 
as embodied in any way in our animality. Here, Taylor claims, Hegel turns to 
Herder. ' Thought, it is argued, must be embodied in an external medium, for 
example language or art. Not only is thought impossible without language (or 
any other medium) but the medium itself is inseparable from the content it 
expresses. Hegel does not, Taylor argues, distinguish between what is added by 
the content of pure Thought and what is added by its mode of expression. This 
45 Taylor (1975) p. 8 1. 
' See Herder (2002) Treatise on the Origin of Language in Philosophical Writings (CUP, 
Cambridge) p65-166. 'Without language the human being has no reason and without reason no 
language' p9l. Michael Rosen challenges Taylor's interpretation of Hegel as having directly 
absorbed Herder's views on language into his thinking. Taylor is claiming that, for Hegel, (1) 
That there is no thought without language and (2) that thought is shaped by its medium. Rosen 
argues that Hegel accepts the former claim but is opposed to the latter. According to Rosen, 
Hegel thinks that Thought is logically independent of its embodiment and that Spirit has its own 
element. As he argues, 'Only by withdrawing into this realm of truth can Spirit attain free self- 
realisation'. Taylor (1975) p. 85. 
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&expressionist' notion of the subject, therefore, retains the anti-dualism of 
Aristotle by denying the existence of a realm of pure Thought outside its 
necessarily embodied existence. 
How then are we to understand this relation to nature? If Taylor is right, Hegel 
thinks that human beings should be seen as a totality but a radically different 
totality to an amoeba or a sheep, for example. That we have reflective 
consciousness radically impacts upon our natural drives and instincts, just as our 
material form is the condition of possibility of consciousness itself. In this sense 
we are a symbiotic totality. On the other hand we are at the top of a hierarchy of 
self-consciousness, which, perhaps, descends through primates and dolphins to 
amoebas. There is a hierarchy of different totalities. 
Hegel, however, adds a new element to this picture from Kantian idealism, that 
of consciousness requiring a constant struggle to extricate itself from nature. 
Reason requires a self-sufficiency of thinking, which involves separating oneself 
off from ones inclinations and desires. As Taylor argues: 
The thinking rational subject can only exist as embodied. In this sense we can truly say that the 
subject is his embodiment ... And yet at the same time this embodiment 
in life has a tendency to 
carry us along the stream of inclination, of impulse towards unreflecting unity within ourselves 
and with nature. Reason has to struggle against this in order to realise itself, And in this sense his 
embodiment is not only other than the thinking rational subject, but in a sense his opposite, his 
limit, his opponent. ' 
3) The Supra-Individual Nature of Subjectivity 
Hegel attempts to resolve this conflict in appealing to a wider, rational plan 
underlying nature. Humans have to be conceived not as separate finite units but 
of vehicles of infinite Spirit. By understanding themselves in this way they are 
Taylor (1975) p. 83. 
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reconciled with the external world, their own nature, and their community. 
Individuals, therefore, have to cultivate their own nature to tune it to the 
demands of reason, on the basis of understanding themselves as the embodiment 
of infinite Spirit. Simultaneously, they must preserve the consciousness of the 
division that set in motion the demand for reconciliation in the first place, as it is 
only through the collapse of the original unity and the emergence of subjectivity 
that the terms of such reconciliation could be established. 
This conception of subjectivity can be seen in opposition to that of Kant. In 
Kant, the content or material synthesized by the subject is always viewed as 
external to the subject itselO The subject is seen as ordering or subsuming an 
external sensuous manifold. For Hegel, the Idea (as we shall see) is constitutive 
of content itself That subject is constitutive or creative of the underlying 
structure of reality entails that it is necessarily supra individual. However, as I 
will argue, rather than identify this supra-individual subject with the collective 
activity of flesh-and-blood human beings, as is the case in the Marxist tradition, 
Spirit, for Hegel, is an autonomous source of content. Before dealing more 
thoroughly with the notion of Spirit I want to, firstly, give a brief genealogical 
account of the evolution of the concept in terms of some of Hegel's broader 
concerns. To this end, I will briefly examine Hegel's work on love, his organicist 
naturphilosophie, and his religious thought in order to place the idea of Spirit in 
a broader context. In all these cases, Spirit can be understood as a philosophical 
response to the problem of alienation, as a form of reconciliation between man 
and man, man and nature and man and God. 
48 Kant (1969) p. 5 1. 
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3.1) Some Background Themes 
3.1.1) Love 
In the 'Spirit of Christianity', Hegel describes love in terms of 'pure subject- 
object identity'. ' In loving someone, one looses something of ones self in 
committing to the other, only to find oneself as part of a greater whole. 
Furthermore, although love involves a kind of abandonment to the other, it also 
involves a kind of mutual recognition, 'a recognition of the independence of 
each partner. What is thus gained by such abandonment is a rediscovery of 
oneself through the other and a form of recognition of independence. 
Hegel takes this to be archetypal for his idea of freedom as reconciliation. " As 
we shall see in Chapter Two, reconciliation involves a process in which the self 
ceases to define itself in opposition to others but, instead, comes to see itself as 
dependent upon a greater whole. The self sees this greater whole as constitutive 
of its identity and self- understanding rather than an external threat to its 
existence. It is clear that Hegel is thinking not only of love in its romantic form, 
but also in terms of Christian love for ones brethren. Hegel takes Christianity, 
understood highly idiosyncratically, to be key to motivating his contemporaries 
to reconcile themselves to the po st-revo lutio nary world. 
4' Hegel, G. (1948) Early Theological Writings (University of Chicago Press, Chicago) p. 308. 
50 'The family, as the immidiate substantiality of mind, is specifically charecterised by love, 
which is mind's feeling of its own unity. Hence in a family, one's frame of mind is to have self- 
consciousness of one's individuality within this unity as the absolute essence of oneself, with the 
result that one is in it not as an independent person but as a member' Hegel, G. W. F. (1991) p. 
110. 
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... terms that appear initially to be bound together are in fact not alien to one another; instead, 
they are moments of one whole each of which, being related to the other, is at home with itself, 
andgoes together with itself. 'Hegel (1991) p. 232. Also see Hegel (1969) p. 603. 
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There are, however, differences between the description of love in the Spirit of 
Christianity and the notion of reconciliation in Hegel's latter works, developed at 
the level of Hegel's metaphysics in the Phenomenology and Logic and at the 
political level in the Philosophy of Right. Firstly, the Spirit of Christianity is 
written at a time when Hegel's metaphysics takes an avowedly mystical turn. 
Love, at that point, is something that cannot be grasped discursively. As a 
mysterious and ideal form of reconciliation, it cannot be comprehended by the 
(Kantian) Understanding, which divides and analyses. In later works, " whilst 
maintaining that love cannot be grasped by the Understanding, Hegel argues that 
it can be grasped by the faculty of Reason, which transcends the limitations of 
the Understanding. Secondly, in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel abandons his 
description of love as a relationship of equality, instead arguing that men are 
calculating and rational whereas women are intuitive and impulsive and hence 
not on an equal footing. " Thirdly, Hegel, in the Philosophy of Right, demotes the 
importance of love to its role in the family. Love, here, is seen as a inchoate form 
of reconciliation, expressed more self-consciously through the notion of mutual 
recognition which is inscribed into the roles and interrelation of subjects in 
ethical life. " Despite these changes, however, the 'gain- through-submissio n' that 
is achieved in Love provides an important analogy for Hegel's broader concern 
" See, for example, Hegel, (199 1) p. 26-7. 
53 , ... [Mlan has his actual substantive life 
in the state, in learning, and so forth, as well as in 
labour and struggle with the external world .... Woman, on the other hand, has her substantive 
destiny in the familly, and to be imbued with family piety is her ethical frame of mind. ' Hegel 
(199 1) p. 114. 
54 Note that the discussion of love in the Philosophy of Right is confined to the section on family 
life. Hegel (1991) pp. 199-208. In an addition to 158, Hegel differentiates between conscious 
unity (in the state) and unity based on feeling (in the family) p. 199. 
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with reconciliation and provides some initial indicators as to what the notion of 
Spirit may amount to. Freedom, for Hegel, is realised only in understanding 
oneself as being part of a larger entity, as vehicles of Spirit. 
3.1.2) Organicism 
Another important strand of influence upon Hegel's notion of Spirit is the 
organicist tradition, which was of great significance as a movement against 
mechanism in the late 18th century, and absorbed by romantic thinkers such as 
Novalis, Schelling and H61derlin. " Organicism can be defined in terms of two 
main features. Firstly, whereas mechanism explains events only in terms of one 
body acting upon another, as an external chain of causality, organicism takes 
cause and effect to be internally related. Hence, organicism takes living beings to 
be self-organising and self- generating. Furthermore, organisms develop in 
accordance with their formal-final cause i. e. they are structured teleologically. 
Secondly, the adoption of the Aristotelian notion of a formal-final cause means 
that an organism has to be understood as a totum, in which the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts, rather than a compositum, in which the parts precede 
the whole. The whole is not reducible to its embodiments but is their foundation, 
source and substance. Beiser" qualifies this distinction in an important respect 
by arguing that, for Hegel, the whole is only prior in the order of explanation and 
55 For a good overview of German Romanticism see Beiser, F. (2003) The Romantic Imperative 
(Harvard, Cambridge), Beiser, F. (1996) The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics 
(CUP, Cambridge). For opposing accounts of Hegel's affiliation with romanticism see Pinkhard 
(2000) Hegel: A Biography (CUP, Cambridge) p. 77 and Beiser (2005) p34-6. For a sympathetic 
account of Hegel's naturphilosophie see Houlgate, S. (1998) Hegel and the Philosophy of Nature 
(Sunny Press, Albany). 
" Beiser (2005), p56-7 
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not existence. To determine what a thing is we understand it in terms of 
universals, in order to define its nature or essence. Such an essence or purpose 
only comes into existence, however, through the immanent development of the 
thing. 
It should be obvious why this holistic way of thinking would have appealed to 
Hegel, whose main concern is the estrangement of man from nature and man 
from man. Organicism conceives of all living things as internally structured 
organisms and, moreover, conceives of the natural world as a whole (including 
human beings) as a complex organism. However, despite its appeal for Hegel, it 
was not a way of thinking that he adopted uncritically. Hegel was well aware of 
Kant's sceptical arguments against organicism in the Critique of Judgement" and 
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made great efforts to distance himself from its extremes. Firstly, Hegel did not 
think that ascribing a purpose to all living things meant ascribing intentionality. 
It is perfectly possible to ascribe a formal-final cause to an organism without 
assuming intention on its part. Secondly, Hegel rejected many of the animist or 
vitalist associations of organicism, for example, the idea of a supernatural force 
or agency running though nature. Most importantly, Hegel, unlike Schelling, 
resisted the naturalistic tendencies of organicism. Whilst he thought of human 
subjectivity as something arising though and within nature, Hegel emphasised 
those realms most associated with self-consciousness and reflection (politics, 
culture and art) as being the highest level of development and organization of 
nature. As I suggest in the section on necessity, Hegel takes such capacities for 
human freedom and self-reflection to be the highest stage in the organization and 
development of nature. However, he marries this prizing of subjectivity and 
" Kant (1987) Critique of Judgement translated by W. S. Pluhar (Hackett, Indianapolis) § 64-5. 
51 See Beiser p. 95-103 for a detailed discussion of Kant's argument and Hegel's response. 
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freedom with an organicist conception of necessity, whereby such development 
inheres within the form of nature itself. Of central importance for Hegel is the 
potential that organicism offers in overcoming Kant's dualism of the nournenal 
and phenomenal realms. Whereas Kant distinguishes between the noumenal 
realm of reason and the phenomenal realm of cause and effect, or between the 
ideal and the empirical, the notion of organicism. suggests that the ideal form is 
inherent in the matter itself. 
Understanding Hegel's organicist world-view, therefore, can be seen to 
contribute two important dimensions to our understanding of the notion of Spirit. 
Firstly, Spirit must be understood as a complex organism in which individual 
moments are internally related to each other. Furthermore, the whole, upon 
which individual moments depend, is greater than the sum of its parts. Secondly, 
Spirit moves teleologically in accordance with its formal-final cause. 
3.1.3) Religion 
The final contributing factor to the development of Hegel's notion of Spirit 
which I want to examine is the religious dimension. " This is the area which is 
most problematic for those who want to develop non-metaphysical readings of 
Hegel. " I suggested above, that Hegel sees the Christian religion as an important 
vehicle for bringing about reconciliation between man and world. There is a 
certain amount of expediency in this belief, as it appears that this is only the case 
in the absence of there being any other major belief system in place capable of 
appealing to the heart and imagination of the Prussian masses. Hegel makes 
"61 See Beiser Ch 4, Stern pp190-194 and Pinkard pp 221-68 for a fuller discussion of Hegel's 
relationship to Christianity. 
60 See, for example, Patten (1999) p. 16-27. 
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many criticisms of Christianity in his writings, making one question whether 
there is anything Christian about his theological views at all. Firstly, he claims 
that the charitable imperatives of Christianity undermine property relations. " 
Secondly, he argues that the teachings of Jesus require people to become 
followers or disciples rather than discover truth for themselves. It is Socrates, not 
Jesus, who is the better exemplar of morality. " Thirdly, Hegel takes the 
Christian notion of brethren to be too exclusive to apply to the whole human 
race. Fourthly, for Hegel, Christians are archetypal of the 'beautiful soul', " 
preferring to abstain from getting their hands dirty and making difficult 
compromises and instead opting to condemn from above. 
The most fundamental critique of Christianity, however, is of its idea of a 
transcendent God. Christianity can only conceive of the highest good as 
something beyond the world, outside and above the earthy city of disease and 
corruption. Indeed, rather than be a vehicle for reconciliation, Christianity has 
served as a vehicle for alienation, projecting notions of the good into a 
transcendent realm rather than endeavouring to create 'heaven on hearth'. ' In 
contradistinction, Hegel's God is an immanent God, of which we finite 
individuals are all vehicles. For Hegel, we are all manifestations of God, literally 
his life function and expression. Charles Taylor, the most prominent 
metaphysical interpreter of Hegel, compares Hegel's conception of the universe 
" Hegel (1984) The Berne Fragments in Týree Essays translated by P. Fuss and I Dobbins 
(University of Notre Dame press, Notre Dame) p. 61-2. 
62 Hegel (1971) p. 119-20. 
6' Hegel (1977) p. 383. 
64 Hegel (1977) pp. 294-364, see especially p. 364. 
41 
to a text in which God says what he is. God is nothing without the universe of 
finite entities and we, as the self-positing of God, are nothing without God. 
As Taylor argues, this is because (for Hegel) God must assume a material 
existence. 65 It must be somewhere at sometime. Because finite Spirits are 
necessarily localised in space and time, there must be a multitude of finite Spirits 
in which God can exist. These must be living beings, as only living beings are 
capable of expressing themselves and thus capable of expressing God's 
existence. Moreover they must be rational animals, capable of the highest form 
of expression, living against background of lower forms of life and inanimate 
nature, which are their foundation. Hegel argues that the existence of three 
levels, finite conscious Spirits (humans), finite Spirits without consciousness 
(animals) and pure externality (inanimate nature) provide the richest and most 
differentiated design of the universe possible, within which God can externalise 
itself. 
Hegel's rather unorthodox Christian God brought forth many contemporary 
accusations of Pantheism. ' As Beiser 67 contends, these accusations, whilst 
partially true, often missed the point. Hegel charges his accusers with not 
'5 Taylor (1977) p. 90. See also Hegel (1998) § 505. 
6' Tony Smith, in response to John Rosenthal's 'Myth of Dialectics' tries to bring out some of the 
radical implications of such acosmism rather than decry Hegel's system as Christian Mysticism. 
'The divine Spirit that is affirmed at the culmination of his Philosophy of religion turns out to be 
the Spirit that unifies a human community, a notion that unquestionably anticipates the 
discussion of Solidarity by radical liberation theologians' Smith (2002) p193. In rejecting the 
notion of a self-sufficient God, outside the world and denying a mystical, transcendental realm, 
which alone has truth, Hegel is fundamentally challenging Christian orthodoxy. This is especially 
radical, given the conditions of censorship employed in early nineteenth century Prussia. 
" Acosmism is the disappearance of the finite in the infinite. 
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understanding what Pantheism means. Pantheism, for Hegel, (more precisely 
understood as acosmism) does not simply identify the divine with the totality of 
all living things. To simply identify a universal with a set of particulars is what 
Hegel calls an 'abstract universal' . 
6' The pantheist, however, is making a more 
specific claim that, whilst God is not transcendent, neither is it merely the sum 
total of living things. Instead, it is the foundation, source and form of all finite 
beings, more than simply the sum of their parts. At this level, we can see a 
connection with Pantheist theology. However, in spite of this, Hegel does not 
take Pantheism to have adequately developed the principle of Subjectivity, a 
principle that is of such importance to his Philosophy. Hegel, as I have 
suggested, prizes those areas most associated with self-consciousness and 
subjectivity, for example, art, philosophy and religion, as being the highest forms 
of expression of god's existence. It is this concern with subjectivity that 
differentiates Hegel from pantheism. However, as I shall argue in the following 
sections, Hegel's attempts to reconcile this concern with human subjectivity with 
his metaphysics are deeply flawed from the standpoint of social constitution. 
3.2) Substance and Subject 
In his preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel makes the claim 
'everything turns on grasping and expressing the true, not as substance, but 
equally as subject. "' 
68 
" See Hegel (1991) p. 102-3 for the distinction between abstract and concrete universality. 
Hegel (1977), p. 23. 
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By this, Hegel means that human experience is both self-conscious and self- 
constituting. However, we only understand it as such at the end of a process of 
development, 
Of the absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the end is it what it really 
is; and that precisely in this consists its nature viz. To be actual subject, the spontaneous becoming 
of itself. " 
The 'end' in question is the 'representation of the absolute as Spirit'. " This 
consists in the realisation that everything we know and everything there is, is the 
creation of a self- determining subject-object. This point is attained through a 
journey whereby lower forms of consciousness discover (albeit without 
intention) that what they take to be knowledge is in fact flawed or inadequate, 
requiring the formation of more complex forms of knowledge. This is a process 
of detenninate negation, the negation of a flawed or imperfect yet determinate 
content to give rise to a less flawed or less imperfect determinate content. 
Determinate negation contrasts with abstract negation in that it maps itself onto 
the contours of what it negates transforn-ting a determinate object and not merely 
standing in an external relation to its content: 
[S]uch a negation is not all negation but the negation of the determinate subject-matter which 
dissolves and is thus determinate negation, so that the form from which it results is essentially 
contained in the result. "' 
Hegel employs a 'comparison of consciousness with itself', in that he relates 
the knowledge of the world available to a specific level of consciousness to its 
claims about what knowledge is itself. The inadequacy of the actual knowledge 
71 Hegel (1977), p. 24. 
' Hegel (1977), p. 28. 
" Hegel (1998) § 35. 
44 
of lower levels of consciousness is seen to result from an inadequate conception 
of what knowledge is. The process of progression of human knowledge is, 
therefore, both one of actual knowledge and the criterion of what counts as 
knowledge itself. Hegel's comparison of consciousness with itself takes place 
from the point of view of the completion of the system whereby we can claim 
that the development from lower to higher modes of consciousness is of 
necessity, that flaws in one level have entailed their resolution at a higher level. 
To the level of consciousness being described, however, such a movement has 
the appearance of externality or chance. As I have said, this process terminates in 
Spirit's knowledge of itself as underpinning everything. It comprehends that 
knowledge is not mere knowledge of an external world but the self- 
understanding of Spirit. 
A number of key points should be apparent from this preliminary account. 
Firstly, through this characterisation of the developmental nature of Spirit, 
Beiser's distinction between the universal as first in the order of explanation and 
first in the order of existence should be clearer (see above). From the point of 
view of the absolute, we come to understand all previous shapes of Spirit as 
inchoate forms of its articulation. Moreover, such shapes come to be seen as 
necessary stages in the development of the absolute, the diremptions of subject 
and object, immanence and transcendence and real and empirical being 
necessary to the self-realisation of Spirit. However, from the point of view of 
existence, Spirit begins as Substance, innate and not conscious of itself. 
Secondly, whereas Hegel seeks to understand the distinctions that unfold in the 
development of Spirit, as expressed in, for example, Descartes n-dnd-body 
dualism or Kant's noumena-phenomena distinction, he is also a radically anti- 
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dualist thinker in that his aim is to both explain and surmount such divisions. 
Hegel conceives as both subject and object as essentially having the same 
structure. Begrif (or the concept) is the name Hegel gives to both the inherent 
form of all reality and the structure reason must assume in order to comprehend 
reality. In order for an object to be intelligible, reason must be structured in 
terms of the rational concept. This is because the structure of the rational concept 
is also that of reality as a whole. 
Finally, to paint this picture presented in the preface to the Phenomenology, 
into the theological argument above, the development of Spirit corresponds to 
the realisation that we are in fact vehicles of the infinite Spirit. For Taylor, this 
involves a constellation of self-awareness, freedom and reason. Spirit is made 
determinate, or expressed through finite Spirits. It teleologically progresses 
towards more and more adequate expressions of itself whereby eventually finite 
Spirits recognise that the structure of the universe is as it is so Spirit can be. It 
becomes 'self-knowledge of a universal Spirit of which we have become the 
vehicles'. " 
Having given this preliminary account of Spirit I want to move on to look at 
some key issues in more detail. These are, firstly, the strength of the notion of 
necessity underlying Spirit's existence and development, secondly, the extent to 
which his system is intelligible to those standing outside it and, thirdly, the 
retrospective character of Hegel's thinking. Finally I want to deal with some of 
the arguments surrounding whether Hegel can be made intelligible without some 
74 Taylor, (1977) p. 90. '[I]n coming to self-awareness, Spirit has also come to its fullest self- 
expression, hence freedom. It has shaped its vehicle to a perfect expression of itself. And since 
the essence of that vehicle, man, is to be the vehicle of Spirit, he too knows himself as fully self- 
expressed i. e. free' Taylor (1977) p. 92. 
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of his more bizarre metaphysical claims. On all these points, as I have indicated, 
I want highlight the gap between Hegel's metaphysics and the notion of social 
constitution in order to raise the stakes for Adorno's critical appropriation of 
Hegel. As I will argue in more detail, I take both Hegel and Adorno to have 
started from a similar problem, alienation, focusing on the conflicts between man 
and both external and internal nature and between individual and community. If, 
as I have suggested, Hegel's account of Spirit is irredeemably bound up with his 
mysticism, there are obvious difficulties in Adorno appropriating the Hegelian 
language of reconciliation. If what is doing the work, for Hegel, in terms of 
healing such wounds is a mystical meta-subject, Spirit, then we must ask what 
Adorno has to offer in its place. We must ask whether there is a way of 
appropriating Hegelian categories in a way which is consistent with the 
materialist insistence that flesh-and-blood human beings are the sole authors of 
history. Whether or not Adorno succeeds in extirpating the rational kernel from 
the mystical shell is the subject of Chapter Three. 
3.3) Rational Necessity 
It is fundamental to Hegel's system that developments in Spirit be characterised 
as having come about of necessity. Necessity, in Hegel, could be understood in 
two main senses. Firstly, Hegel's account of history could be taken as describing 
developments that are necessary in the looser sense of being the best or most 
plausible course history could have taken. This could apply, for example, to 
Chapter Six of the Phenomenology of Spirit which roughly follows human 
history from ancient Greece to the French Revolution. " The movement 
" Although Hegel often makes far stronger claims in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History, 
'It is only an inference from the history of the world, that its development has been a rational 
process; that the history in question has constituted the rational necessary course of the world- 
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underlying the development from lower to higher levels of consciousness is 
experienced as external or accidental by the participants in Spirit's self- 
realisation. Only for those at the end point of this process, can it be seen as 
necessarily having unfolded in this way. Secondly, necessity can be seen as 
referring to ontological facts, that, for example, finite entities exist necessarily as 
mediated through the whole. In this sense, the structure of the Logic can be seen 
to be elucidating the ontological structures of meaning. 
Some, like Paul Franco, attempt to n-dnimise the significance of the notion of 
necessity in Hegel's thought, particularly to his social, political and historical 
thought. " Furthermore, according to this view, it is mistaken to think of reason 
alone generating content which rational individuals must accommodate 
themselves to. ' Findlay's forward to the Phenomenology makes similar claims 
to Franco, arguing that necessity refers only to the most plausible route that the 
development of Spirit could have taken and not the only route. " Findlay claims 
Spirit - that Spirit whose nature is always one and the same, but which unfolds this one nature in 
the phenomena of the worlds existence' Hegel (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World 
History translated by H. B. Nisbert (CUP, Cambridge) p. 10. Such lecture notes were compiled by 
Hegel's students and their authenticity is disputed. 
76 'Distinguishing between the stronger claim that Hegels dialectical progressions constitute the 
only possible resolutions to the internal contradictions of previous forms of consciousness and 
the weaker claim that they represent the best possible resolutions so far, I think all that is 
important about Hegels general approach can be defended on the latter' Franco (1999) p. 86. 
' 'While it is true that Hegel does, at some level, identify freedom with rational necessity, he 
does not see this necessity as a kind of fact that first exists outside of human freedom and only 
later comes to lose its alien character by being understood' Franco (1999) p. 18 1. 
78 "Ibere is no reason to think that Hegel thought that the path traced in the Phenomenology, 
through consisting throughout of necessary steps, was the only path that the conscious Spirit 
could have taken in rising from sensuous immediacy to absolute knowledge' Hegel (1977) p. I 
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that Hegel's dialectic is far subtler than a mechanism that merely pursues a set 
rational course. Hegel recognised that even mathematics could arrive at proofs 
though a number of different paths and certainly saw his own logic as a higher 
and more comprehensive expression of consciousness. " Likewise, Kaufman 
claims that, for Hegel, necessity is an antonym for arbitrariness. If something 
happens out of necessity, what Hegel really means is that it happens for good 
reasons and not randomly or by chance. " 
However, such interpretations can be found wanting in many respects. Firstly, 
for example, Findlay argues in his preface to the Phenomenology, that Hegel 
allows for there being much that is contingent in history. However, whilst this is 
true8l, it does not necessarily contradict with a strong notion of rational necessity. 
The basic direction of history, the basic structure of the universe and the 
progression of levels of consciousness all unfold according to rational necessity. 
There are elements of contingency in the world, however, but elements, which 
exist of necessity. The world necessarily contains different levels of being, the 
higher levels perfectly manifesting the necessity underlying them with the lower 
levels doing so only imperfectly and manifesting elements of contingency. " 
" Hegel (1998) p. 202-4. 
'0 Kaufman (1966) Hegel: Texts and Commentary (Weidenfeld and Nicholson) p. 85. 
" Findlay in Hegel (1977) pii. See Hegel (1991) p. 217-218 for Hegel's discussion of 
contingency in nature. Hegel's discussion here could either be taken as an admission of the 
problem of natural contingency or of an admission of the limits of philosophical deduction. The 
latter appears to be a more plausible reading. That the philosopher cannot deduce the number of 
species of parrot, for example, from absolute necessity is not reason for Hegel to deny that a 
particular number of parrot species exists of necessity. 
82 See for example Hegel (1977) the Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of 
Philosophy (SUNY Press, Albany) p. 9 1. 
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Furthermore such a loose notion of necessity fails to grasp Hegel's project of 
reconciliation seriously. The object of Hegel's philosophy is the reconciliation of 
man to the world. This requires that mankind understand that the modern world 
has developed the objective capacity to be a home not just for 'good' or 
'plausible' reasons but as a consequence of rational necessity. It is this 
recognition, that the modern world is the way it is as the consequence of a 
necessary process of development, which gives weight to the demand for 
reconciliation. Hegel frequently identifies reconciliation with the recognition of 
rational necessity. " To give a famous example: 
To recognise reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby to delight in the present - 
this rational insight is the reconciliation with actuality which philosophy grants to those who have 
received the inner call to comprehend. " 
The notion of necessity is also deeply entwined with Hegel's conception of 
freedom. The level of freedom one obtains through recognising oneself as a 
vehicle of Spirit is infinitely greater than that one can realise as a finite Spirit. 
The reason for this is that, as finite Spirits, much of what we are is given by 
nature. Taylor claims that we are expressive beings yet much of what we do must 
be understood in terms of life functions (digestion, procreation etc. ) and even 
those activities that are expressive should be seen as very much conditioned by 
our animality. " Here, I take it that Taylor is claiming that the Aristotelian and 
Expressivist notions of the subject cannot be reconciled exactly in relation to 
13 It is indeed debatable whether or not the Hegelian needs to make such strong claims - an issue 
I will examine in terms of its political implications in Chapter Two. However, for the moment, 
the use of the notion of rational necessity in grounding a notion of reconciliation can be seen as 
what makes the project for finding a 'home' in the world distinctly Hegelian. 
" Hegel (1991) p. 22. 
85 Taylor (1977) p. 89-91 
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finite Spirits, only in relation to Spirit. The point is, therefore, that there is a 
certain giveness that cannot be transcended by the finite Spirit conceived as such. 
Spirit, however, posits its own embodiment. Its externalisation in the universe is 
both the expression and condition of its possibility. Hence there is no giveness. 
Spirit is entirely determined by itself. 
This radical freedom achieved by Spirit is intrinsically bound to its following 
rational necessity. That is, Spirit follows reason alone and in following a line of 
rational necessity it comes to be driven by nothing outside reason, or nothing 
given. As Taylor argues: 
If one had a line of action which was grounded entirely on rational, conceptual necessity, without 
reposing on any merely given premises, then we would have a pure expression of subjectivity as 
reason, one in which Spirit would recognise itself as expressed, and hence free, in a total 
unadulterated way; something immeasurably greater than the freedom of finite Spirits. " 
However, there is still one given that has to underlie this argument, that Spirit 
be or that Spirit realise itself. As Raymond Geuss argues, this is the only 
imperative that can be obtained from Hegel's philosophy and even, as such, it is 
radically impersonal and not directed at anything anyone could conceivably do. 
Is it still a given though? Taylor claims it is not; as to claim that Spirit should 
'be' is not a limit on its freedom but the very basis of freedom itself. That Spirit 
'be' is the very foundation of the possibility of freedom, everything else follows 
from this point by rational necessity undetermined by anything outside reason. 
Furthermore, that reason is the vehicle for subjectivity follows from its very 
nature. Free subjectivity can only be realised through clear, discursive, 
" Geuss (2003) 'Outside Ethics', European Journal of Philosophy (Volume 11, Number 1), p. 
93. 
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conceptual thought as only then can Spirit accurately grasp itself as both 
substance and subject. 
I suggested that the requirement that 'Spirit be' is the only presupposition 
underlying Spirit's development of rational necessity. However, Hegel still has 
to prove this presupposition. He has to show that if we look at the structure of the 
world, it could be no other way than a manifestation of Gods self- realisation. 
Hegel is not arguing that, because the world appears to have properties that have 
been the creation of a designer it is most probable that they are the manifestation 
of God. Instead, Hegel demonstrates his point through dialectical argument, by 
seeing contradiction in all finite things that point towards having to understand 
them as moments of a wider reality. We climb through various inadequate forms 
of relating consciousness to its objects until we reach knowledge of Spirit as 
positing the world as its necessary embodiment. At this point, all the previous 
contradictions and antagonisms through which Spirit gained self- realisation are 
preserved within a differentiated unity. Spirit both knows itself fully and knows 
how it arrived at its self- realisat ion. 
The ontological necessity described by Hegel posits finite identities as having a 
necessary relationship to something else and ultimately the whole. We can see 
this dialectic operating throughout Hegel's thinking, for example, in the claim 
that everything immediate is (on closer exarnination) mediated. " Likewise, the 
"87 
... [Ilt is quite n-dndless not to see that the unity of distinct determinations is not just a purely 
immediate ... unity but that what is posited in it is precisely that one of the determinations has truth 
only through its mediation by the other; or, in other words, that each of them is mediated with the 
truth only through the other. Hegel (199 1) p. 70. 
88 Spinoza was radically deterministic, claiming that all human actions and thoughts are modes 
of the divine nature. See Beiser (2005) pp. 71-5 for a good discussion of Hegel's relationship to 
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notion that the true infinity is self-related or circular rather than an infinitely 
extending sequence of finite entities can be seen to extend from this principle. 
The idea that things cannot exist on their own because they are contradictory 
and, hence, must pass over into something else, is raised to an ontological 
principle. 
This strong notion of necessity makes Hegel's concept of freedom appear 
rather counter intuitive. In the face of the then dominant Kantian-Fichtean notion 
of autonomy, with its emphasis on choice and subjectivity, does Hegel not 
represent a move back to Spinoza? " Are we not left with a system of thinking 
that is both radically deterministic and quietist (in that nothing human beings do 
can alter the path of human history)? Like the romantics, Hegel was very much 
attracted to the idealist notion of freedom in Fichte but was also attracted to 
Spinoza's naturalism in that it did not posit a distinction between an empirical 
and transcendent realm or between noumena and phenomena. It was precisely 
such dualisms, so integral to the Kantian-Fichtean concept of autonomy, that 
Hegel wanted to supersede. However, he wanted to do so in a form that rescued 
something of the Spitit of the idealist notion of freedom. To 'square the circle', 
Hegel claims human subjectivity to be the highest development of the powers of 
nature. " Those realms most closely connected with human subjectivity, culture, 
politics, art and Christianity, are prized as the highest realizations of reason in 
Spinoza. 
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" These are the areas Hegel associates with 'Absolute Spirit', namely art, religion and 
philosophy (see Hegel (1998) § 553) These are the areas in which individuals are most conscious 
of God's existence. 
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history. However, they are so of necessity, coming to the fore at the moment of 
Spirit's self-realisation i. e. its telos. 
3.4) The Retrospective Character of Philosophy 
A further respect in which Hegel can be seen to avoid the quietist implications 
of Spinoza's theology is in that Gods self- realisatio n, for Hegel, is achieved only 
though the subjective self- realisat ion of finite beings. God is as dependant upon 
human activity asfinite human beings are dependent upon God. " What sort of 
subject can this be, however, if it comprehends what it has done only in 
retrospect? Hegel's notion of the subject seems far removed from that of the 
Fichtean who shapes his path in accordance with his choices. Hegel's notion of 
subjectivity can in fact be separated both from individualist liberal models of the 
subject and the idea of constitutive subjectivity in the critical tradition. " The 
former, crudely understood, tends towards understanding individuals as a 
culmination of their choices, holding them responsible for the life decisions they 
have made for themselves. Whereas Hegel tends to ascribe such a self- 
understanding to modern individuals, the strong notion of unintended 
consequences expressed through the 'cunning of reason' seems to undercut such 
a notion (see below). Hegel shares the radical historicism of the latter, taking all 
human beliefs and practices to derive solely from their cultural and social 
context. However he also subscribes to a strong notion of historical determinism, 
echoing Kant, Schelling, and Herder before him and influencing many Marxists 
after him. Hegel was opposed to any form of historical relativism, seeing History 
90 Hegel (1998) § 505. 
"' For a basic account of the Marxist account of subjectivity and historical progress see 
Callinicos, A. (1983) p. 82-105. 
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as corresponding to rational laws of progress. " Not only does such faith appear 
naYve in the light of the 20'h century, such determinism places Hegel in 
opposition to the unity of theory and practice in the critical tradition, which 
requires that people be understood as being able to practically and collectively 
transform the world and to re-interpret themselves and the world they inhabit 
through such transformation. In contradistinction, Hegel's notion of Spirit is 
radically impersonal, involving a radical separation of theory and practice, 
whereby the Owl of Minerva flies only at the fall of dusk, once Spirit has 
culminated in its own self- realisatio n. 93 
Hegel describes this unintended evolution of history on a rational path in terms 
of one his most controversial ideas, 'the cunning of reason'. This idea originated 
in the populist 'Lectures on the Philosophy of History', authored not by Hegel 
but by his students. As such, its significance should be treated with scepticism. ' 
The doctrine states that human beings essentially act out of self-interest. In 
Hegel's words: '[T]here is no room in reality for empty notions like that of 
pursuing goodness for its own sake. "' 
" Hegel (1975) p. 10. 
9' Hegel (199 1) p. 13. 
94 The lectures, because they are the most readable of Hegel's texts, have become the most 
popular entry point into Hegel's thinking. Although their authenticity is questionable, as they are 
compiled from fragments of lecture notes, a number of scholarly defences have been made of 
their central claims. See, for example, McCamey, J. (2000) Hegel on History (London, 
Routledge). I take the view that, however important the lectures are in terms of their legacy and, 
more importantly, the reaction against them, it is difficult to view the idealist notions of 'reason 
in history' and 'the cunning of reason' as anything but obscure historical relics. 
99 Hegel (1975) p. 84. 
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Furthermore, we always act as if we believe our actions to be freely 
determined, by doing what we please. Our actions, however, without our 
purposeful intention, contribute to the rational unfolding of history. However 
much we think we are acting selfishly, indifferent to moral ideals, we are always 
pawns in history's rational plan. 'The cunning of reason' is supposed to be 
Hegel's answer to the objection that, for him to hold such a teleological account 
of history, he would have to assume a rather naYve view of human agency as 
guided by the ideals of freedom and morality. If the 'cunning of reason' thesis 
holds, one can maintain a progressive account of human history, without 
resorting to an idealistic account of the moral motivation of historical actors. 
Furthermore, to return to the question of the association of a strong concept of 
necessity with both determinism and quietism, the 'cunning of reason' thesis 
appears to include the demand (1) that the agency of human beings is essential to 
historical progress and (2) that human beings understand their actions as freely 
determined. Both demands are reconciled with a strongly rationalistic and 
teleological account of historical progress. 
Given this separation between individuals' own self- understanding of their 
actions and the designs of reason, Hegel's ethics seem radically impersonal. 
From the standpoint of the absolute, that is from the point of view of the 
Hegelian, the key ethical question of 'what ought I to do' seems to become 
"100 Geuss (2003) p. 35. The account of ethics implied by the notion of the cunning of reason is 
very different from that presented in the Philosophy of Right. In the Philosophy of Right, it does 
matter to Hegel that people do the right thing for the right reasons and that they can make such 
reasons intelligible to thernsleves and others. It is also important that people act on the right sort 
of inclination and desire for each reason, for example that marriage is undertaken on the basis of 
love. Hegel (1991) pp. 199-208. 
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largely sidelined. It becomes difficult to ascribe any intentionality to any agent, 
irrespective of how they phenomenologically perceive the situation. This can be 
addressed more clearly by examining what Hegel describes as the 'objective' and 
'subjective' conditions for Spirit's self-realisation. 
When we talk about the reconciliation that marks the end point of Spirit's self- 
realisation we are talking about something 'objective' in the sense that the world 
must be this way for it to accommodate Spirit. As we shall see in the next 
section, the objective conditions of freedom are those in which Spirit can find a 
home. It is referred to as 'objective' precisely, as I have said, because it is not the 
outcome of subjective intentions, as something intentionally 'brought about' by 
any individual or group of individuals. As Raymond Geuss argues, 
Spartacus would not himself have been able to end ancient slavery even if he had intended to that 
(which, as far as we know, he did not), nor could indeed all the slaves in the ancient world, acting 
together, have put an end once and for all to the conditions of slavery unless the historical 
conditions were right. " 
When Hegel refers to the subjective conditions of reconciliation, that we 
subjectively feel at home in the world, again this is not because we see ourselves 
as having intentionally got there. So, to return to the slavery example, we 
understand, from the standpoint of the absolute, that the overthrow of slavery 
was necessary in the course of developing a world in which Spirit can find a 
home but do not see the process of its overthrow as being anything intentional, 
anything that could be attributed to a 'real, determinate, practically effective 
historical agent, who existed in the time in question'. " 
96 
" Geuss (2003) p. 35. 
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In these circumstances, as I have said, the implications of Hegel's philosophy 
become very different to those which assume intentionality of some sort. The 
imperative 'let Spirit realise itself cannot be predicated to any individual or 
group of individuals. Just as no individual or group can abolish ancient slavery, 
no individual can 'realise Spirit'. It is something that happens as the result of a 
gradual, unintended process. 
3.5) The Intelligibility of Hegel's System - Rosen's 
Critique 
Given this description of the movement of Spirit, a further question is raised as 
to how one comes to gain knowledge of the absolute. It has long been the retort 
of the Hegelian that those who criticise aspects of his thinking fail to understand 
the whole on which it is premised. This has provided Hegel and his followers 
with an opportunity to side-step rational criticism of his system on the basis that 
the critic stands outside the holistic, organic view of he who has come to gain 
knowledge of the absolute. Michael Rosen's starting point is precisely that 
Hegel's dialectic is closed to rational criticism. As his interpretation of Hegel 
will be important in deciphering Adorno's dialectic in Chapter Three, it is worth 
turning to some of the issues he raises. 
Rosen invokes the 'post festurn paradox', which he defines as f6flows. Truth, 
for Hegel, requires a system and can only be understood at the point of 
completion of this systern. 
'The true is the whole. But the whole is only the essence which completes itself through its 
development. It is to be said of the Absolute that it is essentially result, that only at the end is it 
that which it is in truth'. " 
" Hegel (1977) p. 2 1. 
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Critics, however, should be interested in whether the individual arguments that 
Hegel advances to get to the point of completion hold or not. Rosen's key 
example is that of the issue of determinate negation, whereby Hegel claims that 
to negate determinate content yields a positive result. Hegel's method of 
philosophical critique, for example, is driven forward through challenging the 
incompleteness of previous philosophical theories. This argument is claimed to 
be false in that (as Karl Popper argues in 'What is Dialectic? ')" Refutation can 
have a significant role in producing better theories but it does not have a logical 
role. Negation does not of logical necessity deliver positive results. Furthermore, 
the procedure of immanent critique, that is the negation of specific content 
within its own parameters, cannot itself be justified on the basis of immanent 
critique. The procedure of immanent critique is often invoked as a means of side- 
stepping the need for transcendental justification. However, the procedure itself 
requires justification that cannot logically fall back on the notion of immanent 
critique itself For Hegel, however, to criticise such arguments in isolation from 
the system is to fail to acknowledge Hegel's insistence upon truth as a totality. 
to criticise from any point other than the point of completion violates a crucial presupposition of 
the system itself, namely that only someone who has really attained its final point can perceive the 
rationality of its attainment. 100 
Rosen's answer to this paradox is precisely to deny that Hegel holds a universal 
and presuppositionless conception of rationality. What he does, instead, is to 
develop an experiential basis for his system through which his claims become 
intelligible. Through this mode of philosophical experience, Pure Thought, the 
99 Popper, K. (1940) 'What is Dialectic? ' Mind (No. 49) pp. 403-26. 
100 Rosen (1982) p. 24. 
101 Rosen (1982) p. 179. 
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claims of Hegel's system make sense. Instead of describing his system as to 
make it intelligible, Hegel presupposes acquaintance with it, an ability to 
practically engage with and participate within its rules and structures. Hence, it 
only makes sense to those within it and remains mystical to those outside. As a 
parallel example we could think of the moral sceptic standing outside the moral 
point of view, unable to engage unless she adopted something of the assumptions 
and argumentative procedure entailed in ascertaining moral truths. In Hegel's 
case, however, the experiential basis appears far more obscure, the experience of 
Pure Thought. This is the 'neo-platonic fantasy' alluded to above. ' 
In defining Hegel's approach as neo-platonic, Rosen cannot be referring to 
Hegel's ontology. The neo-platonic metaphor that God exists as a pool or source, 
separated from the world by high-reaching waterfalls could not be further from 
Hegel's radically unorthodox Christianity. However, Rosen is, I think, right that 
that Hegel's system requires access to some level of experience out with that of 
ordinary practical engagement with the world in order to be intelligible. He is 
also right to worry that any attempt to try to rehabilitate Hegel by taking away 
the rational claims away from their mystical context (for example Adorno) fails 
to recognise that all Hegel's claims derive from this mystical notion of 
experience. Given that I want to argue that both Hegel and Adorno share a 
common understanding of immanent critique, this is problematic. However, in 
Chapters Three and Four, I argue that this is not ultimately debilitating for 
Adorno. Firstly, I present a more modest notion of immanent critique, which 
does not rely upon a strong notion of rational necessity. Secondly, although I 
reject such a strong notion of necessity, I argue that often moves too far in 
rejecting certain features of Hegel's understanding of negation. 
10'102 Franco (1999) p. 84. 
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The picture of Hegel's system which I have presented so far is one which 
highlights the risks of Adorno's appropriation of Hegelian categories for 
materialist purposes. For many Hegel interpreters, one can extirpate the 
mysticism from Hegel's system simply by substituting 'Spirit' for 'society' or 
&social relations'. The claim is not that Hegel did not hold decidedly mystical 
views about God, only that his notion of Spirit is equally intelligible as a notion 
of human inter-subjectivity in general. I do not deal with the Marxist claim that 
Hegel fails to decipher the true origin of Spirit in social labour and thus really 
refers to social processes albeit in a mystical form. This is Adorno's more 
complex interpretative claim, which I deal with in Chapter Three. I, instead, have 
in mind Franco's claim that 'it is not necessary to import into this concept 
[Spirit] any dubious metaphysical or cosmic connotations"" or Patten's claim 
that Hegel's mystic theology is inessential to the key arguments he makes. I want 
to argue that such an interpretation is fundamentally mistaken and that his 
system is intrinsically bound up with 'dubious metaphysical or cosmic 
connotations'. 
Patten's critique of Taylor"' in this respect makes a number of claims, of 
which I will deal with just two. His underlying concern is that there are many 
important elements to Hegel's philosophy which do not fit into the cosmic or 
metaphysical picture and that can be supported outside it. Firstly, Patten argues 
that Spirit refers to a number of different entities, individuals, peoples 
(Volksgeist) and the cosmic Spirit (WeItgeist). Some uses carry metaphysical 
connotations and some don not. Secondly, Patten claims that the argument that 
we are vehicles of God does little work in-itself in generating the content of 
'0'107 Patten (1999) p. 16-27. 
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many of Hegel's claims. So, for example, it is unclear why Hegel should believe 
that specifically modern Sittlichkeit should be the most appropriate mode of 
God's self- realisation and not any other form of community or indeed why he 
believes that we need a community at all. God is not important in raising the 
specific claims Hegel makes. On one level Patten is right, many aspects of 
Hegel's political philosophy, for example, can be justified without appeal to 
Hegel's system. In the next chapter I look more closely at whether Hegel's 
understanding of freedom in his political philosophy needs to be predicated on 
such a metaphysical basis. For the moment I will make a few tentative 
suggestions. Firstly, in terms of Hegel's self-understanding, it seems undeniable 
that these various shapes of Spirit are all mediated through each other and that 
the highest level of mediation is the Weltgeist. The lower levels of Spirit are 
essential to the differentiation and self-realisation of God and whilst their cosrnic 
status is not always explicit, it is presupposed in the underlying framework of 
Hegel's system. Secondly, it would appear that there is a theological 
underpinning for the content of modern Sittlichkeit in that a significant feature of 
the project is to accommodate the Christian notion of subjectivity. Whether this 
notion can be sustained on different grounds is debatable, but if Rosen is right, 
once we grasp precisely what Hegel means by subjectivity it is very difficult to 
separate it from its mystical shell. Finally, it seems difficult to take two of 
Hegel's notions, reconciliation and concrete universality, both of which do so 
much work in terms of Hegel's political philosophy, away from their place in 
the system. I examine both in more detail in the next chapter. 
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4) Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have drawn attention to the conflicts that Hegel takes the 
subject to be confronted with in modernity. As I will argue in subsequent 
chapters, I take Adorno to be also centrally preoccupied with such problems. At 
present, however, Hegel's solutions appear radically inadequate. The reading of 
Spirit I have presented in this chapter has been strongly metaphysical, drawing 
attention to its religious basis, the strong sense of necessity underlying its 
movement and the mystical notion of experience required to understand the 
Absolute from the inside. It is difficult to imagine, at this stage, how such claims 
are to be appropriated by Adorno, who was both atheist and radically anti- 
determinist. In further chapters, however, I will go on to broadly defend 
Adorno's understanding of dialectic and immanent critique, both of which can be 
seen to have firn-dy Hegelian roots. Before I do this, however, I want to look 
more closely at Hegel's political philosophy to see if he has anything more to 
offer in terms of responding to the problem of alienation. I will go on to argue 
that it is in the Philosophy of Right that Hegel provides his most interesting 
account of alienation and reconciliation. Indeed, I will argue that there is much in 
the Philosophy of Right to be appropriated by Marxists and critical theorists. 
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2) Freedom and Reconciliation in 
Hegel"s Political Philosophy 
1) Introduction 
I suggested in the introduction that the notion of social constitution is not solely 
concerned with the explanation and understanding of social processes. It is also 
an ethical concept, offering a powerful critique of alienation. In Chapter One, I 
outlined the various ways in which the notion of Spirit underpins Hegel's 
metaphysical account of reconciliation, itself a response to the problem of 
alienation. I argued that this response is fatally flawed by Hegel's failure to 
understand Spirit as the collective activity of flesh-and-blood human beings, and 
instead treat it as an autonomous source of content. In this chapter, I move to 
consider Hegel's account of reconciliation in the realm of 'Objective Spirit' 
(politics, jurisprudence and morality) as it is at this level that some of the ethical 
issues associated with the idea of reconciliation are articulated more clearly. 
More specifically, this chapter outlines Hegel's notion of reconciliation qua 
social autonomy and begins to examine the extent to which it is compromised 
both by Hegel's metaphysics and his politics. 
Hegel, in the Philosophy of Right, again equates freedom with self- 
determination, the property of being seýf-related or being-with-oneself. One can 
be said to be self-determined when one is dependent upon nothing outside 
oneself. Hegel's ontology, however, commits him to the view there can be 
nothing purely immediate, nothing which is not related to (or mediated through) 
anything else. " Hence, Hegel formulates freedom as the property of being-with- 
'04 Hegel (1991) p. 70. 
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onesetf-in-an-other. " In realising self-determination, one no longer sees social 
institutions or society in general as a restriction upon or interference in ones 
freedom. We have already seen an inchoate form of such reconciliation in the 
notion of Love in Hegel's early writing. Furthermore, we have already seen that 
in comprehending oneself as a vehicle of infinite Spirit, Hegel believes that we 
can begin to resolve the diremption of man from his world and man from his 
own natural being. What appear to be individual dilemmas or conflicts are 
uprooted in their wider contextualisation. His understanding of freedom in the 
Philosophy of Right continues in this trajectory, rooting freedom in a rational 
social order that not only facilitates our freedom but also constitutes us as free, 
self-determining beings. Against its negative, Hobbesian, formulation, Hegelian 
freedom is not an arena in which man can exercise its will freely without the 
interference of any power, 'being able to do as one pleases'. " Instead it is the 
negation of the otherness of such constraints. For Hegel, this requires a shift in 
consciousness, or a change in the way in which we relate to and practically 
engage in the world. It also requires the development of objectively rational, 
freedom-promoting institutions, institutions that Hegel believed had come to the 
fore in post-revolutionary Europe. These two conditions can be described as 
subjective and objective freedom respectively. 
As I have said, the focus of this chapter is 'practical freedom'. Unlike 
speculative freedom, which is essentially about our cognitive relation to the 
world and gained in philosophical activity, practical freedom is concerned 
primarily with the will and its real engagement in the external world. What I 
want to look at, firstly, is the subjective faculties Hegel associates with Freedom. 
10' Hegel (1991) pp. 54-55. 
'06 Hegel (1991) p. 48 
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There is much discussion as to whether Hegel's notion of freedom is close to a 
Kantian-Fichtean notion of autonomy or whether he develops a less oppositional 
understanding of the relationship between reason and inclination. " I develop the 
latter interpretation in order to draw connections with Adorno's understanding of 
the reconciliation of discursive reason and impulse and desire. A second, related 
issue is the extent to which Hegel's notion of freedom is conducive to social 
criticism or moral reflection. Whereas I take Hegel to be requiring that agents 
subjectively and reflectively endorse the rationality of ethical life, I take Hegel to 
be claiming that the day-to-day operation of our morality is unreflective and 
spontaneous. Rather than take this as a limitation of Hegel's political philosophy, 
I take this to be an important contribution to the question of moral motivation. 
That it is the nature of the social relations within which agents operate that is 
formative of ones ethical disposition is a claim that Marxists also want to make. 
Such a disposition is to become a 'second nature' to the individual. A third issue 
is the counter-intuitive idea that freedom, for Hegel, requires identity with social 
institutions whereby such institutions (or more precisely our roles within them) 
are seen as an antecedent condition for peoples self-understandings and sense of 
self-worth. In attempting to ground this claim, I will discuss Hegel's notion of 
mutual recognition and the role of social institutions in nurturing and sustaining 
its development. I take the demand for mutual recognition to be at the ethical 
core of Hegel's thinking. Finally, it is necessary to understand what Hegel means 
by objective freedom, the rational institutions which constitute us as free agents. 
It is not my intention to discuss the detailed constitutional plan that Hegel 
advances in the Philosophy of Right. This section shall focus, firstly on the 
" For example, see Patten, A. (1999) pp. 47-8 for the former view and Pinkard (2000) p. 473 for 
the latter. 
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requirement that a rational social order correspond to the rational concept. 
Secondly, I shall examine the formative role of social institutions in nurturing 
capacities for freedorrý giving some illustrative examples from Hegel's 
discussion of the family, civil society and the state. Again, what I find most 
interesting in this account is the relationship between Bildung and the ethical 
disposition of agents in Hegel's account of social autonomy. 
2) The Free Will 
2.1) Three Determinations of the Will - Natural., Arbitrary and 
Rational 
Before being able to progress towards some of the more difficult issues in 
relation to Hegel's understanding of freedom, it is necessary to first give an 
exposition of Hegel's concept of the free will and its three distinct forms, 
natural, arbitrary and rational. The introduction to the Philosophy of Right is 
dedicated to deriving a 'true' concept of the free will, one which will go on to 
inform his development of a rational social order that best promotes and 
engenders such freedom. 
Hegel does not see the will as a separate faculty, which mediates between 
thinking and acting. "' Instead he thinks of the will as a type of (practical) 
thinking concerned with translating our subjective aims and interests into 
existence in the world. It is essentially about externalising our ends and 
objectives. 
"' 'The distinction between thought and the will is simply that between theoretical and practical 
attitudes. But they are not two separate faculties; on the contrary the will is a particular way of 
thinking - thinking translating itself into existence - thinking as the drive to give itself existence. ' 
Hegel (199 1) p. 35. 
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Hegel begins by discussing two ineliminable elements of the will, the first 
being the moment of 'pure indeterminacy'. This is a formal capacity for 
abstraction, for holding oneself above ones embodiment in a particular social 
order or entanglement in particular ethical commitments. This Hegel describes as 
the 'I's pure reflection into itself, in which every limitation, every content, 
whether present immediately through nature, through needs, desires and drives 
or given and determined in some way, is dissolved'. " Hegel, firstly, associates 
this notion with Brahmanism, a form of Hindu fanaticism in which thought 
reaches such a level of abstraction or pure contemplation that it has no 
discernable subject. Hegel also associates this element of the will with terrorism 
and nihilism, most famously when he talks of the 'fury of destruction' in the 
French revolutionary terror. The will that attempts to flee any limitation or 
determination, what Hegel describes as 'negative freedom' (not to be confused 
with Berlin's 'Negative Freedom'), ` is pathological, "' characterised by a 
certain wanton, aimless destruction. 
[T]here is left for it only negative action; it is merely the fury of destruction. ' 12 
Furthermore: 
The sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore death, a death too which has no inner 
significance or filling, for what is negated is the empty point of the absolutely free self It is thus 
the coldest and meanest of all deaths, with no more significance than cutting off a head of cabbage 
or swallowing a mouthful of water. "' 
Hegel (1991) p. 37. 
Berlin. (1969). 
See Knowles (2002) pp. 29-30. 
Hegel (1977) p. 359. 
Hegel (1977) p. 360. 
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This formal capacity for abstraction becomes pathological if left unchecked by 
a second element of the will, the moment of particularity. This is, essentially, the 
idea that something is willed or that the will resolves on a certain action. "' Each 
time one resolves on a certain path of action, one limits other potential outcomes 
or other possibilities of what one could make of oneself. For example, embarking 
on a PhD in philosophy makes it less likely that I will become a plumber or 
electrician. "' Thus a tension develops between the universal and particular 
elements of the will. From this point, Hegel moves to the moment of 
individuality, in which the will both wills something determinate yet still 
remains 'with-itself' or universal (i. e. it still sees itself as being capable of 
abstracting from all content). At this stage the moment of individuality is more 
of a desideraturn, with much more philosophical work needed to get there. 
From this point, Hegel changes tack and proceeds to look at three distinct 
determinations of the will from the perspective of both its form (the subjective 
ends that it hopes to translate into objectivity) and its content (what it wills). The 
first of these is the natural or immediate will. Hegel does not equate this concept 
of the will with animality, as he believes that humans have the unique capacity to 
stand above their drives and posit them as theirs own. "' Instead, the natural will 
originates in the multitude of drives confronting a human being. Not only are we 
confronted by a number of different drives but also a number of different objects 
with which so satisfy such desires. "' To cancel this double indeterminacy one 
114 Hegel (1991) pp. 39-40. 
Stem (2002) pp. 162-8. 
The human being 'stands above his drives and can determine and posit them as his own', 
Hegel (1991) p. 45. 
117 Hegel (1991) § 12. 
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has to resolve on something, to take the desire for hunger (for example) and seek 
to satisfy it by desiring a particular object (for example a steak). In Hegel's 
terms, the form of the will is entirely indeterminate, marked by the 'abstract 
universality' described above. Yet in terms of content, the will is determinate, 
the process of resolving on something being essential to the detern-driation of the 
will. In contrast to this is the 'beautiful soul' which refuses to resolve upon 
anything determinate. "' 
In the second determination of the will, the arbitrary will, the indeterminacy 
associated with the natural will becomes explicit. Hegel refers to this 
determination of the will as arbitrary because, although it involves the explicit 
and self-conscious 'choosing' of ones ends, it still regards the content of what it 
chooses as external to, or separate from ones ability to choose. "' Like the natural 
will, its content is still made up of drives and inclinations given by nature. Being 
contingent (i. e. externally related to the subject) the content is in contradiction 
with the form of the will, which explicitly resolves on certain ends. 
This claim also applies to more complicated determinations of the arbitrary 
will, whereby we attempt to incorporate our inclinations into a rational system. " 
Our 'choices' are then determined by some universal aim or project and not on 
the basis of particular resolutions upon drives or inclinations. Hegel, here, has in 
"' See Hegel (1977) pp. 383409. 
"9 'The commonest idea we have of freedom is arbitrariness - the mean position of reflection 
between the will as determined soley by natural drives, and the will which is free in and for itself. 
When we haer it said that freedom in general consists of being able to do what one pleases, such 
an idea can only be taken to indicate a complete lack of interllectual culture, for it shows not the 
least awareness of what constitutes the will which is free in and for itself, or right, or ethics and 
so forth. ' Hegel (1991) p. 48. 
"0 Hegel (199 1) p. 50. 
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mind the idea of happiness, in which we attempt to develop a more coherent 
system of desire satisfaction aimed towards the universal aim of well-being. Still, 
however, Hegel sees the content of this determination as external to its form. The 
content is still our contingent desires and inclinations, despite the universalistic 
ambitions of its form. However, against Alan Patten, for whom Hegel's critique 
of the happiness model is taken as confirmation of his affinity with Kantian- 
Fichtean autonomy, "' Hegel's response here needs to be understood carefully. 
Kant clearly rejects the happiness model on the basis of his nature-reason 
dualism. Hegel, however, who questions such an oppositional approach to nature 
and otherness in general, sees the aspirations of the happiness model as 
fundamentally progressive: 
... the freedom of man, as regards his natural impulses, consists not in his being rid of such 
impulses altogether and thus striving to escape from his nature but in his recognition of them as 
necessity and as something rational; and in realising them accordingly through his will, he finds 
himself constrained only in so far as he creates for himself accidental and arbitrary impressions 
and purposes in opposition to the universal. 122 
Having rejected the happiness model, Hegel still thinks that its underlying 
aspiration can be better realised in the notion of freedom, whereby the will takes 
upon the determination of the rational will. The rational will is identical in terms 
of both form and content in that what is willed is freedom itself i. e. it is freedom 
willed by freedom. Hence not only do we have determinate, subjective ends but 
also a determinate content to resolve upon. Understanding precisely what Hegel 
means by this is the concern of the next section. 
121 See Patten (1999) p. 56. 
122 Hegel (1986) Philosophical Propadeutic, translated by AN. Mller (Basil Blackwell, Oxford) 
43. 
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3) Subjective Freedom 
3.1) Hegel's Critique of Kant and the Empty Formalism 
Objection 
The notion of freedom willed by freedom strongly suggests that, for Hegel, 
freedom has a value beyond mere instrumentality and the process of striving for 
freedom should reflect this. Freedom is clearly a good in itself, not merely of 
utilitarian import as, for example, in John Stuart Mill. This formulation can also 
be taken to suggest that agents do not act on the basis of authority, social mores 
or inclination but on the basis of a rationally construed understanding of the free 
will. If acting otherwise, the form and the content of the will come into conflict. 
Alan Patten takes up a very strong interpretation of what Hegelian freedom 
demands of us, arguing that, properly understood, Hegel demands a level of 
critical scrutiny of our practices that goes all the way down. "' Here, Patten 
employs the Hegelian term, 'infinite subjectivity', a term Hegel employs only in 
the morality section of the Philosophy of Right, which is an incomplete and 
indeterminate form of Right. 114 If Patten is right, however, and Hegel does 
demand no less than the 'infinite subjectivity' of modern agents, coupled with 
the demand that we take freedom as an end-in-itself, we are faced with the 
crucial question of how it is possible to derive content from this end. 
Furthermore, if Hegel is to make the 'empty formalism objection' against Kant, 
the claim that Kant's notion of freedom is vacuous because it is impossible to 
derive content from it, it would appear that he has to offer something that Kant 
does not. 
"' Patten (1999) p. 44. 
124 Hegel (199 1) p. 158. 
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At this stage, I think that it is important to identify Hegel's relationship to Kant 
as regards the content of freedom. There are two related issues here (1) what 
motivates us to pursue freedom as an end? and (2) how can we derive duty or 
morality from the idea of freedom alone? If Patten is right, and Hegel is indeed 
firn-dy within the Kantian-Fichtean trajectory of autonomy, then it is unclear as 
to why he so virulently attacks Kant's position as empty and vacuous. Hegel 
claims that, against Kant's nature-reason dualism, desires are an essential 
precondition for action. Furthermore, he argues that desires can have ethical 
status, for example, love in marriage or showing patriotism towards the state. 
Patten balances this apparent discrepancy by arguing that the motivational basis 
of action in Kant and Hegel is very different whilst simultaneously claiming that 
both share an understanding of freedom as separate from one's contingent 
desires and inclinations. "' His objection to Kant is not that he understands 
freedom wrongly but that his notion of 'duty for duty's sake' fails to carry any 
motivational weight. Hence, in Hegel, it is argued that we must be motivated 
neither by duty nor by the fact that an end is prescribed by reason. For Kant, that 
an action is demanded by the categorical imperative is reason enough to pursue 
it. For Hegel, we also need to act on ends which are justified on the basis of 
reason alone and not on the basis of desire or inclination. However, our 
motivation to do so must come from an inclination appropriate to that end. For 
example, Hegel sees marriage as objectively rational, as central to the existence 
of modern ethical life and (therefore) essential to our self- realisation. However, 
my motivation to get married is not that it is justified by reason (although I must 
be aware that this is the case) but the inclination appropriate to this end, love or a 
115 Patten (1999) p. 53-63. 
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desire for companionship. 116 Patten argues, furthermore, that the appropriateness 
or inappropriateness of our inclinations must itself be justified by reason. " The 
point, then, is that Hegel's criticisms of Kant do not apply to himself because of 
his more nuanced understanding of the motivational basis of pursuing ends 
justified by reason. At this stage it is difficult to see how Patten avoids an infinite 
regress in his interpretation. If our motivations are to be justified on the basis of 
reason alone, then it is unclear why we should be motivated to think that a 
particular desire is appropriate to motivate us towards a particular end prescribed 
by reason. In other words, if we are to take Hegel's criticism of Kant seriously it 
must go all the way down and the answer thus far seems to stop arbitrarily. 
Part of Patten's problem, I think, is that he overemphasises a dualism between 
freedom and natural desire or inclination in Hegel, a dualism I take Hegel as 
having sublated. It is the overcoming of nature-reason dualism that I take to be 
central to the concept of reconciliation. Patten draws a parallel between external 
authority and nature, arguing that both are antithetical to freedom. 12' He goes on 
to argue that an essential element of our understanding of freedom is the idea of 
making ones actions our own and thinking through things for ourselves. In the 
case of external authority (for example the case of acting uncritically upon the 
basis of religious authority) and the case of acting upon the basis of natural 
drives we are failing to realise this property of freedom. This parallel is not 
referred to explicitly in Hegel's work although it does rely upon a key element of 
Hegel's thinking, being aware of the rationality of ones actions and not following 
duty blindly. The immediate identification with ones world, for Hegel, 
"' Hegel (1991) p. 200-201. 
127 Patten (1999) p. 63. 
"' Patten (1999) pp. 63-73. 
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characterises ancient Greek ethical life. " As I will argue latter, however, 
Hegel's critique of the immediacy of ancient Greek ethical life does not translate 
necessarily into the advocacy of critical reflexivity that Patten wants. Whilst, 
understanding the rationality of the institutions of ethical life is central to the 
realisation of freedom, it is rectitude that he praises rather than reflexivity. 130 
There is a second respect in which Patten's analogy connects with Hegel's 
project in regards to Hegel's critique of romanticism. The spontaneous freedom 
achieved by pursuing the drives and passions is seen, in fact, to be nothing other 
than the pursuit of desires ingrained in and through social mores. Such desires 
must be moulded in relation to the demands of a rational social order. That 
desires strike us as particularly compelling is no good reason in itself to believe 
that we should pursue them. 
As I have suggested, Patten tends towards too dualistic a reading of Hegel and 
his understanding of the relationship between reason and nature or otherness in 
general. As Pinkard argues, Kant claims that freedom entails some sort of non- 
natural causality (a transcendental causality) above and beyond the natural, 
causal order. This transcendental causality is capable of initiating chains of 
causality, which are not themselves the effect of any earlier causal chain. In 
contradistinction Hegel sees freedom in terms of the way in which we 
understand our stance towards our natural inclinations and desires"'. What is at 
... See Hegel (1977) pp. 267-289 
"' '[I]t is easy to say what someone must do and what the duties are which he has to fulfil in 
order to be virtuous. He must simply do what is prescribed, expressly stated, and known to him 
within his situation. Rectitude is the universal quality which may be required of him partly by 
right and partly by ethics' (Hegel (1991) p. 193) See below on the critical disposition of subjects 
within ethical life. 
"' Pinkard (2000) p. 472. 
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stake for Hegel is the extent to which we see our actions as our own, the extent 
to which we see our reasons for action as ones that originate in ourselves and 
with which we can identify. "' We are always capable of standing above our 
inclinations and desires; this is part of what it means to be human. It is not, 
however, that we are to act on a different basis from such inclinations and desires 
to be free. It is our ability to adopt certain inclinations as our own, to see them as 
motivating us in order to drive our various projects and in constructing our 
identities. As Pinkard claims, 
The agents preferences, desires and impulses have a ethical status for the agent only to the extent 
that they fit into his overall project for life, fit into some sense of his own identity, who he is as the 
acting subject. "' 
Patten accepts this to some extent in recognising that Hegel posits a very 
different motivational basis to that of Kant. However, underlying his 
interpretation seems to be too dualistic and un-Hegelian a relationship between 
reason and nature. Much of this argument rests on the understanding of Hegel's 
rejection of the happiness model of the will, for which Patten criticises Allen 
Wood's anti-Kantian interpretation. 134 1 have already suggested that the reason 
Hegel rejects the happiness model of the will is that it still leaves the content of 
the will as external to its form. However, I have argued that Hegel rejects it for 
different reasons to Kant in that, for example, the organisation and integration of 
the content of the will around one principle is seen as fundamentally progressive, 
whereas for Kant it is treated as purely external. It is ultimately not happiness but 
"' See, for example, Hegel (1991) p. 57. This is what I take Hegel to mean in describing the free 
will as the 'free will which wills the free will'. 
"' Pinkard (2000) p. 473. 
134 Patten (1999) p. 54. 
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freedom that should function as such an organising principle. Only when 
freedom is taken to be the content of the will itself can we take our desires and 
inclinations to be our own and not as a framework external to the subject. 
Freedom requires that our actions must stem from our own commitments and 
projects and that we must be able to comprehend them as such. In the happiness 
model, it is still the case that we take our inclinations and desires as being a 
6given' or 'immediate' material to be acted upon by the will, whereas when we 
take freedom to be the content of the will, they are truly integrated into the 
structure of the will as our own. 
This account of the motivational basis of Hegel's rationalist concept of freedom 
will be given more weight once we have considered the role of freedom in 
establishing our objectively realised identities and the impact of Bildung in 
forging identification with freedom-procuring institutions. For now, we should 
move on to the second question I proposed, as to how content can be derived 
from the end of freedom alone. Here Hegel comes into similar difficulties. The 
problem is that Hegel wants to criticise Kant's categorical imperative as empty 
and still maintain that his notion of freedom can generate content for itself. To 
understand Hegel's position here we need to understand what Hegel means by a 
concrete universal. An ordinary universal takes a set of particulars and picks out 
a common property from amongst them, being dependent upon them for its 
content. In contrast to abstract universality, the concrete universal is capable of 
generating content for itself, A good example of this is Hegel's description of 
teleology in the Science of Logic. The idea of teleology consists, firstly, of a 
subjective end to be projected onto the world, secondly, of the mediation of this 
end through external reality (a means) and, finally, in the realisation of this end. 
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End ... is the concrete universal, which possesses in its own self the moment of particularity and 
externality and is therefore active and the urge to repel itself from itself. "' 
What this simple idea conveys is that an end automatically points to means that 
are instrumental for its realisation. As in Kant's dictum that 'whoever wills the 
end, wills the means', Hegel's idea of teleology takes the will to be self- 
determining only when its determinations contribute to the realisation of its 
purpose. How does this notion contribute towards answering our initial question, 
however, as to how freedom can generate content from itself as a concrete 
universal? Hegel thinks that the infinite regress, which arises out of us 
attempting to justify our reasons for action, comes to a halt at the idea of 
freedom. "' Given that each action we undertake could be justified with reference 
to some particular reason, which in turn could be justified in terms of another, ad 
infiniturn, why is freedom something, which can be posited with no further 
justification? Hegel's answer must be that in order to create the question of an 
infinite regress, to attempt to find reasons for why we act the way we do, we 
already presuppose the idea of freedom as self-determination. "' The subjective 
capacity of self-determination, the ability to raise oneself above our social mores, 
desires and inclinations, is already presupposed in the question of what reasons 
we can fall back on in order to question our purpose or identity. If this is true, 
then the preservation of such a disposition can be seen to be the ultimate end of 
human action, if we are to have any understanding of our purpose or identity at 
all. 
"' Hegel (1998) p. 739. 
136 See, for example, Hegel (1991) p. 52. 
"' I think Patten gives a fairly plausible account of how Hegel would respond to this objection. 
Patten (1999) p. 100.1 still take his account of Hegel to be incomplete as I argue below. 
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This argument runs parallel to that for the freedom of Spirit. Spirit unfolds 
through pure rational necessity, which allows it to achieve a radical freedom, 
undetermined by anything given. It is, however, itself dependent upon one given, 
that 'Spirit be'. As a foundational condition for the very nature of its freedom in 
rational necessity, this condition does not undermine Spirit's claims to radical 
freedom; rather it marks a starting point from which all else follows. In the same 
way, making freedom the content of the will functions not as an arbitrary 
limitation but a precondition for its very possibility. 
3.2) Social Roles and the Possibility of Critical Reflection 
The main problem with developing a Kantian interpretation of Hegel is that we 
lose sight of what is distinctly Hegelian in Hegel's account of freedom, namely 
the understanding of freedom as reconciliation. This involves a very different 
account of ethical disposition to that in Kant, one which stems naturally from the 
sort of roles and obligations one establishes within an ethical community, and 
not from reason alone. Although Hegel expects agents within ethical life to be 
able, if pushed, to provide intelligible reasons to themselves and others for their 
actions, he does not think that the operation of day to day morality works in this 
way. I now want to examine the practical operation of reconciliation in more 
detail, drawing upon Neuhouser's helpful clarifications of Hegel's argument. 
This section will begin to provide answers to some of the questions of motivation 
introduced in the previous section by looking more closely at how the 'subjective 
disposition' appropriate to freedom generates purpose in our lives. 
Firstly, we need to examine Hegel's reasons for thinking that adopting the right 
subjective disposition to participating in social institutions is part of what it 
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means to be free. In other words, given that Hegel, so far, has a broadly intuitive 
notion of freedom as self-determination, how can this be reconciled with the 
counter-intuitive idea that such freedom can only consist in being bound by 
participation in social institutions and, furthermore, in seeing such institutions as 
constitutive of our freedom and thus (in some sense) identical with ourselves. 
Through examining Hegel's arguments in this respect, drawing on Neuhouser to 
clarify some areas of ambiguity, we can gain a better understanding of how 
Hegel understands the subjective disposition of freedom, particularly, what 
Hegel understands by being- in-o neself- in- another. We can, then, begin to 
crystallise what Hegel means when he claims that laws and institutions should 
not be 'alien to the subject; on the contrary the subject bears Spiritual witness to 
them as to its own essence, in which it has its self-awareness and lives as in its 
element which is not distinct from itself, a relationship which is immediate and 
closer to identity than even [a relationship ofl faith or trust. ' 138 
This argument has three aspects, that we regard institutions as (1) our end, (2) 
our essence and (3) the product of our activity. I shall deal with each of these in 
turn. Regarding social institutions as our ends entails a unity in content between 
the universal will and our particular wills. This unitY takes upon different forms 
in different institutions for Hegel. In civil society, Hegel sees a unity of content 
in the mechanism of the market whereby the culmination of our various labours 
can be construed as some sort of common endeavour. "' Only through such 
participation can we come together and maintain our common livelihood. This, 
however, is a fairly superficial unity whereby our wills still remain external to 
each other. We may participate for our common good but we do so only out of 
138 Hegel (199 1) p. 19 1. 
Hegel (199 1) pp. 224-226. 
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egotistic interest. " Within the fan-dly, in contrast, we adopt a less conscious 
unity of wills in which we undertake endeavours for the common good almost 
spontaneously, embracing their ends as our own. 14' As Neuhouser notes, Hegel is 
talking about very different senses of the particular and universal will to 
Rousseau, whom attempts to connect the two in the 'Social Contract'. 14' For 
Hegel, particularity does not refer to an individual taken in abstraction from the 
social whole, the egocentric will. Instead it refers to a determinate quality of 
individuals, the determinate position that the individual occupies in the world. 
Particularity is not something that stems from a feature of human beings, as in 
the egotistic individual, but something that stems from our social role. It is 
already mediated through the universal. For example, in the family the father is 
particular in that he bears a particular role of responsibility and particular duties 
towards other family members. Furthermore, his attachment to his ends is 
intuitive rather than self-conscious. The individual family member does not see 
his will as external to that of the family as a whole. Hence, in a very strong sense 
we can see what Hegel means by a unity of wills in the family. This does not 
only apply to the fan-dly, however, as this notion of particularity already points 
beyond a Rousseauian conception of the unity of wills. "' Social institutions as a 
whole are seen not just as a means to ones private ends. They not only provide us 
"0 'The selfish end in its actualisation, conditioned in this way by universality, established a 
system of all-round interdependence. ' Hegel (1991) p. 221. Hegel contrasts this form of 
instrumental universality with the self-conscious universality that one adopts as a citizen (see p. 
275). 
"' 'The ethical existence of marriage consists in consciousness of this union as a substantial end, 
and hence in love, trust and the sharing of the wholse of individual existence. ' Hegel (1991) p. 
202. 
142 Neuhouser (2000) p. 89. 
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with our means of subsistence but also constitute us as 'beings of standing'. 
Even in civil society, Hegel sees the particular roles we occupy (through 
different guilds) as being partially constitutive of whom we are. 144 Hence, the 
particular will (our determinate position within the social whole) and the 
universal will (the nexus of social institutions) can be seen as forming a 
fundamental unity, which stretches beyond one of mere fungibility or 
instrumental import. 
In order to comprehend this unity we must move to a second level, the unity of 
essence. Underlying this non-fungible or non-instrumental unity is a unity of 
what Neuhouser terms our essences or practical identities. "' Here, he claims, that 
Hegel does not mean essence in an abstract sense, although Hegel does claim 
that such an abstract, universal identity obtains between individuals in Abstract 
Right. " In the more comprehensive notion of freedom achieved in ethical life, 
we win our particular identities through the various roles we occupy within our 
social institutions. " These are our practical identities as opposed to our abstract 
identities as (for example) bearers of rights. By this, therefore, Hegel does not 
understand our unity as one with social institutions themselves but with our roles 
"' Many have challenged Hegel's interpretation of Rousseau in this regard. See Stern (2000) pp. 
157-62, and Franco (1999) pp. 3-11. 
'" '[T]his nexus of capability and livelihood is a recognised fact, with the result that the 
corporation member needs no external marks beyond his own membership as evidence of his 
skill and his regular income and subsistence, i. e. as evidence that he is a somebody. ' Hegel 
(199 1) pp. 271-272. 
"' Neuhouser (2000) p. 93. 
'46 'Personality essentially involves the capacity for right and constitutes the concept and the 
basis (itself abstract) of the system of abstract and hencefonnal right. ' Hegel (199 1) p. 69. 
147 Hegel (1991) p. 191. 
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within them. Social institutions are undifferentiated from ourselves only in so far 
as they come to be seen as essential to maintaining and sustaining the various 
roles and identities with which we come to identify. These particular identities 
established through our social roles are fundamental in two ways. They both 
provide us with purpose or with projects through which to live our lives and give 
us self-esteem through giving us an identity in the world. Hegel is, here, making 
a more fundamental point than the rather banal observation that because our 
identities originate in socialisation we should not view them in abstraction from 
their social context. This is a claim with which even the most individualistic 
political philosophers could agree. He is claiming that having a practical and 
social identity is fundamental to who we are, endowing us with purpose and 
standing in the world. "' 
The third point is that we must see the social world as dependent upon our 
wills. Although we are born into a world which is not of our choosing we must 
understand that its continued existence is dependent upon the collective activity 
of our wills. This is fundamental as it is a condition of freedom, for Hegel, that 
the will is not merely seen as a capacity for freedom but something that must be 
realised in the world for it to have existence. We cannot grasp our freedom 
unless we see our actions as impacting upon and constituting the social world. " 
"' As members of families (Hegel (1991) pp. 202-203), corporations (Hegel (1991) pp. 271-272) 
and as citizens (Hegel (199 1) p. 275. 
'4' This last condition must be placed in the context of the account of subjectivity which I 
developed in Chapter One. In other worlds, whilst it is important that people understand that their 
activities impact upon and shape the world around them, the underlying structure of the modern 
world has to be understood as a consequence of the designs of Spirit and not some form of 
collective, intentional activity. 
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How then are we to take these three steps as linking a notion of self- 
determination with social participation? Like Rousseau, Hegel believes that 
acting on the basis of the general will means that we are subject to no other will 
other than our own. "O However, Hegel wants to say more than Rousseau in 
advancing this claim. By participating in social institutions we are doing more 
than merely participating in an endeavour of common benefit or acting in terms 
of the public interest but we are, furthermore, enabling ourselves to establish 
objectively realised identities. "' Participation in ethical life, therefore, allows us 
to be self- constituting, to translate who we take ourselves to be into the external 
world. Because our self-conceptions can only come about through social 
participation (we can have no self- understanding in abstraction from social 
practices) and because such conceptions only achieve actuality through activity 
in the world, ethical life can be seen as essential to self-determination. 
One critical issue that is raised through this discussion is the extent to which, if 
we can have no self-understanding in abstraction from social practices, we can 
adopt a reflexive or critical understanding of ourselves and our social roles. 
Neuhouser, as I have suggested, is less open to the interpretation of Hegel as 
demanding critical scrutiny of our social practices. "' On the one hand he 
acknowledges the fundamental difference in Hegel's interpretation of ancient 
Greek ethical life and his understanding of modern ethical life. For Hegel, the 
"0 The 'ethical powers that govern the life of individuals' are not perceived as 'alien' to the 
subject. Hegel (199 1) pp. 190-9 1. 
"' For example, Hegel frequently discriminates between the state (der Staat) and the necessity- 
state (der Notstaat) (for example Hegel (1991) p. 275). The former is self-consciously identified 
with as crucial to establishing our identities as citizens whereas the latter is solely of instrumental 
importance in allowing society to function properly. 
152 Neuhouser (2000) pp. I 10- 113. 
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Greeks existed in an unreflective harmony with their social institutions, intuiting 
them as a natural and eternal order within which they obtained harmony. "' 
Modern ethical life has to incorporate the growth of moral subjectivity, which 
has been thrown up by Christianity. The growth of the principle of subjectivity is 
ineluctable, despite Hegel's frequent romanticisation of the ancient Greek polis. 
Therefore, given this central transformation, one cannot simply be reduced to his 
or her social role without remainder. If we were to be entirely absorbed in our 
social practices there is no sense in which we could be free. Hegel requires the 
subjective affirmation and interpretation of our roles in order for us to be 
considered self-determining. We must, in other words, be able to stand back and 
accept or reject them. Of course, if such roles are justified by reason (which 
Hegel thinks they are in the modern world)"' then our failure to reconcile 
ourselves with them would signal a form of unfreedom. Nonetheless, that we 
have the capacity to reject them is fundamental. 
When pursuing Hegel's characterisation of the subjective disposition of modern 
ethical life as trust, Neuhouser claims that trust has two components. On the one 
hand, its 'cognitive content' is a harmony between institutions/practices, others 
and ourselves. On the other hand, the 'subjective content' of trust can vary from 
... Hegel (1977) pp. 266-278. 
114 Hegel's reasons for thinking this are discussed below. Although this chapter is dedicated to 
presenting a reasonably faithful interpretation of Hegel -I will return to the question of whether 
one can accept Hegel's arguments regarding the subjective disposition of freedom whilst 
rejecting his arguments that the modem world is worthy of being deemed fundamentally rational. 
Moreover, there is also the question as to whether the framework Hegel appeals to in arguing that 
the modern social world is objectively worthy of being 'a home' can be crucially adopted for 
more radical purposes. I will later argue that both these options are open to Adorno. 
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'second nature', "' an unreflexive identity with our institutions as in Greek 
ethical life, to a more critical or reflexive form of affirmation. He also draws a 
distinction between our motivation in affirming social institutions and the fact 
that such affirmation is subject to rational reflection. The claim is that it does not 
necessarily matter what the subjective form of affirmation is as all that is 
important for Hegel is that reconciliation could be subject to rational reflection. 
Hence, we may be reconciled to our social practices out of habit or social 
convention and still be free or self- detern-dned given that such affirmation could, 
if required, be open to critical scrutiny and be justified. In this we acknowledge 
that even agents of habit are capable of reflectively changing their habits. "' 
This position is not consistently argued by Hegel: 
The broad distinction between the instinctive act and the intelligent and free act is that the latter is 
performed with an awareness of what is being done; when the content of the interest in which one 
is absorbed is drawn out of its immediate unity with oneself and becomes an independent object of 
ones own thinking, then it is that Spirit begins to be free, whereas when thinking is an instinctive 
activity, Spirit is enmeshed in the bonds of its categories and is broken up into an infinitely varied 
material. '" 
Here, Hegel implies the necessity of a far more critical attitude to the 
institutions of ethical life. However, it does appear that the weight of evidence, 
Hegel (199 1) p. 195. 
'If what produces the procures the freedom associated with trust is the belief that ones social 
world is basically hospitable to ones deepest practical aspirations, then the subjective side of 
social freedom is in no way diminished when the belief is founded on reason rather than 
unquestioning faith. This also implies that the belief central to trust can be held in a relatively 
unquestioning form, it can be immediate trust, and still be social freedom (assuming it is at the 
same time a true belief)'. Neuhouser (2000) p. 113. 
157 Hegel (1998) p. 37. 
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especially in the Philosophy of Right, is on a far less reflexive relationship in 
which: 
[T]he subject bears Spiritual witness to them [the laws and institutions of ethical life] as its own 
essence, in which it has its self-awareness and lives as in its element which is not seen as distinct 
from itself. "' 
Within 'ethical life' we come to adopt an almost spontaneous sense of 
obligation and duty to one anothen"' 
In an ethical community it is easy to say what someone must do and what the duties are which he 
has to fulfil to be virtuous. He must simply do what is prescribed, expressly stated, and known to 
him within his situation. Rectitude is the universal quality which may be required of him. " 
Again: 
"8 Hegel (1991) p. 191. 
"' How does this square with Hegel's understanding of Ancient Greece? I think that Hegel takes 
reflection (as demonstrated in Socrates retreat into his conscience) to be more appropriate in the 
polis given that the undifferentiated unity of Ancient Greece was radically deficient - unable to 
incorporate the principle of subjectivity. As the order of modern ethical life has accommodated 
this principle in its institutional structure (see below), the relationship of trust is more 
appropriate. 
"0 
. Hegel (1991) pp. 193-194. Hegel, here, seems to be displaying his usual contempt for those 
who treat ethical questions as inherently difficult or arduous - for whom 'rectitude can easily 
appear as something of a lower order'. Hegel seems to think that such strenuous moral 
deliberation is more appropriate to an 'uncivilised' (Ibid) community. In modern ethical life, 
however, ones duties and obligations are explicitly mapped out through participation in the 
institutions and practices of ethical life. Given that such institutions and practices have an 
underlying rationality in facilitating human freedom, rectitude is the most appropriate disposition 
to adopt within ethical life. 
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Mhe habit of the ethical appears as a second nature which takes the place of the original and 
purely natural will and is the all-pervading soul, significance and actuality of individual 
existence. "' 
As I will later argue, there is an underlying assumption here, which can be seen 
to run into Marxist thinking. This is that, situated within a framework which 
recognises and supports meaningful roles and pursuits, people are able to adopt 
an almost spontaneous sense of ethical relationship to one another. The structure 
of Hegel's argument for the centrality of ethical life is also interesting in this 
respect, in that it takes individual rights to be parasitic upon the ethical 
community rather than foundational, as they often are in liberal individualist 
accounts of rights. "' 
"' Hegel (199 1) p. 195. 
162 , Morality and the earlier moment of formal right are both abstractions whose truth is attained 
only in ethical life. Thus, ethical life is the unity of the will in its concept and the will of the 
individual, that is, of the subject' (Hegel (1991) p. 62). For Hegel, we have many different roles 
and commitments, each of which entails a different form of self-understanding. These extend 
from abstract conceptions of persons, for example individuals as bearers of rights or owners of 
property, to the ascription of moral subjectivity, for example responsibility, duty and conscience, 
to our more concrete roles in 'ethical life', as member of a family, practitioner of a trade or active 
citizen. Each level is parasitic upon the next, with our participation in ethical life being the 
foundation of both our capacity for an ethical disposition and the framework of protections 
offered over individual rights and property. 
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4. ) Objective Freedom 
4.1) Mutual Recognition 
I have suggested that, for Hegel, social participation is the only means by 
which people can develop ascribe worth to themselves. Now it is time to flesh 
out this argument in terms of some deeper concerns of Hegel's philosophy. 
For Hegel, to have a free will means to have a sense of ones will acting upon 
the external world and a sense that ones will is not dependent upon anything 
external for its existence. 16' There are three ways in which it can do this, (1) 
through negating objects in the world (2) through forcing recognition upon other 
subjects and (3) through obtaining the mutual, free recognition of other subjects. 
The first tactic is, for Hegel, futile. If we destroy objects in the environment to 
demonstrate our independence from them, we only demonstrate independence in 
a very partial sense in that we only negate one form of the object. Killing and 
eating an animal for food, for example, manifests itself in desire for another 
animal to kill ad infinitum. " To truly prove our independence in this way we 
would have to destroy the entire environment which, even if it left us still alive 
would mean that we had no more objects to negate and therefore, because the 
free will needs to be actualised in the world, would be left with nothing beyond 
the mere self-assertion of a will. We, therefore, require an object with which we 
can gain an acknowledgement of our freedom, which is not destroyed in the 
process. Hence, we arrive at the notion of recognition, whereby an agent receives 
acknowledgement from another agent of his freedon-L 
"' Hegel (1991) p. 54. 'Only in this freedom is the will completely with itself, because it has 
reference to nothing but itself, so that every relationship of dependence on something other than 
itself is thereby eliminated'. 
'64 Hegel (1977) pp. 104-110. 
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Hegel, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, begins from the standpoint of the 
philosopher in arguing that only by adopting a form of 'mutual recognition' can 
the subject's desire for independence be maintained. This, firstly, involves 
something like the Kantian claim that individuals be regarded as ends and not 
means, 'as something that has an independent existence of its own, which, 
therefore it cannot utilize for its own purposes, if that object does not of its own 
accord do what the first does to it'. "' Secondly, it entails that we gain our own 
self-understanding as reflected in the other. 
Each sees the other do the same as it does; each does itself what it demands of the other, and 
therefore also does what it does only in so far as the other does the same. Action by one side only 
would be useless because what is to happen can only be brought about by both. " 
As I argued in Chapter One, freedom is achieved only as seeing oneself as part 
of a wider whole. In 'mutual recognition' we come to be part of 
'[t]he absolute substance which is the unity of different independent self- 
consciousnesses within their opposition, enjoying perfect freedom and independence; T 
that is 'we' and 'we' that is T. ' 167 
So far, however, Hegel is speaking only from the point of view of the 
philosopher. He next has justify this position phenomenologically, i. e. from the 
point of view of the experience of consciousness in order to prove that 'mutual 
recognition' is the only route by which the subjects demand for independence 
168 
can be met. This task is performed in the famous dialectic of master and slave. 
In the master slave dialectic, recognition is at first one-sided and unequal. In a 
"' Hegel (1977) p. 112. 
166 Hegel (1977) p. 112. 
167 Hegel (1977) p. I 10. 
16' Hegel (1977) pp. II 1- 119. 
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fight to the death, the master obtains the coerced recognition of the slave. "' 
However, as he only obtains recognition from the slave (whom himself is not 
worthy of recognition) he does not obtain the acknowledgement of his freedom 
from one who is free himself. Because he does not acknowledge the freedom he 
commands for himself in the other, his own freedom is nothing but abstract self- 
assertion. His own freedom can be attained only in dialogical reflection in the 
other, in recognition by another whom the master himself recognises as free. 
This apparent impasse is broached by the labour of the slave. Through labour, 
"' There are three main readings of the origin of the life and death struggle (as best summarised 
in Stern, 2002 pp. 75-83). The most simplistic reading is that the desire to impose ones will upon 
objects in the natural world is simply translated into a desire to impose ones will upon other 
subjects. This manifests itself in the life and death struggle. However, we can take this account to 
be missing an important element of Hegel's case - that the desire for recognition - to be actively 
recognised as a subject, is distinct from the desire to make another subject into a passive 
instrument of ones desires. The former account does not seem to provide a role for the demand 
for recognition in the origin of the life and death struggle. It is the unwillingness to give anything 
up in return for such recognition that leads to the fight to the death. However, the second 
argument seems to provide a weak explanation of why the life and death struggle must ensue. On 
a third reading, the fact that one party is willing to give up its life is indicative of its freedom: its 
ability to adopt a disposition of indifference towards its natural existence in reaching a higher 
end. The life and death struggle, as a test, is essential to the development of freedom itself. 
However, on the third interpretation, we can only possibly imagine the life and death struggle as 
a historically contingent form in which the subject's freedom can be demonstrated. In a civilised 
society such recognition is maintained by performing ones role in ethical life. Hence, the third 
reading has major implications for thinking about what work the master, slave dialectic is 
supposed to do in the Phenomenology, suggesting it to be part of a historical story rather than an 
argument driven by conceptual necessity. On reading two, we retain the conceptual element but 
have a weak argument as to why the fight to the death ensues, that the subject wants 
independence but is unwilling to give anything up in return. 
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the slave obtains a form of objectivity, which is unavailable to the master. The 
slave transforms the world around him in preparing food for the master and thus 
begins to understand the impact of his will in the world. From this follows a 
number of forms through which recognition is attained, the details of which I do 
not have the space to discuss here. The end point, as I have already argued, is 
4mutual recognition'. This recognition must be given freely and not imposed 
upon another in order for it to obtain actuality and not be mere assertion. 
The idea of mutual recognition explains, firstly, why Hegel thinks that our 
self-conception is dependent upon social interaction, as we each understand 
ourselves only through our reflection in the other. Secondly, it follows that social 
activity is the only means by which such self- conceptions can be translated into 
the world, as social interaction is constitutive of our practical identities. By the 
time Hegel wrote the Philosophy of Right much of the emphasis and radical 
potential of this idea is lost. However, the basic idea of mutual recognition can 
be seen as fundamental in justifying the role of particular institutions. Within 
social institutions, the demonstration of ones freedom does not depend upon 
risking ones life but upon filling posts or social roles which makes us worthy of 
the respect and recognition of one another. Hence, mutual recognition must be 
embodied in social institutions. However, the arguments that Hegel advances for 
particular social institutions in the Philosophy of Right still rest upon the 
assumption that such institutions objectively promote freedom because they best 
mediate the mutual recognition of individuals. The account of recognition is far 
more complex here and, in many ways, stripped of its radical simplicity. 
Recognition is now grasped in many determinations and forms. Different social 
institutions can be seen has mediating different forms of recognition. Before 
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turning to these specific forms, it is essential to understand the sense in which 
they can be seen as 'objective'. So far we have only been discussing the 
attitudinal requirements of Freedom. Bringing in the idea of Mutual Recognition 
and the requirement that it be mediated through a particular rational social order 
requires that we first understand what is uniquely rational about modern ethical 
life. 
4.2) The Rationality of Modem Social Institutions 
'Objective', in Hegelian terms can be understood in three separate ways, all of 
which can be seen to be attributed to the institutions of ethical life. Firstly, in 
embodying 'objective' freedom they must embody 'true' freedom, that is 
freedom that is true to its concept (outlined above) as opposed to merely 
6common sense' ideas about freedom. "' Secondly, 'objective' refers to the 
externalisation of the concept of freedom into actuality, into an institutional 
framework. "' Thirdly, in arguing for 'objective freedom', HcgcI is claiming that 
the reasons he gives for the institutional framework in the Philosophy of Right 
have a validity independent from the subjective dispositions of those within 
them. "' In other words, he aims to provide an account of the rationality of social 
institutions, which is true whether or not their members subjectively affirm such 
institutions. 
The claim of 'Objective freedom', in Hegel, can be seen to involve two 
prerequisites. Firstly, there is the more straightforward precondition that social 
institutions must provide objective conditions under which individuals can attain 
'70 Hegel (199 1) p. 48. 
171 Hegel (199 1) p. 190. 
Hegel (1991) p. 227. 
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a free will. "' This feature can be seen to have parallels with Rousseau's political 
philosophy, although it is formulated very differently. The second, more 
distinctly Hegelian argument, is that, taken together, the institutions of ethical 
life themselves replicate the structure of a self- determining will. The social 
whole is itself organised along the lines of the concept of freedom and, hence, in 
affirming the institutions of ethical life, one is identifying oneself with the 
concept of freedom itself. 
As Hegel claims, 
The fact that the ethical sphere is the system of these determinations of the Idea constitutes its 
rationality. "" 
I shall first investigate this aspect of 'objective freedom', drawing upon 
Neuhouser's helpful clarifications, before looking at the various ways in which 
the institutions of modem ethical life more straightforwardly secure a basis for 
human freedom. 
Hegel claims that '[als a living mind, the state only is as an organized whole, 
differentiated into particular agencies, which proceed from the one notion ... of 
the reasonable will and continually produce it as their result'. ` Neuhouser goes 
on to break this claim down into four parts. For 'objective freedom' to be 
realised, the framework of institutions must (a) be organised teleologically, (b) 
be self-replicating, (c) be 'articulated into specialised semi- auto no mous 
functioning components' and (d) have their inter-relations determined by the 
rational concept. 176 In terms of teleological organisation, Hegel can be seen to be 
173 Hegel (199 1) pp. 227-223. 
174 Hegel (199 1) p. 190. 
175 Hegel (197 1) The Philosophy of Mind translated by AN. Miller (Oxford, OUP) §539. 
17' Neuhouser, (2000) pp. 121-2. 
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drawing an analogy between social and biological organisms, albeit an extremely 
limited analogy. By understanding a plant in terms of its telos we can come to 
grasp how the various differentiated parts and processes that make up its 
biological structure contribute the realisation of its purpose. Of course, the 
analogy is limited as Hegel thinks that, within the social organism, people are 
able to step outside of their immediate social roles and to reflect upon the 
rationality of the whole. In other words, the individual parts are attributed self- 
consciousness. However, it raises the centrality of the interpenetrating unity of 
universality and particularity in Hegel's thought, the idea that the whole subsists 
only through its differentiation into individual components, each of which, 
simultaneously, is maintained only through the whole. 177 
Actuality is always the resolution of universality into particularity; the latter appears to be self- 
sufficient, although it is sustained and supported only in the whole. "' 
In terms of reproducibility, the framework of institutions must be self- 
sustaining in two senses. Firstly, as I have argued, they must materially 
reproduce themselves as, for example, the family produces human beings and 
Civil Society produces material wealth. Secondly, they must provide for the 
Spiritual reproduction of the community, forging human beings whom 
participate in and identify with the social whole. I shall detail the various ways in 
which the latter is achieved bellow. 
The most important, and distinctly Hegelian, aspect of 'objective freedom' is 
that the institutions of ethical life replicate the structure of the rational concept. 
As we have seen in Chapter One, in order for an object to be intelligible, reason 
must be structured in terms of the rational concept. This is because the structure 
1'7 See my discussion of Hegel's organicism in Chapter One. 
178 Hegel (199 1) pp. 302-4. 
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of the rational concept is also that of reality as a whole. As I have said, the 
rational concept contains three moments, immediate unity, difference and 
mediated unity. This metaphysical claim is now seen to be given a more concrete 
elucidation in Hegel's political philosophy in that each aspect of the social order 
is seen to correspond to one of these moments. Hence, the family corresponds to 
inunediate unity, in that it fosters an unconditional and unreflective bond of trust 
between its members. Civil society, conversely, corresponds to 'difference' 
whereby relations between atomistic individuals are only external. In the state, 
we have the moment of mediated unity, whereby the different spheres are 
coordinated yet preserved as differentiated moments. 179 
4.3) Bildung - The Formative impact of Social Institutions 
To get an idea of how this differentiated unity works, we need to understand 
the second feature of 'objective freedom', that of securing the means for people 
to realise their freedom. Central to this idea is the notion of Bildung, a broad 
term used to describe the forging of uneducated, natural individuals into free, 
self-conscious human beings. As I argued in Chapter One, Hegel's distinct 
solution to the problem of relating reason to ones instincts and desires is to forge 
the raw, natural, human being into one endowed with reason so that neither is in 
conflict. The human subject acts on the basis of reason, not for its own sake (as 
in Kant) but on the basis of drives or instincts which themselves are tamed and 
molded into reason. That we come to act upon instincts which accord with 
It is, incidentally, precisely this development of abstract categories in the Logic and 
subsequent application to the modern world that Marx objects to in his 'Critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy of the State'. Marx (1974) pp. 57-199. 
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reason is a product of Bildung. As opposed to formal education, Bildung takes 
place behind the backs of its subjects. There is, therefore, no need to presume a 
desire for the acquisition of freedom amongst the participants of modern ethical 
life. By engaging in the fan-dly and civil society, which individuals must do of 
necessity to survive, they acquire the characteristics of free individuals by 
stealth. The very harsh and disciplinary nature of this initiation to the world is, 
furthermore, central to people coming to realise the importance of freedom. 
The process of Bildung works through the coordination of activity in the two 
spheres mentioned above (family and civil society). I shall come to the role of 
the state later. Together, these spheres not only meet the requirements of the 
rational concept, but also promote the three separate conceptions of freedom I 
outlined above, abstract personhood, moral subjectivity and the 'social freedom' 
engendered through ethical life. They, therefore, maintain the lower as well as 
the higher types of freedom. Neuhouser identifies a number of reasons why the 
modern family can be seen to promote the values of freedom. " Whilst these 
arguments are by no means exhaustive and only briefly stated, they give some 
indication of how Hegel envisages participation in the institutions of ethical life 
as a form of Bildung. Firstly, the family engenders moral subjectivity through 
parental discipline. The child, originally a mass of natural desires and instincts, 
begins to identify with an authority outside itself and comes to transform itself in 
the image of the authority figure. This represents an important stage in the ability 
to direct ones raw inclination. "' Secondly, the family gives children an important 
"0 Nwhouser (2000) pp. 150-157. 
"' 'The end to which punishment s are directed is ... of a subjective and moral nature, seeking to 
have a deterrent effect on a freedom still entrammelled in nature and to raise the universal into 
the childrens consciousness and will. ' Hegel (199 1) p. 211. 
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lesson in learning to treat collective ends as ones own, necessary for full 
engagement in ethical life. The relationship of trust, or intrinsic obligation to 
others, helps children think of their ends in terms of a common project. "' 
Thirdly, the family is central to attaining recognition. Children are not only 
furnished with particular traits from their parents but gain recognition of their 
particularity from them. Unlike the recognition individuals 'win' in the field of 
civil society, the recognition conferred from a parent to child is unconditional. "' 
Finally, the family gives children the skills and confidence to find independence 
in the world. Hegel finds the modern nuclear family particularly well suited to 
this task, unlike the extended family, which he claims fosters dependence. "' 
The formative effects of Civil Society are very different. Civil society is largely 
the realm of atomistic, setf-interest, although the meeting of private ends is seen 
to be broadly consistent with the collective attainment of material well-being. "' 
Hegel's admission of the inevitability of social inequality and poverty under such 
circumstances places serious limits on his claims in this respect. 116 The existence 
of the corporations is supposed to mitigate such atomism, although the Solidarity 
within different interests is, again, based on external relations of mutual gain, far 
from the volitional immediacy of the family. Central to engagement in civil 
society is the formative effects of labour. As Hegel claims in the 
Phenomenology: 
182 Hegel (199 1) p. 2 10. 
"3 Ibid., p. 211. 
184 Ibid., p. 213. 
"' Ibid., pp. 220-226. 
186 See, for example, Hegel (1991) p. 265, where Hegel discusses the structual inequalities in a 
market system. 
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Work ... is desire held in check, fleetingness starved off; 
in other words, work forms and shapes the 
thing. The negative relation to the object becomes its form and something permanent, because it is 
precisely for the worker that the object has independence. This negative middle term or the 
formative activity is at the same time the individuality or pure being-for-self of consciousness 
which now, in the work outside of it, acquires an element of permanence. It is in this way, 
therefore, that consciousness, qua worker, comes to see in the independent being [of the object] its 
own independence. "' 
This passage, from Hegel's description of the dialectic of master and slave, 
gives some important background regarding the formative qualities of labour. 
Labour channels the raw, natural desire of the worker into a specific goal, 
transforming or shaping a particular thing. Through this, the ends of the worker 
attain a 'permanence' or objective existence by which the worker can himself 
comprehend the impact of his activity. By shaping an objective existence 
through his activity he too comes to realise objectivity in that he sees himself as 
able to transform the world according to his own ends. Labour is an essential 
formative aspect in winning a free will. 
The question, however, is as to what specific qualities of modern civil society 
give rise to its unique ability to generate and sustain 'objective freedom'. Here, 
Hegel argues, it is the particularly abstract nature of the relations between people 
within a capitalist market that allow them to achieve 'universality. The capitalist 
market is characterised by a highly specialised division of labour and a 
specialisation of commodity production to meet ever more specific needs. 
Moreover, the reduction of concrete to abstract labour and the mediation of 
social relations through the medium of money (in Marxist terms), means that we 
come to regard others not in terms of their particularity but their being a class of 
'human beings' with which we can identify. 
"' Hegel (1977) p. 118. 
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out of the mediation [inherent in] universal exchange of labour and goods the individual 
becomes, and goes forth as, a self-consciously free will ... which is also universal. 
"' 
In Neuhouser's phrasing 'they establish an identity to that which is not 
identical'. "' In opposition to Marx (and of course Adorno), therefore, the 
abstract nature of relations in civil society is a positive formative experience, so 
long as it exists in check with the other two key institutions of modern ethical 
life. In the family one receives recognition for ones particularity whilst in civil 
society one is as part of the universal class of humanity. 
Finally, we come to the state. Hegel regarded the State as independent from 
both the immediate particularity of the family and the instrumentalist 
universality of Civil Society and saw it as able to regulate and maintain the 
distinction between the two. Whereas, in Civil Society, universality is an 
unintended consequence of individuals acting for their particular ends, 
Universality becomes a self-conscious end in the State: 
The state therefore knows what it wills and knows it in its universality as something thought. 
Consequently, it acts and functions in accordance with known ends and recognised principles, and 
with laws not only in themselves but also for the consciousness. 
By this Hegel means that the state expresses the universal through laws, which 
are publicly transparent. Citizens can see the universal through which they 
subsist as having emerged through public deliberation (of course, excluding 
women and most corporations) and objectified in law. Furthermore, as Patten 
... Die Philosophie des Rechts: Die Mitschriften Wannenmann (Heidelberg 1817) p. 125 quoted 
in Neuhouser (2000) p. 163. 
18' Neuhouser (2000) p. 163. 
'90 See Hegel (1991) pp. 290-304. 
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argues, the universal nature of the state can be seen to possess two further 
dimensions, which separate it from Civil Society and the Family. Firstly, the 
universality Hegel refers to is that of a 'universal good', independent of people's 
contingent desires and inclinations. The State promotes the capacity for free and 
rational agency and strong social ties as rational goods, above and beyond 
whether we affirm them individually. In Civil Society, in contrast, universal 
goods are only accidental results from the selfish pursuit of ends. Secondly, the 
universal good promoted by the State is 'other-regarding', having to do with the 
good of the community as a whole and not ones self, family or close friends. 
Hence, in the rational State, we find the final moment of the Concept, mediated 
unity. Freedom now exists as 'Idea', as the 'true' concept of freedom actualised 
through a triadic structure of social institutions each representing one moment of 
the rational concept: 
The right of the state is therefore superior to the other stages, it is freedom in its most concrete 
shape, which is subordinate only to the supreme absolute truth of the world Spirit. "' 
5) Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have addressed two central aspects of Hegel's political 
philsophy. I take these to be crucial to an understanding of the notion of 
reconciliation. Firstly, I have looked at the subjective disposition required by free 
agents. I have argued against interpreting Hegel as a Kantian in this respect, 
drawing attention to his less oppositional conception of the relationship between 
reason and impulse. I have also explored the nature of the ethical disposition 
aquired by agents in ethical life, arguing that it aquires the charecteristics of a 
"' Hegel (199 1) p. 64. 
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'second nature'. Secondly, I have looked at the notion of objective freedom in 
Hegel, to examine how the subjective capacity for freedom and reconciliation is 
to be socially instantiated. I have argued that there are two crucial components at 
work here. These are, firstly, the existence of institutions which promote the 
mutual recognition of agents as persons of moral worth and, secondly, 
institutions and practices which develop an appropriate ethical disposition in 
agents. In the latter case, I have given a number of examples (from the 
relationships of family, civil society and citizenship) to demonstrate how Hegel 
envisages this process of Bildung to take place. 
All these resources, I will later argue, are important for the understanding of 
reconciliation in the critical tradition, although there are crucial differences in 
content. Before developing Theodor Adorno's own notion of reconcilliation, 
however, I want to step back to the question of Hegel's metaphysics. It is from 
this point that I want to develop Adonro's critique of Hegel. 
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3) The Absolute as Capital? Adorno's 
Reading of Hegel 
1) Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, I gave an account of Hegel's notion of 
reconciliation both at the metaphysical and political levels and suggested that 
many of the shortcomings in Hegel's thinking might be rooted in his inability to 
fully grasp the notion of social constitution. As I will argue, At the level of his 
metaphysics, Hegel n-dsidentifies the collective activity of flesh-and-blood 
human beings with God, whereas, in his political philosophy, Hegel hypostasises 
the capitalist forms of the state, economic exchange and nuclear family. This 
chapter develops such criticisms more closely, via Adorno's Three Studies on 
Hegel, attempting to bring together both the critique of Hegel's metaphysics and 
his politics. 
The key claim made by Adorno that I want to address here is that Hegel's 
Absolute is analogous in structure to capital. In examining this claim I want to 
begin to assess the extent to which Adorno can consistently think both with and 
against Hegel. On the one hand, Adorno can be seen to adopt Hegelian 
categories in articulating his understanding of the operation of the capital. On the 
other hand, Adorno accuses Hegel of hypostasising the capital relation and 
failing to understand it as socially constituted. 
Before examining the substance of Adorno's argument, I want to first look 
more generally at the way in which Adorno reads historical texts. This is 
important in that it allows us to understand (1) why Adorno thinks he can 
develop an understanding of Hegel's philosophical vocabulary outside Hegel's 
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own self-understanding and (2) why Adorno thinks he can attribute features to 
Hegel's thinking (for example the Absolute as a representation of Capital) that 
Hegel himself does not. Following on from this, I begin with a preliminary 
account of Adorno's relationship to the German idealist tradition in general. 
Next, I begin to enquire as to whether the Absolute-Capital analogy holds. I do 
this at two of levels, examining whether it takes into account Hegel's substantive 
concerns with human freedom (as covered in Chapter Two) and whether the 
logical relationship is analogous. 
I will argue that, because of Adorno's understanding of textual criticism, he is 
able to develop Hegel's vocabulary in a way which is not compromised by the 
more dubious aspects of Hegel's metaphysics (as described in Chapter One). In 
Chapter One, I argued that Hegel's mysticism and his strongly teleological 
account of rational necessity were incompatible with a rational and anti- 
determinist Marxism. In this chapter, I compound this criticism by claiming that 
Hegel's account of the relationship between particularity and universality mirrors 
the reduction of the qualitative to fungible commodities in capitalist exchange. 
2) Adorno and Philosophical Texts 
I take Adorno to be making five key claims as to the proper approach to 
Philosophical texts. 
1) Adorno insisted on an approach to philosophy whereby the critic navigates 
within the parameters of a particular philosophical tradition rather than 
criticising it from outside. Instead of formulating first principles and then setting 
out to claim an intellectual victory over this or that theory, philosophy is to take 
as its starting point the development of internal tensions within an existing 
tradition. This approach is often described as 'Immanent Critique'. 
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In 'Tradition and Knowledge"" Adorno claims that knowledge has become a 
hypostasised duplication of the world 'as it is'. We have become unable to see 
the world as socially constituted with an array of possible futures. Part of the 
reason for this is the intellectual division of labour, in which history has become 
a 'special, fact-gathering branch of science"" and philosophy has carved out its 
own niche in epistemology. As such, philosophy becomes unable to comprehend 
its own historicity. 
However, Adorno does not, however, believe that such a division of labour can 
be skipped 'by fiat"' in adopting a radically different or more holistic 
philosophical approach. We cannot start from first principles or simply re- 
describe things in a different way. This is why, for example, Adorno's response 
to epistemology is characterised as the 'metacritique of epistemology', and not 
'Against Epistemology' as it is often translated (from Zur Metakritik der 
Erkenntistheorie). "' In Adorno's twist on the disenchantment thesis, 196 the 
problem confronting modernity is that we have progressively disavowed the very 
mediations through which reason subsists (nature, language or tradition, for 
example). Central to this condition is what Adorno describes as the 'fallacy of 
constitutive subjectivity', " whereby the thinking subject thinks of itself as self- 
sufficient, outside the various mediations which are the condition of its 
possibility. It is a 'fallacy', firstly, because it denies what makes reason possible 
"' Adorno (1973) pp. 53-55. 
193 Adorno (1973) p. 53. 
Adorno (1973) p. 205. 
For example, the translation by Willis Domingo (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982) 
19' See Adorno (1997) pp. 343. 
197 Adorno (1973) p. xx. 
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and, secondly, because it ideologically reinforces an illusion of freedom within a 
world in which we are objectively unfree. This is why, for Adorno, 'wiping the 
slate clean' is not an option. To do so merely repeats the 'fallacy of constitutive 
subjectivity' in assuming that such natural- historical conditions can be removed 
by an act of will. 
For this reason, Adorno claims that his approach to philosophy cannot be 
described as a method. "' A method, whereby one adopts some external schema 
to be applied to particular content, expects the object of knowledge to 
conveniently arrange itself around the subject's methodological apparatus. In 
rejecting methodology, Adorno heralds a 'transition to exegesis' "' in which the 
tensions arising within the text itself are the starting point for enquiry. In this 
way, 'philosophy rests upon the texts it criticises. ' Adorno approvingly cites 
Hegel's remarks at the opening of the Phenomenology that philosophy requires 
'simply looking on'. " Of course, in Hegel, such spontaneous receptivity to the 
object is possible only because it is ultimately identical with the absolute 
subject. 20' 
2) Whilst philosophy must remain within tradition, it can reinterpret the 
semantic power of particular concepts outside the intentions of the author. As 
Rosen argues, concepts 'can turn out to have an identity which in fact goes 
beyond the way that they function to organise those texts in which they were 
"' Adorno (1973) pp. 4-6. 
199 Ibid., p. 55. 
200 Ibid., p. 55. 
201 Ibid., p. 6. 
202 See the next section for Adorno's critique of Hegel in this respect. 
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originally used'. ' Hence, Adorno is adamant that grasping Hegel's concepts not 
be restricted to Hegel's 'self- understanding'. ' 
3) The possibility of developing concepts in this way rests upon the assumption 
that every philosophical concept carries a reference to natural-historical 
experience within it. Concepts are not neutral semantic entities but expressions 
of particular, epochal modes of human experience. As I have claimed, Adorno 
sees philosophy as proceeding from developing internal tensions in a text or 
tradition more generally. So, for example, he systematically engages with 
various distinctions in Kant's thinking (theory and practice, noumena and 
phenomena, concept and intuition etc. ) which he takes to be ultimately 
untenable. However, the contradictions in Kant's thinking are not read as 
mistakes on his part or intellectual errors. Such contradictions attest to real 
historical contradictions, for example the distinction between knowing an object 
in-itself and as it appears to consciousness, which for Adorno testifies to the 
reified nature of objects of labour in the exchange society. "' Adorno calls this 
approach a 'metacritique' as it is an investigation of the conditions of possibility 
of particular philosophical systems. Whereas Kant enquires as to the conditions 
of possibility of experience, Adorno enquires in to the conditions of possibility 
of Kant's formulation of experience. 
20' Rosen (1982) p. 153. 
204 Adorno (1973) pp. 160-1. 
'0' 'The rigidly dualistic basic structure of Kant's rational, critical model duplicates that of a 
relation of production, in which commodities fall out of machines like his phenomena fall out of 
the cognitive mechanism; where the material and its own determinacy are as indifferent in 
relation to their profit as in Kant, who has it stencilled in. ' (Adorno (1973) p. 387) 
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This account of concepts is possible because of what Adorno describes as 
'metalogical reference'. " Adorno wants to challenge Kant's notion that the 
existence of the categories can be epistemologically separated from their 
experiential content, instead claiming that for a concept to be thinkable it must 
contain a reference to experience. Concepts thought of in separation to their 
experiential content are not only empty but blind, not even thinkable. ' 
Such 'metalogical reference' means that even the most abstract philosophical 
systems can be deciphered to yield their 'truth content': 'The only way to pass 
philosophically into social categories is to decipher the truth content of 
philosophical categories. ' " 
4) The idea of 'metalogical reference' distinguishes Adorno's approach from 
that of a sociology of knowledge. For the latter, and it seems Adorno explicitly 
has in mind the sociologist Karl Mannheim, 'the truth or untruth of philosophical 
'06 Adorno (1973) p. 135. 
207 Adorno (1973) p. 391. Adorno essentially reiterates Hegel's critique of Kant. The apriori 
categories of the understanding are unintelligible in isolation from the nonconceptual. 
Furthermore, the forms of time and space are not pure intuitions but accessed only through the 
conceptual. Adorno's concern is to open up the possibility of removing Kant's 'block' on 
metaphysics by demonstrating the mutual implicatedness of concept and content. However, that 
Kanfs system is contingently rooted in a specific form of natural-historical experience is the 
conclusion of Adorno's study rather than being the opening premise. He is well aware that a 
consistent Kantian would claim all possible experience to be made possible only by the existence 
of the categories. The success of the argument is, therefore, contingent on the extent to which he 
can challenge the tenability of the various epistemological distinctions in Kant's system. For a 
fuller account of Adorno's critique of Kant see his Lectures on Kant's First Critique and Jarvis 
(1998) Chapter 6. Whilst following Hegel's critique of Kant to a point, Adorno does not accept 
Hegel's conclusions as will be seen below. 
20' Adorno (1973) p. 198. 
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teaching has nothing to do with social conditions'. " Mannheim posited a causal 
relationship between one's social base or membership of a particular group and 
ones knowledge of the world arguing that there is no socially or historically 
independent criteria of truth. Adorno does not, however, see the relationship 
between philosophical categories and sociology as externally contingent. 
Because categories by their very nature contain an experiencial referent, to 
develop contradictions in philosophical texts is to engage in social criticism. 
Furthermore, such contradictions (if honestly and accurately attested to) reach 
beyond contingent perspectives to the very objective nature of social relations 
themselves. "' 
5) From the above, we can see two notions of 'truth"" in operation. Firstly, 
'truth' refers to the ability of a philosophical system to testify to real historical 
'0' Ibid. 
"Adorno has little patience with any form of relativism. In fact, he describes the emergence of 
relativism as a product of a necessary illusion involved in capitalist social relations. 
'An entrepreneur who does not wish to be crushed by the competition must calculate so that the 
unpaid part of the yield of alienated labour falls to him as a profit, and must think that like for like 
- labour-power versus its cost of reproduction - is thereby exchanged; it can just as stringently be 
shown, however, why this objectively necessary consciousness is objectively false-The 
presumed social relativity of the intuitions obeys the objective law of social production under 
private ownership of the means of production. ' Adorno (1973) p. 36. 
"' Adorno's notion of 'truth' is fairly unique. It is Platonic, in that truth is an aspect of the 
(absent) good, and Hegelian in that it is embodied in institutions and practices (see Finlayson, 
2003 p172n). Furthermore, given Adorno's philosophical negativism - truth often figures as a 
form of experience rather than a set of propositions. Certain types of modern music, for 
example, are capable of delivering a somatic, non-discursive form of experience which pieces 
through the 'universal fungibility'. 
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contradictions and not bury or hide the antagonisms of bourgeois society. Kant's 
project, for Adorno, is particularly interesting in this respect. Secondly, 'truth' 
consists in presenting natural- historical experience as changeable or open-ended 
and not converting features of present experience into historical invariants. 
Adorno, drawing heavily on aesthetics, is concerned precisely with trying to 
open up potential space for different forms of experience. Despite the apparent 
immutability of modern consumer capitalism and its debasement of human 
experience, this is not the only imaginable world. 
The question remains as to why it is only the specific tradition of German 
Idealism that is worthy of engagement. I can think of two reasons why Adorno 
thinks this. Firstly, as I have indicated, attempts to go beyond the questions 
raised by Kant and Hegel by setting the problems they raise to one side often 
result in adopting positions which they have already anticipated and criticised. 
This is particularly true of the ontological positions of Kierkegaard, Husserl and 
Heidegger. "' Secondly, the dynamic philosophical approaches of Hegel and 
latter Marx best acknowledge the real antimonies of bourgeois society without 
hiding behind logical non-contradictoriness. Adorno is particularly scathing of 
Anglo-American analytical philosophy, seemingly for this reason. It is difficult, 
however, not to read a great deal of academic snobbery into Adorno's Germanic 
foCUS. 213 
212 See Jarvis (1998) Adomo (CUP, Cambridge) Ch. 8 for a good account of Adorno's work on 
these three philosophers. 
21' Adorno, whilst in Oxford, complains that "making actual philosophical things comprehensible 
to the English counts among the impossibilities [of working at Oxford], and to a certain extent I 
have to screw back my work to a child's level in order to remain intelligible" Quoted in Buck- 
Morss (1978) pp. 138-9). Ayer, who was also at Oxford at the time, refers to Adorno as a "comic 
figure" with a "dandified manner and appearance". The department, he claims, was 'ýmore 
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2) Adorno's account of Hegel - Some Preliminaries 
What I will do now is look at how Adorno's approach to philosophical exegesis 
works in relation to Hegel's writing. Adorno, as a materialist thinker, wants to 
challenge Hegel's idealism, whilst being very much aware that many attempts to 
move beyond Hegel fall back to positions Hegel had already anticipated. 
Furthermore, Adorno does not take Hegel's absolute idealism, however, to be 
straightforwardly idealist. Adorno wants to argue that idealism and realism are 
not opposed for Hegel. It is precisely through absolute idealism that the 
opposition between matter and a consciousness that bestows form is 
extinguished. For this reason, Hegel can make the claim in the Phenomenology 
that his 'method' is one of 'simPly looking on' "' and not mere subjectivism. 
The system of knowledge is ultimately identical with the absolute; hence it refers 
beyond the subject. 
In what sense, then, is Hegel still wedded to idealism? Adorno still wants to 
maintain that Hegel dissolves 'anything not proper to consciousness into a 
positing by the absolute Spirit'. '" Hegel, Adorno argues, is caught in a 
contradiction between his Fichtean inheritance (the idea of the world as derived 
from an original positing) and the implications of his own 'dynamic totality' 
which discards any original positing. Hegel wants to grasp the world as a 
positing by Spirit, yet in making everything commensurable with Spirit, he has 
to do away with the very idea of a foundational subject that does the positing. 
amused than impressed by the attention he was directing to the philosophy of Jazz". (Ayer (1978) 
p. 153) 
214 Adorno (1993) p. 6. 
215 Adorno (1993) p. 10. 
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Both world and subject are ultimately identical. In Adorno's words, Hegel's 
Spirit 'tries to jump over its own shadow'. 216 
This creates a problem for Hegel. The 'P, in not being distinguished from all 
else, 'belongs instead to what it is opposed to', it belongs to what is posited 
(Adorno (1993) p. 14). Fichte (and Hegel's) response to this problem is the 
abstraction of the subject from the individual. Whereas Kant, more honestly, 
testifies to the irreducibility of the (empirical) world and a transcendental 
subject, Fichte tries to 'extricate' the transcendental subject further and further 
from facticity. For Kant, the transcendental subject needs a 'supplementary' 
content, sensuous nature, in order for knowledge to be possible. Adorno argues 
that both Hegel and Fichte, in contradistinction, abstract the subject from the 
empirical individual through the logic of their attempts to move beyond Kant. 
They, however, forget that 'I' must designate some consciousness or other and 
end up making Spirit 'nonsense. "' 
Adorno claims that this abstraction Hegel's position mirrors the abstract social 
relations of capitalist society. Hegel is really expressing a certain social form 
albeit whilst unaware that he is doing so. Adorno is aware that reading Hegel in 
this way makes him susceptible to the 'reproach of sociologism, "' the charge 
that Adorno is abandoning the procedure of immanent critique and merely 
mapping an external social structure onto Hegel's system. However, Adorno 
denies that this is what he is doing, given that he takes his starting point to be the 
incoherence generated by Hegel's abstraction from the empirical subject. Rather 
than read this as an intellectual error on Hegel's part, however, Adorno thinks 
216 Ibid., p. 13. 
217 Ibid., p. 17. 
2'a Adorno (1993) p. 18. 
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that the abstract nature of Hegel's notion of Spirit accurately says something 
about the fetishised nature of modern life. 
What does Adorno mean by this? Firstly, Spirit's mediation of individual 
moments functions in a manner analogous to society's mediation of human 
individuals through social labour. There is a logical relationship between the 
two. Just as in the exchange society, each exists only for 'someone else, reduced 
to a mere moment of a larger whole, each moment of Spirit exists only by virtue 
of the totality: 'The individual fact can no more avoid it [Spirit] than the 
individual person can avoid the contrainte sociale. ' "' 
Secondly, Spirit's abstraction from the empirical is analogous to the operation 
of the exchange society in which the individual properties of human beings and 
the goods they produce are subsumed by universal exchange. Society attains a 
hovering, suspended character, appearing not as the collective work of flesh-and- 
blood human beings but as an entity with a life of its own: 
As the unity of human subjects who reproduce the life of the species who reproduce the life of the 
species through their labour, things come into being within society objectively, independent of 
reflection, without regard to the specific qualities of those who labour or the products of labour. "' 
Finally, just as capitalist socialisation is accompanied by the violent restraint 
and containment of human powers and forms of expression, the labour of the 
concept' idolised by Hegel, is a form of heteronomy. For Adorno, concepts are 
formed in and through the attempt to understand and manipulate nature. 211 in 
coming to know and control nature (here Adorno means both the external world 
and our own somatic or corporeal being) under the mechanism of subsumptive 
219 Ibid., p. 20. 
Adorno (1993) p. 20. 
221 Adorno (1973) p. I I/Adorno (1993) p. 22. 
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classification it comes to be fixed and immutable. Hence 'the strains and toils of 
the concept are not metaphorical'. "' 
Thus, in summation, Hegel is driven towards the empirical by the incoherence 
of his own attempts to abstract from it. Furthermore, society is not a purely 
empirical entity but embodies the mechanisms of Spirit. However, the society 
Hegel's system represents is not one standing at the pinnacle of reason's triumph 
but the 'false' society of universal exchange. Hegel, for Adorno, is mistaken in 
identifying it as such. He transfigures (abstract) labour, 'which is the suffering of 
human beings', " into the triumph of reason. 
Before looking in more detail at these claims, there is a further important sense 
in which Adorno takes Hegel to be mistaken. Hegel, firstly, takes the totality of 
social labour and presents it not as a product of human activity but the 'actus 
purus' of Spirit. There is a reversal of constitutum and constituens. Secondly, 
However, Adorno recalls Marx's 'Critique of the Gotha Program' in claiming 
that the totality of social labour itself also needs a substratum, physical nature. 
The absence of any material substratum in Hegel's thinking is itself seen to 
mirror the historical separation of physical and mental labour. It represents the 
hypostasis of one pole of labour, mental, in abstraction from the corporeal. 
Whilst the hypostasis is deceptive it is not of Hegel's own invention. Adorno 
thinks that the 'closed universality' " of social labour requires everything to be 
mediated through social labour to the extent that we have no access to that 
beyond the subject. 
222 Adorno (1993) p. 21. 
223 Adorno (1993) p. 23 
224 Ibid., p. 25. 
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Therefore, the reconciliation heralded by Hegel between man and world is 
described by Adorno as a 'trespass' against real reconciliation. It is a false 
assertion of oneness in a world of 'unreconcilable violence'. Adorno's position 
here is not the trivial claim that Hegel's ethical justification of the modern social 
world fail to map onto the world as it is, that he simply 'got it wrong' in adhering 
too enthusiastically to the potential of the French Revolution. For many of 
Hegel's defenders it is Hegel's underestimation of the nefarious impact of 
capitalism and not his substantive philosophical claims that force him to into his 
theodicy of the modern world. " However, for Adorno, it is not the case simply 
that Hegel's reconciliation has been espoused prematurely, rather that the 
structure of reconciliation in Hegel's work itself is one of 'annexing the alien'.... 
of subsuming all otherness (see below). As I have claimed, this is not a 'mistake' 
on Hegel's path but testimony to the experiential basis of Hegel's system in the 
embryonic capitalism of early 19th Century Prussia. It is all the more impressive 
in that, 150 years on, it has proved itself to be true beyond Hegel's expectations. 
A world integrated through production through the exchange relationship, depends in all its 
moments on the social conditions of its production, and in that sense actually realizes the primacy 
of the whole over its parts; in this regard the desperate impotence of every single individual now 
verifies Hegels extravagant conception of the system. 227 
Despite accusing Hegel of the 'celebration' of Bourgeois labour, Adorno also 
sees a certain sense in which Hegel denounces the whole. Firstly, Adorno warns 
225 See Smith, Tony (2001) Review of 'Hegel on History' by Joseph McCarney in Historical 
Materialism Volume 9 Number I 
226 Adorno (1973) p. 19 1. 
22' Adorno (1993) p. 27. 
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against seeing Hegel's idolisation of the state as some sort of rnýistake or 
irrelevant addition to his political philosophy. The excessive authority of Hegel's 
state is necessary only because he recognises that the contradictions in civil 
society, the drive towards impoverishment and the creation of a 'penurious 
rabble', "' cannot be contained without the imposition of external authority. 
Hence, he testifies to the irreconcilability of bourgeois social relations. Secondly, 
however, Hegel cannot transgress the limits of bourgeois society without 
negating the thesis of Absolute identity. The speculative identity of rationality 
and actuality requires that the dialectical principle not radically extend beyond 
'what exists'. " At least, the ethical foundations of Hegel's political philosophy 
must be rooted in institutions and practices, which are tangible and concrete. Yet 
Hegel's thinking is also a critique of positivity, refusing to take 'facts' at face 
value and unveiling the dynamic mediations through which they subsist. Hegel 
fails to follow through the critical impulses of his thinking and, instead, comes to 
rest in absolute identity. Yet, although he fails in terms of his own criteria he also 
proves himself true as 'in reality this very non-identity has the form of 
identity'. "' In other words, the failure to register anything outside of the 
dialectic, to assume the identity of identity and non-identity, is testimony to the 
drive of capital to dominate each and every aspect of human practice. 
3) Some Critical Issues 
Adorno's identification of the logic of Hegel's Spirit with capital relations 
raises a number of important problems. Firstly, many contemporary Hegel 
commentators would argue that Hegel's substantive concerns with human 
2" Hegel (199 1) p. 267. 
Adorno (1993) p. 1.1 challenge this interpretation of the double-dictum in Chapter Four. 
230 Ibid., p. 31. 
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freedom do not lend themselves to the analogy with capital relations described 
above. Hegel's entire project is dedicated to the development of capacities for 
human self-determination and is not an ideological apology for totalitarianism. In 
response to such claims we could restrict the analogy to a logical analogy 
between the structure of Hegel's Spirit and that of capital. This analogy raises 
some fundamental issues as regards Adorno's use of Hegelian vocabulary and 
his relationship to Marxism. Thirdly, and most importantly, the analogy raises 
important questions about the constitution of capital. Adorno's identification of 
capital with Hegel's idea, leads to a very one-dimensional conception of capital 
relations. If capital has in fact become a self- actual is ing power, what chance is 
there of its overthrow? I shall deal with these three areas in sequence. 
3.1) Hegel's Substantive Concerns 
Firstly, there is the question of Hegel's own views on capitalism and their 
relation to his views on human freedom. A more sympathetic reading"' sees 
Hegel as having a greater affinity to simple commodity production, not keen on 
the expansion of capitalism yet resigned to its inevitability and unable to 
conceive of a better means of social organisation. However, Hegel's 
philosophical justification of wage-labour seems to suggest otherwise. "' 
Furthermore his attempt to justify capitalist exchange on the grounds that it 
231 See McCarney (2000) p. 189. 
232 '1 can alienate individual products of my particular physical and mental skills and active 
capabilities to someone else and allow him to use them for a limited period, because, provided 
they are subject to this limitation, they aquire an external relationship to my totality and 
universality. ' (Hegel (1991) p. 97). Hegel thinks that only through externalising one's powers in 
this way can one become conscious of ones abilities. 
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allows the subject to achieve 'universality', being abstractly identified as part of 
a 'class' of human beings through the 'universal exchange of labour and 
goods'. " As I have argued, this is precisely the opposite position to Marx and 
Adorno. 
However, given this basic commitment to capitalism, Hegel is still deeply 
concerned with the prospects for human freedom. Hegel's idea of freedom 
requires a 'true reconciliation', involving not only the objective existence of 
freedom (freedom in accordance with the standards of reason) but also subjective 
freedom (the subjective identification with social institutions and the satisfaction 
of the subject's particularity). In other words, there is a set of firm ethical 
commitments in Hegel's thinking which make demands that cannot be 
accommodated within modern capitalism* Rather than providing an ideological 
gloss on capitalism, Hegel gives us critical resources to challenge it. 
There are a number of problems in Adorno's interpretation which mean that he 
fails to draw on such resources. Adorno wants to correct widespread 
misunderstandings of Hegel (especially in the English speaking world). He 
attacks those (such as Veblen, Dewey and Santayana) whom identify a 
connection between Hegel and German imperialism and fascism ... in his 
idolisation of the state. Likewise, he rejects Popper's claims of 'moral and legal 
positivism'. " However, Adorno himself tends towards such claims in 
interpreting Hegel as a Fichtean. Hegel's appeal to the state is of a very different 
16 nature to that of Fichte. Hegel's appeal to the state is orientated towards the 
facilitation and preservation of mutual recognition. It acts as an external device 
233 
234 Adorno (1993) p. 28. 
235 Popper (1969) p. 41. 
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to maintain the forms of recognition received in participation in the family and 
civil society in addition to engendering unique 'civil' forms of recognition itself. 
Adorno's references to Hegel's use of the term 'submission, " however, 
succumb to a rather crude interpretation of Hegel's political enterprise. 
No amount of interpretive skill would let us dispute away the fact that the word submission means 
the opposite of freedom ... 
Firstly, Adorno too quickly lumps Hegel in with Fichtean coercion rather than 
seeing mutual reciprocity as the ethical foundation of Hegel's political thought. 
This point is, perhaps, of minor importance, given that ultimately what Adorno 
wants to claim is that, irrespective of Hegel's intentions, he is forced into 
developing a highly authoritarian notion of the state in response to the 
contradictions within civil society. Mutual reciprocity must dissolve if the 
'penurious rabble' is to be kept in check. However, secondly, this statement 
raises confusion as to Adorno's own conception of freedom. As I will argue, 
Adorno, like Hegel, emphatically rejects the 'marketplace' notion of freedom as 
solely 'being able to do as one pleases'. " Also, like Hegel, he sees freedom as 
giving oneself over to the Other, adopting the Hegelian language of 
reconciliation. Furthermore, he rejects the Kantian notion of autonomy, instead 
prizing the value of humility, the 'attempt to do justice to what is other, won 
236 In Fichte, the state functions primarily as an external means of coercion to make sure all 
parties do what they have promised to do in terms of the social contract. The freedom available to 
those in Fichte's contract is very limited. In Fichte's state, 'no one must remain unknown to the 
police' (quoted in Gibson, A. (2002) Rethinking an old Saw in Adorno: A Critical Reader (Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford) p. 247). 
23' Adorno (1973) p. 350. 
211 Ibid. 
2'9 Hegel (199 1) pp. 48-9. 
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from reflection on ones own limitations'. '40 By polemically disn-dssing Hegel in 
this way Adorno comes across as a crude liberal. " 
Furthermore, Adorno does not register the difference between Objective and 
Absolute Spirit. Hegel, Adorno argues, remains 'ideological' in that his 
philosophy 'alleviates' the contradictions of civil society within the Absolute. 
Adorno accuses Hegel of 'suspending' the dialectic, in demanding the modern 
social world to be one worthy of reconciliation. "' This implies that Hegel's 
Absolute somehow acts as a mitigating device for the contradictions of civil 
society. Adorno appears to be being disingenuous here. Hegel is well aware of 
the evils of the world arising from civil society. Poverty and, in the extreme, war 
are necessary outcomes of capitalism. However, he takes a rather stoical attitude 
to such evils. Reason, as the 'rose in the cross in the present' 243 must facilitate 
our reconciliation to a world in which suffering is an inevitability. Hence our 
attitude towards 'objective Spirit', the realm of politics and social relations, is 
one of rectitude, of fulfilling our role. The sort of practical freedom Hegel 
associates with our everyday activity is often of a fairly austere type. So whilst 
Hegel often raises problems with a capitalist economy, its undermining of the 
independence of the state and its tendency to create the 'penurious rabble', he 
affirms the basic institutions of civil society as being fundamentally rational. 
However, in the realm of objective Spirit we are to respond stoically to such 
contingencies and achieve real freedom in the higher levels of philosophy, art 
and religion. 
240 Adorno (2000) p. 169. 
241 See Chapter Five for a fuller account of Adorno's notion of freedom. 
242 Adorno (1973) pp. 334-8. 
243 Hegel (199 1) p. 47. 
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In this respect Hegel is very much within the Lutheran tradition of dealing with 
the pains of the world by inner withdrawal. ' However, rather than merely acting 
as an extension of 'objective Spirit', 'absolute Spirit' embodies a conception of 
freedom qualitatively different from that of 'objective Spirit'. The Absolute 
'retains the highest contradiction within itself'. " 
This is not an accusation made by Marx, who sees Hegel as moving beyond his 
own standpoint only through pushing the negation of the negation into the 
absolute. Marx recognises in Hegel's idealism, a hypostasis of the condition of 
alienated labour. Yet he also sees, in the unceasing movement of the dialectic 
beyond what merely exists, the possibility for transcending such alienation: 
The Phenomenology is, therefore, a hidden, mystifying and still uncertain criticism; but inasmuch 
as it depicts mans estrangement, even though man appears only as mind, there lie concealed in it 
all the elements of criticism, already prepared and elaborated in a manner often rising far above 
the Hegelian standpoint. "' 
3.2) The Logical Analogy 
3. Z 1) Constitutum and Constituens 
Hegel's attitude towards capital is not, however, Adorno's primary concern. 
What he is more interested is the mechanisms of abstraction at work in both 
Hegel's hypostasis; of Spirit and the fetishism of capital. In Hegel, the 
substantive realms (political and social institutions and practices) are 
embodiments of the Idea. Although Hegel is occasionally muddled on this point 
his underlying project is to map out an abstract metaphysical system to which 
'44 See Marcuse (1986) p. 14. 
245 Hegel (1998) p. 824. 
246 Marx (1992) p. 385. 
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reality is to later correspond. " There is really no two-way interchange between 
thought and the real world, the latter is merely the embodiment of the former. 
This inversion of ground and what is grounded can, therefore, be seen to mirror 
the domination of dead over living labour. Furthermore, at the level of the 
individual, Hegel's logic reinforced the formal, legalistic freedom of capitalist 
social relations. "' If the truth of everything is an abstraction of itself, freedom 
can only be conceived in abstract, formal terms. Hegelian freedom can be seen to 
be logically connected to a state in which we are free in being able to sell our 
labour power but are forced to do so of necessity. It is freedom with no concrete 
content. 249 
'47 See Smith (1999) On the Homology Thesis in Historical Materialism Volume II Number 1. In 
response to C. J. Arthur, Smith claims this objection both rests on a misunderstanding of Hegel 
and is ultimately trivial. Hegel's abstraction is, Smith claims, merely 'thinking about thinking', a 
process of abstracting generalisations from the way in which people talk about and perceive the 
world thy live in (Smith, 2003 p. 188-9). Such 'thinking about thinking' has no intrinsic relation 
to capitalism, no specific connection to the process of fetishism, but is something that people do 
at all times. Indeed we will still need second order thinking under socialism. I want to argue that 
a) this is not Hegel's position and b) even if it were this objection is not trivial for Adorno in 
terms of his objection to identity thinking. 
248 See Arthur, C. J. (2003) The Hegel-Marx Connection in Historical Materialism Volume II 
Number I p. 183. 
249 This is something of a charecture of Hegel's position. Whilst Hegel does maintain a rather 
legalistic conception of freedom in Abstract right, this is dependent upon the wider sphere of 
Ethical Life, rooted in social institutions and practices that promote self-determination (see 
Chapter Two). Whilst Hegel was nSfve to think that such practices could withstand the impact of 
capitalism, his notion of freedom itself can be seen to point more productively beyond abstract 
legalism. 
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3. Z2) The Preponderance of the Universal 
Perhaps the most important criticism underpinning Adorno's response to Hegel 
regards Hegel's philosophical privileging of the universal. This is Adorno's 
greatest concern with Hegel's project, despite Hegel's own claim that dialectical 
movement preserves differentiation. Against Gibson", who claims that Adorno 
is merely misinterpreting Hegel in a Fichtean light, it appears that Adorno's 
prime concern is more in terms of what Hegel is allowed to do within his own 
terms. Hegel's assertion of the value of the individual and his emphasis on 
differentiation is superseded by the driving logic of his system: 
The conception of a totality harmonious through all its antagonisms compels him to assign to 
individuation, however much he may designate it a driving moment in the process, an inferior 
status in the construction of the whole 251 
This is process is bound up with a fundamental problem with Hegel's 
conception of the individual and particular: 
There is only one way for Hegelian logic succinctly to identify a universal and an undefined 
particular, to equate cognition with the fact that the two poles are mediated; and that is for logic 
which Hegel also views as an a priori doctrine of general structures, not to deal with the particular 
as a particular at all. His logic deals only with particularity, which is already conceptual. Thus 
established, the logical primacy of the universal provides a fundament for the social and political 
primacy that Hegel is opting for. "' 
The 'individual' and 'particular' in Hegel are merely the concepts of 
'particularity' and 'individuality' and as such deny themselves. For Hegel the 
Concept is 'the infinite form, the free creative activity which can realise itself 
250 Gibson (2002) p. 260. 
"' Adorno (1974) p. 17. 
252 Adorno (1973) p. 326. 
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without the need for a material present outside itself". For Adorno, it is 
precisely such 'material' which makes concepts thinkable. Adorno's dialectic is 
therefore of an entirely different nature to that of Hegel, operating in and through 
the poles of identity and non-identity. Hegel's assumption of thought's self- 
sufficiency is the sine qua non of identificatory thinking. Therefore, despite 
Hegel's claims to give such moments their due, to preserve in thinking the 
differentiated moments which constitute it, he must ultimately bow to the 
primacy of the universal. 
3. Z3) The Negation of the Negation 
As I have claimed, the crux of Adorno's relation to Hegel rests upon the extent 
to which Hegel can accommodate differentiation. The analogy between Hegel's 
Absolute and the operation of Capital ultimately rests on the reduction of 
otherness to sameness. Just as the self-movement of the concept in Hegel 
dissolves all otherness, so does capital come to dominate every aspect of social 
life. The key, for Adomo, is Hegel's tendency towards integration is the 
$negation of the negation'. 
Hegel's negation of the negation, it is claimed, pushes Hegel's dialectic towards 
'absolute integration'. Indeed, such integration, Adomo associates with 
Auschwitz, the supreme indifference to particularity, 'Absolute negativity is in 
plain sight and has ceased to surprise anyone. ' ' 
That negative enquiry produces a positive result is seen to lend itself to the 
affirmation of the status quo, precisely against the 'positivity' that was the target 
of Hegel's criticism. This is especially so in light of the horrors of twentieth 
Roscn (1984) p. 156. 
Adorno 0 973) p. 362. 
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century history. Instead, if we are to take up the critical element out of Hegel's 
thinking, 'the seriousness of unswerving negation lies in its refusal to lend itself 
to sanctioning things as they are'. " So whilst Hegel's critical philosophy attains 
its dynamism from being able to find contradictions or insufficiencies in all 
categories or identities, it ultimately presupposes an identitarian framework in 
the 'identity of identity and non-identity. 2-' 
To those entirely sceptical of Hegel's metaphysical claims, such objections 
may seem straightforward. Yet Adorno, wants to rescue certain critical aspects 
from Hegel's philosophy whilst rejecting both the experiential content and key 
elements of the structure of Hegel's dialectic. His rejection, using Marx, of Spirit 
as an autonomous source of content attacks Hegel at his core. This is the basis of 
Adorno's analogy of Spirit to capital, that Spirit's production of content from 
itself mirrors the production of exchange value for its own sake. Yet Adorno's 
language is still embedded in Hegelian categories, for example, dialectic, 
mediation, reconciliation. He claims to be able to adopt the dialectic as a critical 
procedure for 'disintegrating' the logic of ident ity2" by unveiling the mediations 
through which though subsists. Rosen, in his book Hegel's Dialectic and its 
Criticism suggests that, firstly, Adorno is guilty of a misreading of Hegel and 
"'W(L, p. 159. 
2`6 Ibid., p. 7. 
g is to disavow the content of 2" According to Adorno, to think conceptually (identity thinking) 
that concept. To identify a particular we do not say what it is but what category or law it comes 
under. 
'Identity thinking says %hat something falls under, or of what it is an example or a representative 
- and therefore is not itseir Adorno (1973) p. 149. 
Adorno thinks that by 'identifying' an object we render it fixed and intransient and leave it open 
to manipulation. The concept is, thus, an instrument of domination. 
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that secondly, this misreading undermines his basis for distinction between 
positive and negative dialectic. 
The problem is that the tension between the raw 'content' and the 'concepts' 
applied to them can always be transcended in Hegel's thought. This is a 
presupposition of the Hegelian dialectic. Spirit is an autonomous source of 
content which 'operates behind the point at which the common opposition 
between positive and negative holds, and, for this reason, Adorno's suggestion 
that the movement of dialectic be subdivided is misplaced: if the negative 
movement takes place so, ipso facto does the positive one. "' For Adorno it is 
the tension generated by the untruth of identifying non-identical concepts and 
objects that is the basis of his negative dialectic. It is a dialectic, which, thus, 
does not take as its starting point the inevitability of its transcendence. This, for 
Rosen, amounts to a rejection not only of the affirmative aspect of Hegel's 
though but also of Hegel's whole enterprise. For Hegel, there is 'no such thing' 
as an affirmative and negative side to his thought, they are not distinct. 
Adorno, however, insists that it is not the 'identity of identity and non-identity' 
259 that makes dialectical thought possible but by the fact that identity and non- 
identity are not reducible to each other. It is the non-identical, an undialectical 
element, not exhausted by thought which makes dialectics possible. 
Adorno has to admit that his enterprise can not be seen as a strict development 
of Hegel's thinking, which, indeed, he does in Negative Dialectics. 
2" Roscn (1982) p. 163. 
2'9 Adorno (1973) p. 7. 
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If it was objected to this that the critique of the positive negation of the negation would cut the 
vital nerve of Hegels logic and permit no dialectical movement at all, then this latter would be 
delimited to a naYve faith in the authority of Hegel's self-understanding. " 
Hence, in terms of Adorno's own rule for philosophical interpretation, he can 
claim to have developed an understanding of Hegel's dialectic outside Hegel's 
own self-understanding. 
A further point of contention arises when we consider whether or not Adorno is 
interpreting Hegel correctly. Adorno's objection to the 'negation of the 
negation' (the positive in the negative), as I have stated, is that it is bound up 
with a strongly teleological notion of human progress. To assert such a claim of 
rational progress in the face of Auschwitz is barbaric. However, it is not 
necessary to read Hegel in this way. For Hegel scholars such as Raya 
Dunayevskaya and H. S. Harris, "' for example, dialectical movement can involve 
retrogression just as it can involve progress. If the objection is that the 'negation 
of the negation' is bound up with the inevitability of historical progress then it is 
certainly disputable that this is the only way in which it can be conceived. This is 
certainly not Marx's understanding of the negation of the negation: 
[11n grasping the Positive significance of the negation which has reference to itself, even if once 
again in estranged form, Hegel grasps man's self-estrangement, alienation of being, loss of 
objectivity and loss of reality as self-discovery, expression of being, objectification and 
realisation. In short, he sees labour - within abstraction as man's act of seV-creation and man's 
relation to himself as an alien being as the emergence of species-consciousness and species-life. " 
260 Adorno (1973) p. 160- 1. 
'6' See, for example, the introduction to Dunayevskaya, R (1973) Philosophy and Revolution 
(London, Pluto) and the short monograph by H. S. Harris (1995) Phenomenology and System 
0 lackett, Indianapolis). 
262 h1arx (1992) p. 395. 
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Here we appear to have a more creative and less one-dimensional reading of 
the negation of the negation than in Adorno. We can think of the first negation 
as the refusal to be defined as a commodity and the second negation on terms of 
the potentialities and powers unleashed through that first reftisal. On this reading 
there is no reason to connect the second negation with a teleological account of 
history. The argument is simply that struggle against capital involves the 
invocation of new creativities, forms of human relationships, senses of identity 
etc., which arise through rejection of how we are defined though the capitalist 
system. Such a reading would avoid a sense of negation that was merely an 
empty refusal. 
There would appear to be a good reason why Adorno himself does not 
explicitly move in this direction, given that the focal point of his thinking is 
negation of a world which makes Auschwitz a possibility. To invoke a sense of 
the positive in the negative would appear to give Auschwitz some sort of 
redemptive significance. Recall that in terms of Hegel's theodicy evil is 
explained as a necessary precondition for the existence of good. "' It is only in 
the fall from the innocence of the Greek polis, and the resultant atomism, that the 
potential for reconciliation in ethical life arises. Would Adorno be committed to 
such a schema were he to accept that it is in our recognition and response to evil 
that the potential for human goodness lies? I explore this issue at greater length 
in Chapter Five, arguing that this is an issue over which Adorno is tied. For the 
time being, it is clear that Adorno's response to Hegel as regards the 'negation of 
the negation' raises difficulties in his own project, difficulties which arise though 
his attempt to radically move beyond Hegel. 
See Beiser (2005) p. 270-275 for an interesting discussion of Hegel and the problem of evil. 
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It is not only the teleological nature of Hegel's negation of the negation that is 
at issue here. As I suggested in the introduction, there is also a fundamental 
distinction to be made between the negation of negative conditions and negation 
which ultimately passes over into the positive. This is an issue I have to postpone 
to Chapter Four. 
4) The Constitution of Capital 
I have argued that Adorno is largely right to argue that Hegel's logic can be 
seen to mirror the structure of capitalist accumulation, despite many of his 
substantive concerns for human freedom. However, this analogy has 
fundamental implications for understanding the constitution of capital. Hegel's 
Absolute, as a self- actualising entity, operates in an analogous manner to capital 
in that it operates above and beyond human beings and in that it 'tolerates 
nothing outside itself', ' absorbing all qualitative difference into itself. However, 
what (normally Hegelian) Marxists want to claim is that Capital itself is 
constituted by the alienation of human labour. Capital is human labour, which, 
through capitalist social relations, is converted into an external power 
confronting human beings. This is essentially what Marx's theory of value is to 
explain, how the things we make come to exercise power over us. To not 
recognise capital as constituted by labour is not an intellectual error as such. 
Capital is an abstraction from human labour but a real abstraction. Labour really 
is mediated through the value form; it is not merely that we see it in that way. 
However, this must mean that it operates differently from Hegel's logic. 
In Marx, we can come to grasp capital as a form of labour at Points in which 
the capitalist system breaks down into periodic crises. At these moments, the 
contradiction internal to the constitution of capital comes to surface. The 
264 Adorno (1993) p. 6. 
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appropriation of capital rests on human suffering, on expropriating human 
energies (capital's use-value) into an abstract commodity to be manipulated and 
exploited. The rejection of such commoditisation can be witnessed in strikes or 
demonstrations or even seemingly trivial actions such as forging sick leave from 
work. "' Thus, the subjection of concrete to abstract labour can be seen to be 
incomplete, human beings can never be wholly commoditised. Capital rests upon 
constantly negating its own use-value, living labour. 
According to Arthur, Hegel's Absolute can be seen to operate in a similar 
manner. Recall that Spirit moves by 'the labour of the negative', " by negating 
all that is opposed to it. Spirit negates nature, yet nature turns out in the end to be 
nothing but an unrecognized part of itself. Negation, thus, always involves 
higher levels of integration. The Absolute represents the highest level of such 
integration, whereby we come to see the whole of reality as a construction of 
Spirit. Capital operates on a similar principle in that it integrates labour into the 
value form. However, the analogy only works from the point of view of Capital. 
The Marxist really wants to claim that capital's claim to self-sufficiency is false. 
This parallels the critique of Hegel for n-dstakenly seeing the whole of reality as 
the product of Mind and not the practices of flesh-and-blood individuals. 
Furthermore, nature is a genuine other to Spirit as is Labour to Capital. Thus, we 
can claim that Hegel's. system testifies to the failure of Capital to grasp its origin 
in living labour. 
Adorno, however, faces a key difficulty in conceptualizing capital in this 
manner. As Gibson argues, Adorno never really properly explains the root of the 
dorriination of exchange value, tending to view it as a social apriori rather than a 
265 See Holloway, J. in Open Marxism Vol I -'In the beginning was the Scream'. 
266 Hegel (1977) p. 10. 
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consequence of the dual character of labour. There are certainly elements of 
Adorno's thinking in which the principle of exchange assumes an almost 
transhistorical character. " However, the claim that Adorno 'equates the idea of 
the social character [of production] with reification" and identifies the social 
with totalitarianism is misplaced. Gibson claims Adorno to be, firstly, 
existentialist in his privileging of individual virtuosity and of holding a Kantian 
view of autonomy. "' Not only does he explicitly reject the latter" he also speaks 
of a 'constellation' of inter-subjectivity, individual subjectivity and nature in his 
essay 'subject and object'. "' His rejection is of the 'administered society', the 
mechanisms of compulsion operating in late capitalisrn, and not sociality per se. 
However, Adorno also fails to specify more concrete mechanisms at the root of 
humankind's unfreedom. Gibson claims that the emphasis on exchange rather 
than the dual character of labour presents the capitalist's problem of valorisation 
as solved. 
Total rationalisation does away with the revolt that Marx argued was central to capitalist 
reproduction. "' 
Rather than winning its freedom on the back of human suffering, which 
necessarily rebounds against it, capital can merely assimilate developing 
" 'If barter is the secular form of sacrifice, the latter already appears as the magical pattern of 
rational exchange, a device of men by which the Gods are overthrown by the very system by 
which they are honoured' Adorno (1997) p. 47. 
... Gibson (2002) p. 273. 
2'9 Gibson (2002) p. 274. 
2'0 Adorno (2000) p. 169. 
27' Adorno, Theodor Wiesengrund (2000b) The Adorno Reader (Brian 'o Connor ed. ) (London 
Basil Blackwell) p. 75. 
2'2 Gibson, 2002 p. 285. 
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contradictions. However, Gibson is too quick here in making such claims. 
Firstly, Adorno is well aware of the antecedent condition for the production of 
exchange value in the dual character of labour. " Secondly, he recognises (in 
highly orthodox Marxist terms) I that capitalism is founded upon the 
exploitation of one class by another. However, he wants to maintain that class 
can no longer be experienced as such due to the emaciation of human 
experience. Furthermore, he is deeply sceptical of the traditional mechanisms of 
class politics, especially of the replacement/supplement of the revolutionary 
class for the revolutionary party. Such scepticism is essentially related to his 
refusal to identify the end of capitalism as an end to all forms of don-ýination. ` 
However, despite such scepticism, Adorno could never concede that the problem 
273 Adorno (1973) p. 192. 
274 'This makes it necessary to consider the concept of class closely enough so that it is both 
preserved and changed. Preserved: because the distinction between exploiters and exploited not 
only persists undiminished but grows in compulsion and fixity. Changed: because the oppressed, 
today in accordance with the forecast of theory the overwhelming majority of humanity, cannot 
experience themselves as a class' (quoted in Jarvis (1998) p. 58) 
'While proletarian class consciousness may not indeed exist in the advanced capitalist countries, 
this does not necessarily mean, as the commonly held view would have it, that social classes do 
no longer exist. Class was originally defined in terms of the means of production, not in terms of 
the consciousness of its members' (Adorno, (1968) Late Capitalism or Industrial Society? In 
Proceedings of the 1968 GSA (Frankfurt) p. 235). 
275 Adorno wants to broaden the notion of reification to instrumentalist relations with nature. He 
wants to challenge the notion that an end to alienation (in the Marxist sense) would necessarily 
result in human freedom. Structures of domination are not restricted to the domination of capital 
over labour. To end domination would require non-instrumentalist relations with both internal 
and external nature and not merely a transformation in the nature of our social relations. 
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of valorisation could be solved. The total commoditisation of human beings is 
not only impossible but unthinkable: 
There is no light on human beings and things, in which transcendence is not reflected. 
Inextinguishable, the resistance against the fungible world of exchange in that of the 
eye, which does not want the colours of the world to be destroyed. In appearance is the 
promise of what does not appear. 276 
5) Conclusion 
In conclusion, I have argued, firstly, that Adorno's appropriation of Hegel is 
consistent with his approach to philosophical interpretation in general. Hegel is 
interpreted in terms of the reference to natural-historical experience within his 
texts. Such an analogy explodes Hegel's use of particular concepts and allows 
Adorno to develop them outside Hegel's self- understanding. Adorno rejects the 
semantic function played by particular concepts in Hegel's system (vis a vis their 
experiential basis in the 'exchange society') yet simultaneously draws upon a 
radically critical Hegelian language in order to undermine that very mode of 
experience itself. 
Secondly, I have argued that Adorno's dismissal of Hegel often n-ýisses out on 
some important resourceS277 to articulate the demand for human freedom, 
particularly in ignoring the ethical basis of Hegel's thinking and conflating 
objective and absolute Spirit. Indeed, I will argue in subsequent chapters that 
Adorno is very much reliant on a Hegelian understanding of freedom. 
Thirdly, the analogy of Spirit with capital need not lead to a one-dimensional 
conception of capitalism if we consider the analogous function of the 'labour of 
the negative' (in Hegel) and capital's negation of its own use-value (in Marx). 
276 Adomo (1973) p. 404-5. 
Bearing in mind the problems raised with such resources in Chapter Two. 
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Furthermore, Adorno's main problem is not in failing to grasp the root of 
exchange in the dual character of labour but his scepticism, both in terms of class 
consciousness ever materialising amidst modern consumerism and in terms of 
there being a suitable agent to deliver revolutionary change. However, this is not 
merely a question of historical analysis but is tied up with philosophical 
significance of 'negation' in Adorno's thought. I subject this to a greater degree 
of scrutiny in the following chapter. 
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4) Immanent Critique and 
Determinate Negation in Adorno 
1) Introduction 
So far, I have argued that Adorno's appropriation of Hegel does not necessarily 
contradict his commitment to the idea of social constitution. Indeed, Hegelian 
categories are essential to his ability to articulate notions of inversion and 
alienation. Of particular importance here is the analogy Adorno draws between 
Hegel's Absolute and capital. However, I have also highlighted some significant 
departures that Adorno makes from Hegel's thinking. Adorno rejects Hegel's 
understanding of the negation of the negation, his understanding of the 
relationship between the universal and particular, and his inversion of 
constitutum and constituens. In this chapter, I want to more closely examine the 
form that Adorno's negative dialectic takes in the absence of such key elements 
of Hegel's metaphysics. I want to argue that Adorno's philosophical negativism 
is essential to his commitment to the idea of social constitution and that, 
moreover, this places him in a stronger critical position than many of his critics 
in the second generation Frankfurt school. 
To begin with I want to say a little more about the primary object of Adorno's 
critique, the unfreedom of modern subjects, to better orient the discussion that 
follows. I draw on Max Weber and Karl Marx as Adorno's key influences in 
making this claim. Next, I want to deal with two related misconceptions of 
Adorno's response to social heteronomy, found in Jurgen Habermas and Albrecht 
Wellmer. These are, firstly, the charge of 'performative contradiction' and 
secondly, the claim that Adorno appeals to an 'aesthetic' form of rationality 
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which is the 'other' of discursive reason. I reject these criticisms of Adorno on 
the basis that they, firstly, employ wilful misinterpretation of his work and, 
secondly, that the sort of distinctions upon which they rely (e. g. system and 
lifeworld) are precisely the type of separations forms that a notion of social 
constitution seeks to underrrýine. I next turn to the question of the extent to 
which Adorno relies upon the Hegelian notions of immanent critique and 
determinate negation. Important differences between Hegel and Adorno emerge 
here, in that determinate negation in Adorno does not generate a discursive 
notion of the good but merely indicates or (in a Wittgensteinian sense) 'shows' 
the good in the face of radical evil. Adorno invokes the Bilderverbot (the 2nd 
commandment) at this point to rule against the positive depiction of utopia. In 
the remainder of the chapter I identity three models (atonal music, the 
constellation, and the dialectical image) in order to clarify Adorno's meaning of 
determinate negation. 
2) The Unfreedorn of Modern Subjects 
Adorno and Horkheimer's 1947 work, Dialectic of Enlightenment, sets itself 
the ambitious task of discovering why "mankind, instead of entering into a truly 
human condition, is sinking into a kind of barbarism". 27' Enlightenment, which 
promised liberation from fear and ignorance, has resulted in a "Universal 
fungibility"27' of which the bureaucratised and mechanised brutality of 
Auschwitz is the logical outcome. Adorno thinks that the world has become one 
in which people are (predominantly) valued only in terms of their usefulness for 
others. It is this cold way of looking at others that precipitates such horrors as 
Adorno (1997) p. xi. 
Finlayson (2002) p. 4. 
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Auschwitz. " Not forgetting the awfulness of the times Adorno lived through, 
which underlie his immense pessimism, it is not difficult to think of many more 
recent examples of barbarism (Rwanda, the Balkans, and Sudan etc. ) to 
substantiate much of the force of Adorno's rhetoric. Adorno borrows part of the 
explanation for this story from Max Weber. "' With the growth of the natural 
sciences, the world is robbed of all Spiritual or substantive value. In the 
disenchanted world, those kinds of knowledge which are instrumental (in that 
they best allow for the control and manipulation of external nature) become 
progressively more dominant, 'Whatever does not conform to the rule of 
computation and utility is suspect'. " Disenchantment renders instrumental 
reason an end in itself, aside from the substantive ends it is to serve. Linked to 
this process is the ever-increasing expansion of bureaucracy. The bureaucratic 
machine, the iron cage, quickly acquires a momentum of its own, aside from the 
substantive ends of government it is expected to fulfil. The disenchanted world is 
one governed by impersonal rules and procedures in which people lead ever 
more rigid, regimented and predictable lives. "' 
"0 '[C]oldness, the fundamental principle of bourgeois subjectivity, without which Auschwitz 
would not be possible. ' Adorno (1973) p. 363. 
281 See 'Science as a Vocation' in (1948) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology translated by 
H. H Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Routledge, London). For some good secondary reading on 
Weber and societal rationalisation see Wolin, S. (1984) Max Weber: Legitimation, Method and 
the Politics of Theory (Basil Blackwell, Oxford), Lbwith, K. (1932) Max Weber and Karl Marx 
(George Allen and Unwin, London) and Whimister, S. And Lash, S. (eds. ) (1987) Max Weber, 
Rationality and Modernity (Allen and Unwin, London). 
"'Adorno (1997) p. 6. 
2" Sheldon Wolin offeres an exellent account of Weber's iron cage, defining it in terms of "legal 
codes and administrative organisations that promise order, predictable decisions, regularity of 
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Thus, according to Weber, there is a contingent, historical link between the 
dominance of certain forms of knowledge, which emerge alongside the growth 
of the natural sciences, and socially sedimented patterns of unfreedom. In terms 
of this Weberian account of societal rationalisation, the modern world can be 
seen as unfree in two main senses. Firstly, instead of responding to the highest 
Spiritual and cultural values we become slaves to economic compulsion or 
purely mundane passions. Disenchantment has come to rob the world of 
inherently worthwhile or valuable pursuits and, thus, has reduced all action to a 
kind of instrumental behaviour disassociated from substantive human ends. The 
disenchanted agent is merely a vehicle for her impulses and desires and cannot 
be seen to be acting autonomously in the Kantian sense. Secondly, the 
predominance of knowledge which best allows for the manipulation and control 
of nature leads to people becoming habituated in treating not only objects in 
terms of their fungibility i. e. merely as means to satisfy the subjective ends of the 
agent, but also human subjects. Increasingly subjects behave strategically and 
instrumentally towards one another and come to regard one another as means to 
their own ends. 
The other part of the story comes from Karl Marx. Adorno's main connection 
to the Marxist tradition can be seen in his adaptation of the category of 
commodity fetishism. In Capital Volume 1,284 Marx argues that the process of 
capitalist exchange involves a subsumption of the heterogeneous qualities of 
procedures, and responsible, objective and qualified officials; into economics that operate 
according to principles of calculated advantage, efficiency and means-end strategies; into 
technologies that promote standardisation, mechanical behaviours and uniform tastes. " (Wolin 
(1984) p7 1) 
'" Marx (1975) pp. 81-94. 
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commodities under the homogenous and abstract category of value. Non- 
identical and incommensurate use-values are abstractly identified as exchange 
values. This predomination of exchange value is itself rooted in the subsumption 
of concrete labour (the expenditure of labour in a particular form with a definite 
aim) by abstract labour (the expenditure of socially necessary labour), which 
determines the exchange value of a commodity. When, therefore, we compare 
the relationship between different commodities we are really expressing the 
relationship between individual labour and that of society. The exchange process 
requires that social relations be presented in the "fantastical" form of a 
relationship between commodities. This is because we take "exchange value" to 
be a property of the commodity itself and not a social relation between 
producers. In doing so we come to see social and historical processes as 
operating above our heads rather than as products of our own practice. 
Adorno's interests as a musicologist and aesthetician lead him to predominantly 
use the decline of western cultural production as exemplary of the general shift 
in the structure of capitalism. Art's "use-value", for Adorno, resides in its 
"purposelessness" - its autonomy from economic production and societal 
prescription. "' However, as capitalism develops, the demands of capitalist 
exchange substitute the genuine "use-value" of cultural products with "exchange 
value" - the extent to which a commodity can be exchanged with others: 
Everything has value only in so far as it can be exchanged, not in so far as it is something in itself. 
For consumers the use value of art, its essence is a fetish, and the fetish - the social valuation 
which they mistake for the merit of works of art becomes its only use value, the only quality they 
enjoy. 286 
See Adorno (1997) p. 225. 
139 
Such developments in culture are exemplary of the fate of all commodities in 
capitalist society. We are left with "the production of exchange value for its own 
sake""' - the ever-spiraling production of commodities, which justify their 
existence only to the extent that they can be exchanged and not that they meet 
genuine human need. "Production", Adorno claims, "forgets its human aims". 288 
Often castigated as a mandarin aesthete who finds all ideas of "production" and 
"labour" distasteful - and not without justification" - Adorno's underlying 
concern seems to be the development of different social relations within which 
production can be re-attached to genuine human needs. His goal comes close to a 
fairly orthodox Marxist position in calling for "production for use by the living 
rather than for profit',. 21 
The ethical implications of the "exchange society" are devastating. Adorno 
wants to argue that it is precisely this abstract identification of human beings that 
makes possible the bureaucratised and mechanised genocide of Auschwitz. The 
gradual conversion of human beings into "tools" within an increasingly 
"administered world" reaches its apogee in mass murder. 291 
This understanding of societal rationalisation is addressed at the 
epistemological level in Adorno's seminal work, Negative Dialectics. These 
2" Adorno (1997) p. 128. 
287 See Adorno (1968) p. 239. 
"8 Adorno (1993) p. 12. 
289 See, for example, Sur F Eau in Adorno (1974). 
290 Adorno (1973) p192. Of course, Adorno cannot say what "genuine need" is in any categorical 
way as all use-value is now mediated through exchange-value. He can only point towards the 
dissolution of such mediation. 
29' Adorno (ed. ) (1976) The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology translated by G. Adley and 
David Frisby (Heinemann, London) p. 59. 
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arguments can be seen as a development of ideas sketched in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. In the Dialectic of Enlightenment instrumental reason has three 
characteristics, which can be summarised as follows, 
I. "The explanation of every event as repetition". " Particular events, objects or 
properties are only known when they can be seen to share certain 
characteristics with other particulars and can be placed under the ambit of a 
pattern of occurrence, a general law or a conceptual framework. Similarly, 
the laws/concepts that classify particulars are subsumed under higher order 
concepts/rules from which the former can be seen to be deducible. 
IL The separation of the knowing subject from object. Enlightened reason 
requires that concepts/laws with the "widest cosmological role" "' be given 
precedence i. e. concepts/laws with the most universal breadth. In a parallel 
process, enlightened reason takes it upon itself to rid the world of 
anthropomorphic projection. By this I mean the projection of human value 
onto the external world. That which is most objective is that which can be 
furthest separated from the distorting influence of human beings. Our 
understanding of particular phenomenon is isolated from the somatic, 
attitudinal effects they generate. 
III. The principle of instrumentality. Causal explanation moves from being 
contemplative (in the mythic world) to interventionist. Only those 
concepts/laws which best allow for the control and manipulation of nature 
gain precedence. 
At this stage it is difficult to know exactly how Adorno wants us to understand 
the relationship between these claims. In Negative Dialectics, however, it is clear 
Adorno (1997) p. 12. 
293 See Bernstein (2001) p. 83-90 for a detailed account of this process. 
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that all three characteristics can be seen to be integrated in terms of what Adorno 
describes as identity thinking. 
Marx's notion of fetishism (see above) appears to be at the root of Adorno's 
association of identification and heteronomy. Adorno, however, moves far 
beyond Marx's limited and historically conceived discussion of the term, 
claiming that all acts of identification function in this way. For Marx, it is not 
conceptual thinking itsey"which is the source of reification but particular socio- 
historic conditions. For Adorno, the problem has far deeper epistemological 
roots. The concept itself is the "organon of thinking" and all conceptual thinking 
involves identification. "Any definition is identification. , 21 
According to Adorno, to think conceptually is to disavow the content of that 
concept. To identify a particular we do not say what it is but what category or 
law it comes under: 'Identity thinking says what something falls under, or of 
what it is an example or a representative - and therefore is not itself. ' "' 
Adorno, thinks that by "identifying" an object we render it fixed and intransient 
and leave it open to manipulation. The concept is, thus, an instrument of 
domination: 'Concepts ... are moments of the reality that require their formation, 
primarily for the control of nature' " 
Adorno, is claiming that concepts are instruments or tools because they are 
forged in and through the universal fungibility. He goes further than this, 
however, in claiming that this means through which we cognise the world around 
us actually feeds into and determines the condition of universal fungibility itself 
- sustaining and nurturing its development. 
294 Adorno (1973) p. 149. 
295 Adorno (1973) p. 149. 
Adorno (1973) p. 23. 
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These claims raise a number of important issues. At one level, Adorno's 
concern here can be seen as very much connected to that of Marx. The critiques 
of both fetishism and identity thinking concern forms of thinking which are 
unable to grasp movement and potentiality and remain wedded to the status quo. 
Both are forms of critique which take the idea of social constitution to be central. 
. However, Adorno's account of identity thinking extends far beyond Marx's 
location of the problem of alienation at the level of the wage labour relation. 
Instead, it extends to the nature of concept formation itself. One interpretation of 
Adorno, which I deal with in the next section, accuses him pursuing a critique of 
the concept itseýf and claiming that to escape domination is to escape 
conceptualisation. Such a reliance upon an idealist philosophy of the subject 
would seem very much at odds with a commitment to the idea of social 
constitution. In contradistinction, I take Adorno to be offering an account of 
experience which, rather than rejecting conceptualism per se in favour of some 
aesthetic form of reason, locates the problem in a process of rationalised concept 
formation which disavows the somatic moment in cognition. By this I mean the 
attitudinal or bodily impact that objects have upon us. The problem is not with 
concepts per se but with a particular, rationalist epistemology, identity thinking, 
which Adorno takes to have become hegemonic in the modern world. I develop 
this claim in far more detail in the following chapter. 
3. Habermas and Wellmer on Adorno 
Adorno's adaptation of Weber and Marx paints a depressing picture of a world 
in which the commodification and instrumentalisation of human beings is near 
total. How can Adorno, threrefore, proceed from this point without the certainty 
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of the Hegelian dialectic? To begin to address this question I turn to Habermas 
and Wellmer's critique. 
3.1) The Charge of Terformative Contradiction' 
It is often contended that the difference between Habermas and Adorno 
ultimately derives from the former's greater enthusiasm for the liberating 
potential of the Enlightenment project. This impression is certainly one 
Habermas wants to maintain. ' Ultimately, however, this distinction seems to 
rest more on the political difference between Adomo's utopian Marxism and 
Habermas's willingness to accommodate certain features of a market economy 
and liberal democracy. As I will argue, Adorno frequently uses liberal ethical 
standards emphatically, in order to highlight way in which such values are 
distorted by their situatedness in the exchange society. In this sense, Adorno's 
expectations of Enlightenment are higher than those of Habermas. 
Philosophically, the difference lies in Adorno's refusal of any unimpeachable 
grounds for critique against Habermas's attempts to build ethical criterion upon 
the norms governing communicative action. Here then comes the crux of the 
issue. That Adorno and Horkheimer's refuse to adopt any systematic means of 
distinguishing between the progressive and destructive elements of 
Enlightenment thinking, whilst still defending its legacy, is said to result in 
297 See Hullot-Kentor, 1989 p372,377. Hullot-Kentor, in his historical account of the reception of 
the Dialectic of Enlightenment, accuses Habermas of being responsible for many misconceptions 
of the text and its authorship, largely in order to preserve his own selfperceived role as 
torch, holder of the enlightenment. He also accuses Habermas of falling behind rationalists such 
as Kant (in the 3rd Critique) and Schiller in drawing such a rigid distinction between aesthetic 
and discursive reason. In this sense, it is Adorno whom is the true inheritor of Enlightenment. 
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'performative contradiction'. 
298 
Adorno and Horkheimer's 'petitio principii' in the introduction to the Dialectic 
of Enlightenment is famously specified as follows: 
We are wholly convinced ... that social freedom 
is inseparable from enlightened thought. 
Nevertheless ... we have just as clearly recognised that the notion of this very way of thinking, no 
less than the actual historic forms, the social institutions, with which it is interwoven, already 
contains the seed of the reversal universally apparent today. '99 
In another passage, Adorno cites Wagner's 'Parsifal' as illustration, 
[R]eified and rationalized society... could become a society worthy of human beings ... but only by 
applying its rationality to itself, in other words, only through a healing awareness of the marks of 
unreason in its own reason ... [O]nly the spear that inflicted the wound can heal it . 
300 
It does not appear that Habermas's objection to this strategy is that it is 
logically incoherent. As Deborah Cook argues, we often develop ethical 
standards out of the very conditions deemed to be bad 
Witnessing injustice committed in the name of justice (a monstrous commonplace today), critics 
must appeal to the very concept of justice in whose name injustice is perpetrated. 301 
Habermas's concern seems to be a deeper one, that, in radically overestimating 
the extent of 'damaged life', Adorno has undermined the basis of his own claim 
to critical authority. Habermas claims that the genealogy of reason presented by 
Horkheimer and Adorno, is 'astoundingly oversimplified'. " Adorno and 
Horkheimer are mistaken in that reason does not remain entirely subordinated to 
2" Habermas (1988) The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Polity, Cambridge) p. 119. 
Adorno (1997) p. xiii. 
300 Adorno (1993) p. 74. 
"' Cook (2003) p. 193. 
302 Habermas (1987) p. 112. 
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the dictates of instrumental rationality, especially in relation to its most recent 
products, modern science, universalistic ideas of justice, and morality and 
autonomous art. Note that both Adorno (explicitly) and Habermas (implicitly) 
accept that there is something nefarious about purposive reason. However, 
whereas, for example, Adorno and Horkheimer see science as having 'rejected 
any claim to theoretical knowledge in favour of technical utility, 'O' Habermas 
considers science as having a specific dynamic which allows it to make claims 
beyond those that are technically useful. Whilst Adorno and Horkheimer 
consider the authority of ethical norms to have been destroyed by purposive 
rationality, Habermas sees the universalistic foundations of law and morality as 
fundamentally progressive and separate from their instrumental function. The 
problem, according to Habermas, is that Adorno and Horkheimer insist upon the 
Nietzschen claim that power and validity are inseparable: 'The critical capacity 
to take up a Yes or No stance and to distinguish between valid and invalid 
propositions is undermined as power and validity claims enter into a turbid 
fusion. ' " 
The critique of ideology is taken to the extent that context (genesis) and norm 
cannot be separated. The possibility of pursuing an immanent critique that can 
judge the irrationality of bourgeois society from the perspective of bourgeois 
norms themselves is eradicated, as those norms themselves become nothing more 
than expressions of the will to power. "' The root of this error is that Adorno and 
'03 Ibid., p. I 11. 
304 Ibid., p. 112. 
305 Habermas seems to be suggesting here that immanent critique requires some sort of procedural 
separation of norms from their context so that they can be used to judge the world in which they 
are invoked. For Adorno's view of immanent critique see below. 
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Horkheimer fail to recognise that there are other tYPes of reason other than 
instrumental reason, namely (for Habermas) communicative reason, which is 
anchored in the norms governing communicative action. By initiating a totalising 
critique of reason (rooted in the erroneous restriction of critical theory to the 
paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness), Adorno and Horkheimer fail to 
grasp a potential basis from which critical theory can operate. 
Outside the question of whether or not Habermas's own basis for critique is 
valid (something outside the scope of this thesis), I will make a couple of 
preliminary responses. Firstly, Adorno makes no claim to have unimpeachable 
foundations for his critical theory. Indeed, whilst relations of don-ýination persist, 
the world cannot be wholly rationally intelligible and hence such foundations are 
impossible. For Habermas, therefore, to develop his own quasi-transcendental 
critical apparatus is a supremely ideological gesture. Simon Jarvis usefully sums 
up the difference between first and second generation Critical Theorists as 
follows. The second generation critical theorists want to ground a model of 
social conflict in a theory of communication, 'the theory of communication is the 
grounding element, the model of social conflict is what is grounded. " Adorno, 
conversely, develops a theory of the entanglement of communication and 
domination, which cannot itself be grounded in a theory of communication. 
Thus, Adorno cannot accept a separation (even for analytical or procedural 
purposes) between communication and social conflict. 
Secondly, although Adorno cannot claim immunity from his situatedness 
within the exchange society, " he can argue that, as a philosopher and 
musicologist, he is more immune to such effects than those in disciplines more 
'06 Jarvis (1998) p. 36. 
'07 Incidentally, neither can Habermas. See Cook, 2003. 
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directly in the service of capital accumulation. " Indeed, the practices which 
Adorno appeals to, for example love, art or philosophy, are those which stand in 
the greatest degree of opposition to the universal fungibility. Adorno tends to 
locate 'the good' in practices which can still attest to the damage to ethical 
practices through the universalisation of exchange. Minima Moralia, for 
example, traces the (still visible) erosion of human experience within many 
practices that have become a refuge for ethical life, on the fringes of the 
exchange society. " 
In this context, the practice of critical theory can, although not immune from 
the distortions of the exchange society, be seen to have a certain degree of 
autonomy. This requires that we take Adorno's thinking to have a higher degree 
of critical authority than those forms of thought which are bound up with the 
reproduction of the capitalist market, for example positivist sociology or 
economics. Critical Theory sees itself as 'serving no alien purpose' in that it 
plays no ftinctional role in the social whole (it is not concerned with reforming 
this or that part). It is autonomous from the whole in that, although it arises from 
the social structure, it points entirely towards its future transformation. "0 
... Here Adorno seemingly distances himself from Marx's '71 heses on Feurbach' - 'All mysteries 
which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the 
comprehension of this practice' (Marx, 1992). However, Adorno tends to view music and 
philosophy as highly specialised. forms of 'labour' - in the sense that both are concerned by the 
transformation of materials objectively laid down by tradition (see Jarvis, 1998 p45) . Thus, 
Adorno neglects the traditional spheres of practice considered by most Marxists (strikes, 
demonstrations, political intervention) whilst simultaneously widening the sphere of practice 
itself 
309 See, for example, Bernstein, 2002 Ch. 2. 
310 See Theunissen, p245. 'Critical Theory serves no alien purposes, because the praxis towards 
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3.2) The Disavowal of Discursive Reason? 
There is, however, a more fundamental criticism to be made of Adorno by both 
Habermas and Wellmer. I shall develop this critique through Habermas's Theory 
of Communicative Action Volume I through to Wellmer's Persistence of 
Modernity. 
Habermas's first critique of Adorno is orientated around his relationship to 
Lukacs. Firstly, Lukacs (like Marx) begins with the specific form of capitalist 
social relations, namely the wage-labour relation characterised by the commodity 
form of labour power exchanged within a capitalist economic system. Reified 
consciousness can be explained only by reference to this specific historical 
relationship. "' - For Adorno, reified consciousness is only one historical 
manifestation of a universal characteristic of (hitherto existing) human history, 
identity thinking. Such thinking attains universal significance through capitalist 
relations of exchange but does not have its genesis in them. Secondly, following 
what Habermas describes as an 'idealist retranslation of the concept of reffication 
into the philosophy of consciousness, "' Adorno (re)anchors thought to the 
context of its reproduction by rooting reified consciousness in the self- 
preservation of the subject in the face of external nature. Hence, reffication is 
given an anthropological foundation, which, furthermore, is set in terms of 
subject-object relations (i. e. man and nature). In other words, reification is 
identified with the instrumental control of what is other to the subject, the 
attempt to 'annex the alien', "' by placing it under the arnbit of the subjects' 
which it points is only the fruition of the praxis that is Critical Theory itself'. 
311 See Lukacs (1968) 1-fistory and Class Consciousness (Merlin, London) pp. 83-110. 
"' Habermas (1984) p. 378. 
313 Adorno (1973) p. 19 1. 
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comprehension/control. Finally, domination over things and over other people is 
taken to have emerged from the domination of nature and seen to have an 
identical structure. Therefore, the concept of reification is generalised both 
temporally and substantively. 
As Habermas argues, we now have a notion of reification (what Adorno 
describes as 'identity thinking) that is exceptionally broad, covering discursive 
or conceptual thinking per se. All such thinking (or perhaps all thinking) is 
conceived as being a means of dominating and manipulating external nature. 
However, for Adorno to talk of identity thinking pejoratively he must posit an 
original or imagined reconciliation between man and the world. In other words, 
Adorno must appeal to some non-instrumental relationship with the world whist 
simultaneously making the claim that reason both has been historically and is 
substantively instrumental. In doing so, Adorno directs us towards the non- 
identical, that which evades conceptualisation and cannot be grasped 
discursively. Reconciliation between man and nature can be conceived only 
mimetically, as some form of somatic impulse, and not though conceptual 
thinking. This aporia is the source of Habermas's anxiety with Adorno's position. 
How can such impulses be transformed into thoughts or insights? 
... [I]f thought is always tied to operations that have no specifiable meaning outside the bounds 
of instrumental reason, all the more so today when, with the triumphal procession of instrumental 
reason, the reification of consciousness seems to have become universal? "' 
Habermas acknowledges that Adorno is fully aware of this aporia in his 
thinking. By the time he wrote Negative Dialectics, Habermas claims that 
Adorno conceived of critical theory as an 'exercise' or a 'drill'. ` Negative 
314 Habermas (1984) p. 384. 
3'5 Ibid. p. 385. 
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dialectic serves only to exhibit a glimmer of the 'aporetic nature of the concept 
of the non-identical', "' unthinkable without conceptual thought yet also outside 
thinking. Such a glimmer can be attained only though an aesthetic mode of 
presentation of philosophy or, more profoundly, in works of modern art which 
escape instrumentalisation (properly interpreted through a correct aesthetic 
theory). 
Although Habermas acknowledges that Adorno is fully conscious of the aporia 
at the heart of his philosophy he finds it deeply unsatisfactory: 
A philosophy that withdraws behind the lines of discursive thought to the mindfulness of nature 
pays for the wakening powers of its exercises by renouncing the goal of theoretical knowledge, 
and thus by renouncing that program of interdisciplinary materialism in whose name the critical 
theory of society was launched in the early thirties. 3'7 
The reason for this failure is that critical theory remained within the 
philosophy of consciousness', a monological relationship of subject and object. 
The claim here, therefore, is not that Adorno lacks unimpeachable foundations 
for his thinking but that he misfires fundamentally in his choice of target. 
Wellmer, in the Persistence of Modernity, develops this critique further. For 
Adorno, according to Wellmer, the 'proton pseudos' of discursive reason lies in 
the generality of concepts, that they 'identify things that do not go by the same 
name'. "' Adorno's problem with conceptual thinking is that it prearranges or 
fixes the meaning of its content. Wellmer's contention is that the problems 
Adorno identifies with conceptual knowing and the demand for a 'reflexive, non- 
316 Ibid. 
311 Ibid. 
311 Wellmer (1991) The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics and 
Postmodernism translated by David Midgely (Oxford: Polity Press) p. 71. 
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reifying' language can be met without the negativity of Adorno's philosophical 
position. Having to 'conjure up' a notion of reconciliation between man and 
nature is not, according to Wellmer, philosophically necessary. "9 
Wellmer identifies a paradox in Adorno's position. What we normally refer to 
as 'true', linguistic propositions (S is P), are considered by Adorno to be false. 
This is because, as I have said, the generality of conceptual knowing violates the 
integrity of the non-identical. However, this means that Adorno can no longer set 
this emphatic sense of 'truth' (his claim that we miss something in standard 
linguistic propositions) in any relation to what we normally mean when we speak 
of 'truth or 'falsity'. Furthermore, as Wellmer argues, we have no basis upon 
which to claim that the generality of concepts violates the non-identical except to 
make a fairly trivial claim that (general) linguistic signs do not (in themselves) 
express the particular circumstances of their use. Wellmer claims that Adorno 
goes wrong here in making a judgement about language from outside, confined 
to monological subject-object relations. 
If we apply the metaphors of prearranging and truncating to language as a whole, then they reveal 
an intentionalist prejudgement about language; in fact they reveal, as can easily be seen, a 
naturalistic variant of the philosophy of the subject-as-constituti ve-of- meaning. 
Wellmer accepts that this is not the intention of Adorno's project, that Adorno 
repeatedly emphasised the fact that all thought is linguistically mediated, but 
argues that his critique of the identificatory concept achieves precisely the 
opposite. It unwittingly lends itself to an idealist philosophy of the subject 
whereby the way in which we conceptualise the world is seen as being 
constitutive of the world itself. Adorno wants to posit an intimate connection 
311 lbid p. 72. 
310 Ibid., p. 73. 
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between 'cognition and action' whereby the violence committed to the non- 
identical by the generality of concepts is also violence comn-dtted against the 
human and natural world. By fixing and objectifying meanings and making them 
immutable, thinking also objectifies social relations themselves. Furthermore, 
discursive reason, defined in terms of 'identity thinking', cannot but disavow 
sensuous nature by virtue of its abstract generality. The conclusion of Adorno's 
argument is thus 
Adomo can only conceive of the better Other of the instrumental Spirit as a world beyond 
discursive reason, and he can only conceive of a non-violent organisation of society in terms of 
nature as a whole achieving a state of redemption. 321 
According to Wellmer's interpretation, Adorno must insist that the Other to 
identity thinking is something beyond language (presumably some form of 
aesthetic rationality). As I have said, where Wellmer thinks Adorno is mistaken 
is in seeing the problem as one with rather than within language. If he were to 
traverse the latter route he could begin to grasp the problems of prearranging or 
truncating meaning as problems with particular uses of language as opposed to 
problems with language itself. Wellmer pursues this argument in providing 
examples of instances in which specific forms of language use can demonstrate 
concretely the sense in which the generality of concepts can violate the non- 
identical. However, these arguments proceed within the boundaries of language 
itself and not from the outside. 
In summation, Wellmer worries that Adorno's critique of identificatory reason 
threatens to reject reason altogether in favour of a 'true' (presumably aesthetic) 
mode of reasoning which is the 'other' of discursive reasoning. Subsequently, 
Adorno threatens to reject history (his utopianism being so radically negativistic) 
3" Ibid., p. 74. 
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and to offer no basis from which he can locate the potential transformation of 
society. If Wellmer is right, this would appear to strongly challenge Adorno's 
commitment to a notion of social constitution, presenting him instead as a rather 
mystical utopian. How, then are we to respond to Wellmer's critique? 
Jay Bernstein, in his 2002 work Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics rightly 
objects that Wellmer has very much misunderstood Adorno's position. Bernstein 
thinks that two factors are likely to be influencing Wellmer's interpretation of 
Adorno as maintaining a position 'outside language' (and thus outside history). 
Firstly, whilst Adorno maintains that all conceptual judgements (S is P) are 
linguistically mediated (we only know S or P though their linguistic equivalents) 
a purely linguistic analysis rnýisses something in understanding the cognitive act. 
This, Adorno thinks, is the experiential aspect of cognition, presumably the 
somatic or impulsive moment of knowing. Bernstein concedes, '[T]o that extent 
[Adorno] does remain within a philosophy of consciousness'. "' Secondly, 
Adorno's defence of the rhetorical aspect of language... seemingly dismisses 
standard conceptual judgements (which violate the content they attempt to 
capture) instead defending the expressive and performative aspects of language. 
This, Bernstein argues, leads Wellmer to think that Adorno's non-identical is the 
(presumably aesthetic) 'other' of conceptual thinking. 
Bernstein, however, thinks that this line of argument is not open to Adorno. 
Here he begins simplistically. Consider a standard assertion, 'the chair is red', 
and a rhetorical statement, 'the chair is red like a plum tornato! ' As both have the 
same inferential core, Bernstein claims that Adorno cannot think that there is 
something intrinsic to all conceptual thinking, which violates its content. 
32' Bernstein (2002) p. 268. 
323 '[T]he rhetorical aspect is on the side of content' Adorno (1973) p. 56. 
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Adorno's claim is, instead, that the latter directs our attention towards the 
experiential content of concepts whereas the former is merely neutral. Against 
Wellmer 
The content to be rescued through rhetorical reorientation is not the other of conceptual 
understanding but that part of the content of the concept which is passed over and abstracted from 
in the disenchantment of the world and the rationalisation of reason; it is the suppressed mimetic 
moment of the concept. 324 
As our conceptual apparatus is rationalised through the growing prevalence of 
instrumental reason, this mimetic aspect of the concept (which allows us to 
communicate reflexively with the content of a concept) is suppressed. Adorno's 
notion of identity thinking refers to a socio-historical process, which forges 
concepts into a formal and immutable system and disconnects them from their 
mimetic aspect. Furthermore, far from calling for the adoption of an 'aesthetic' 
form of reason and the abandonment of discursive thinking, Adorno (as I shall 
argue in the final chapter) is merely giving an account of how reason works. In 
disavowing the somatic aspect to cognition, reason becomes impoverished. 
4. Immanent Critique? 
So far I have claimed that not only do Habermas and Wellmer frequently 
misread Adorno's position but, also, that their criticisms of Adorno are 
frequently grounded in precisely the sort of hypostasised distinctions which 
Adorno's 'negative dialectic' seeks to undermine. Whereas Habermas, and 
Wellmer distinguish between intersubjective theories of communication and the 
philosophy of consciousness, Adorno takes such a distinction to disavow the 
very mediations that make language and communication possible. As a self- 
proclaimed materialist thinker, Adorno takes any philosophy which leaves the 
324 Bernstein (2002) p. 273. 
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somatic out of reason to be wedded to idealism. I develop this claim more fully 
in Chapter Five. Furthermore, whereas Habermas wants to distinguish between a 
theory of communication, which delivers certain universalistic norms, and an 
understanding of domination, Adorno recognises no such distinction. Instead, 
Adorno is interested in the interplay between forms of domination and the way in 
which social norms are constituted. However, without the procedural separation 
of norm and genesis indicated by Habermas, how can Adorno's critique break 
through the apparently all encompassing ideology of the exchange society? To 
begin to develop an answer to this questions, I think it is necessary to return to 
Hegel, as it is through the Hegelian notion of immanent critique that Adorno is 
to be better understood. This, I think, places him even further from the 
transcendental Kantianism of Habermas. 
1) Immanent Critique in Hegel 
For Hegel, it is not the task of the philosopher to give instruction as to what one 
'ought' to do. He derides the Kantian construction of moral maxims as 'an empty 
325 
game, now amusing, now more serious, now pleasing, now dangerous'. 
Instead, the task of the philosopher is to interpret and comprehend the rules 
which are implicit in the practices and institutions of the community in which we 
inhabit. This is what is normally meant by immanent critique, famously 
encapsulated in Hegel's double-dicturn. 
What is rational is actual; 
and what is rational is actual 326 
325 Hegel (199 1) p. 14. 
326 Ibid., p. 10. 
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This does not mean that Hegel is a moral or legal positivist, as Popper accuses 
him of being. Hegel's choice of technical terms here is deliberate, 'actuality' as 
opposed to 'existence'. He defines Actuality as the 'unity of essence with 
Existence. " Actuality can either refer to a practice or institution which has 
flourished in accordance with its essence or a general condition in which reason 
emerges through tangible institutional forms. 
To decipher the actuality of an institution or practice one has to understand its 
inner dynamic. Those practices and institutions which exist for good reason, 
those which essentially maintain and promote human freedom (as Hegel 
understands it), will triumph in the unfolding of history whilst those with no 
rational purpose will wither away. The latter are consigned to the category of 
'lazy existence'. For example, we may take the essence of democratic 
institutions to be fair representation of a population with protection for minorities 
but consider some of the contingent features of such institutions (e. g. hereditary 
peerages or pompous forms of address in the House of Commons) to be part of 
'lazy existence'. Such institutions have actuality when they have realised their 
essence in practice. The philosopher, far from being impotent in such 
circumstances, is to comprehend and promote the actuality of institutions and 
practices in order to advance the process of flourishing actuality. "' 
327 Hegel (1991) p. 213. 'Actuality is the unity, become immediate of essence and existence, or 
of what is inner and what is outer. ' 
328 Some institutions, as I argued in Chapter Two, will never reach actuality. A market economy, 
for example, is actual only when it universally provides for the material needs of a population 
(this is its 'essence' or purpose). However, markets cause structural inequality and poverty of 
necessity. Hegel's response to this is a rather stoical one, that the market is the best system that 
we are going to get and that its failings should deal with its failings as best as we can. 
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The latter part of Hegel's double dictum makes the epistemological claim that 
we have no access to forms of rationality which are not embedded in practices 
and institutions. This follows from the Hegelian notion of 'necessary 
embodiment' (see above). Reason must be embodied in language, tradition, 
history etc for it to be intelligible. Again in response to Kant, Hegel thinks that 
moral maxims that are abstractly formulated outside the actual practices of flesh- 
and-blood humans are unintelligible. 
4.2) Adorno's notion of Immanent Critique 
Adorno accepts this speculative identification of actual and rational to the 
extent that, as I have already claimed, he does not believe reason to be located in 
some transcendental schema, nor some aesthetic realm outside history. Instead of 
engaging in external critique, starting from first principles, criticism takes place 
on the basis of principles which institutions and practices conspicuously endorse. 
Adorno, therefore, takes the liberal legitimating beliefs of modern capitalism, 
free and equal exchange, rights and freedom, in order to claim that such ethical 
beliefs cannot be realised within the terms of capitalism. "' In emphatically using 
such concepts he hopes to push them to their logical conclusions, outside the 
framework in which they were originally conceived. Adorno, therefore, seeks to 
use immanent critique in order to condemn the irrationality of the modern social 
world rather than to develop a Hegelian theodicy. 
Take, for example, the 19th Century liberal notion of free and equal exchange. 
32' As I will explain below, this is not merely a case of demonstrating internal inconsistency - as 
in Marx's critique of exploitation - but involves a qualitative transformation of the norms 
invoked. 
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Such a notion, whereby we are equally free to sell our labour and purchase 
within capitalist mechanisms of exchange, is contradicted by the basic inequality 
underlying a capitalist system, whereby the means of production are in the 
ownership of a small minority. For Adorno, the ideological notion of free an 
equal exchange, conceals this basic inequality but also contains within it an 
implicit claim to real equality. Such a claim, however, can be realised only 
through common ownership of the means of production and an end to capitalism. 
Matters do not rest here, however, as the notion of equality itself must undergo 
a qualitative transformation through such a critique. As we have seen, it is not 
merely the 'lie' of free and equal exchange that Adorno finds problematic. It is 
the very nature of equivalence between non-identical commodities and human 
beings mediated through the medium of money. Furthermore, it is precisely this 
fetishism of commodities and human labour, which, for Adorno, binds people so 
closely to the status quo. Therefore, the notion of equality to emerge though 
Adorno's critique of universal exchange must recognise the non-identity of 
particulars. 
There is a second sense in which Adorno is employing an immanent critique of 
the exchange principle, from the point of view of a commodity's use-value. The 
implicit claim of the market to meet human wants is undermined by the 
subsumption of use-value by exchange value and the production of exchange 
value for its own sake. Here, Adorno engages in immanent critique. However, 
Adorno does not want to defend 'use-values' against 'exchange -values', as 
conceptualising human labour purely in terms of its 'use value' reduces it to an 
object to be manipulated. Again, immanent critique, whilst partially adopting the 
ethical standards of liberal capitalism, must result in the qualitative 
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transformation of such standards themselves. 
4.3 The Limits of Immanent Critique 
In this important sense, Adorno can be seen to be following a (albeit far more 
radicalised) Hegelian strategy of tracing the rational in the actual, actuality being 
the conspicuous ethical claims used to legitimate capitalism yet simultaneously 
denied in its operation. In fact, in a broader sense, the intentions expressed in the 
opening of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, to judge the enlightenment project in 
terms of its own claims to be able to deliver us from fear and ignorance would 
appear to be paradigmatic of such a strategy. However, there are a number of 
problems with Adorno taking up such an approach. Firstly, as I have argued, 
Adorno wants to claim not only that the legitimating beliefs of liberal capitalism 
are incoherent, that they are untenable within the capitalist system they 
legitimate, but that they are morally defective. Hence, the notions of freedom and 
equality which Adorno implicitly appeals to are qualitatively different from the 
narrow, legalistic form they take in (crude) liberalism. As I have already argued, 
Adorno has a very sophisticated means of being able to transform the use of 
concepts outside their original context through tracing their metalogical 
references (see Chapter Three, Section One). However, it is questionable that 
such a critique of liberal ideology can illuminate any more than the internal 
inconsistency of such concepts. It does not tell us why what is legitimated is 
morally wrong and why the ethical implications of Adorno's thinking are morally 
right. "' Therefore, Adorno's inunanent critique must be supplemented with a 
3'0 The Truth status of moral claims is essential for Adorno. Such Truth status cannot merely be 
reduced to a coherent development of liberal norms in and against their contradictory relationship 
to capitalist mechanisms, 'Truth is objective not plausible' (Adorno (1973) p. 42). See Chapter 
Five for a fuller account of Adorno's ethical ethics. 
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more substantial ethical theory. I deal with this in the next chapter"'. 
Secondly, against Hegel, Adorno does not think that the modern social world is 
essentially worthy of being 'a home'. Whereas Hegel sets himself the easier task 
of illuminating and promoting the actuality of an essentially rational world order, 
Adorno occupies a world in which there are few (if any) traces of goodness left. 
Rational enlightenment has become reduced to Mythology (see above) and 
situatedness within the exchange society damages and distorts what ethical 
practices remain. In other words, in Hegel we are presented with a fundamentally 
rational world, geared towards the promotion of human self-determination but 
beset by the contingent problems of war and poverty. In Adorno we are 
presented with a fundamentally irrational world which systematically thwarts 
human freedom and within which genuine ethical practices have all but been 
extinguished. 
As I have argued, however, Adorno agrees with Hegel to the extent that he does 
not think that critique can be levelled from some external position. That the 
rational is actual requires that sources of normativity, however distorted, be 
located in actual social practices and institutions. This means that Adorno cannot 
be purely 'negative' and has to latch on to fleeting fragments of the good in, as 
he puts it in Minima Moralia, their 'alienated form'. For Michael Theunissen, "' 
this leads him into contradictory positions. Adorno begins with a conception of a 
world of 'radical evil'. "' However, he also wants to claim that '[C]onsciousness 
"' The theory outline also meets the criteron of 'immanent critique' in that the resources it draws 
upon are immanent to the structure of experience. See Chapter Five. 
33' Theunissen, Michael (1999) "Society and History: A Critique of Critical Theory" in Dews, 
Peter (ed) Habermas; A Critical Reader (Oxford, Blackwell) 
333 Adorno (1973) p. 374. 
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could not even despair over the grey, did it not harbour the notion of a different 
colour, whose dispersed traces are not absent in the negative whole'. "' 
Simon Jarvis responds to Theunissen's claims in 'Adorno; A Critical 
Introduction', firstly addressing the hermeneutic status of Adorno's claims. 
Jarvis claims that we cannot take Adorno too literally. This is not because 
Adorno glosses over the problem of contradiction by appealing to an 
'aestheticised reason, which removes contradiction by suggesting that one limb 
of a contradictory pair was not meant literally' (lbid). Instead, Adorno thinks that 
to make despair into an absolute is unthinkable. Jarvis insists that Adorno's 
thinking is speculative in the Hegelian sense. Hegel's claim that speculative 
thinking can see 'the rose in the cross of the present' is echoed in Adorno's claim 
that 'dispersed traces' of colour are 'not absent from the negative whole. ' For 
Adorno, '[e]very line which if read with sheer literal -rriinded ness speaks despair, 
bespeaks hope'. "' Adorno thinks that we cannot read claims of the first type 
without hearing claims of the second within them. In other words, a 'pure' 
negativism could not be expounded because it is unthinkable. 
Here we must return to the question of how reliant Adorno is upon Hegelian 
metaphysics. I have argued that, for Hegel, determinate negation always delivers 
a positive result. Negation logically generates new content, the development of 
higher forms of consciousness and self-determination. Hence Hegel's optimistic 
strategy of reading the rational in the actual can only confirm the triumphant 
march of reason. As I argued in Chapter Three, this is behind Adorno's rejection 
of the negation of the negation. However, does Jarvis's suggestion that, for 
Adorno, '[e]very line which if read with sheer literal - n-iindedness speaks despair, 
334 Adorno (1973) pp. 377-8. 
335 jarViS (1998) p. 214. 
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bespeaks hope' not bring Adorno closer to a Hegelian position? Consider the 
following quotations. 
[Freedom] can only be grasped in determinate negation in accordance with the concrete shape of 
unfreedom. 
336 
[T]he false, once determinately known and precisely expressed, is already an index of what is 
right and better. "' 
Is Adorno not pursuing a Hegelian strategy of reading the positive in the 
negative? Adorno can certainly be seen to vacillate on this issue. For example, he 
clearly states that, contra Hegel, the non-identical is not 'obtainable by a 
negation of the negative'. "' All negation delivers is 'criticism', ` that is 
knowledge of the bad. This is not only an issue with his philosophical treatment 
of Hegel but also with his more general account of the status of hope in the post- 
Auschwitz world. Take the following passage, for example, in comparison with 
those quoted above. 
After Auschwitz, our feelings resist any claim of the positivity of existence as sanctimonious, as 
wronging the victims; they balk at squeezing any kind of sense, however bleached, out of the 
victims' fate. And these feelings do have an objective side after events that make a mockery of the 
construction of immanence as endowed with a meaning radiated by an affirmatively posited 
transcendence. " 
There are a number of issues at work here. Firstly, there does seem to be a 
general vacillation in Adorno between an understanding of the world as evil all 
336 Adorno (1973) p. 23 1. 
337 Adorno (1998) p. 288. 
3" Adorno (1973) p. 158. 
331 Ibid., p. 159. 
NO Adorno (1973) p. 361. 
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the way doym and an understanding of the world dornýinated by the nefarious 
logic of the 'iron cage' but with pockets of goodness at the margins for example 
in acts of resistance, spontaneous kindness or artistic creativity. "' Overall, 
however, Adorno can be seen to be far more disposed towards the former 
position in light of the extraordinary brutality of his times and the absence of any 
reasonable alternative. Secondly, however, there is also the question of what 
Adorno means by negation and its relationship with Hegel's usage. On the one 
hand, Adorno is using the word 'negation' in a Hegelian sense. It refers not to 
non-being but to something existent that negates something that should not be. In 
other words, Adorno's philosophical negativism aims not towards a limitless 
scepticism (a negation of all positive content) but towards the detertninate 
negation of existing negativity, i. e. the mutually supportive nexus of identity 
thinking and relations of domination. When, therefore, Adorno talks of a 
'negative dialectic', it is not really negative or, at least, it is only negative from 
the point of view of that which it is trying to negate. However, as I shall try to 
illustrate below, Adorno's notion of determinate negation is qualitatively 
different from that of Hegel's in that it can only hint at a not yet existing good 
rather than read the rational in the actual. This demand leads Adorno to sources 
outside the framework of German Idealism. Therefore, in order to understand 
Adorno's notion of determinate negation more thoroughly I want to, firstly, 
examine his secularisation of the Judaic image ban and, secondly, his 
appropriation of Walter Benjamin's notion of the constellation. 
34' For the former view see the passage above in addition to Adomo (1973) p. 361. The latter 
view can be best seen in Minima Moralia, in its withdrawal into the individual sphere. See 
Adorno (1974) pp. 15-20. 
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4.4) The Bilderverbot 
Key to understanding Adorno's notion of determinate negation is the 
Bilderverbot. Adorno makes frequent references to the Judaic ban on graven 
images throughout his work. "' In theological terms, the ban preserves a divide 
between the divine and material and warns against the corporealisation of the 
Godhead. 
Adorno's use of the Bilderverbot is idiosyncratic. Firstly, it can be seen to be 
broadly concurrent with the Marxist refusal to picture utopia. "' This refusal can 
be seen to stem from the importance Marxists place upon the idea of collective 
self-creation as an end in itself. If the Marxist critique of alienation highlights 
our experience of capitalist society as a world operating above our heads and 
beyond our control, then it would appear self-defeating for Marxists to prescribe 
or dictate a blueprint for a future society. Secondly, the Bilderverbot does not, as 
in its religious usage, mean sectioning off the divine as a pure, ineffable realm of 
experience. Instead, as Elizabeth Pritchard argues, it is better viewed as a means 
through which Adorno can illuminate the hellishness of the world. " Utopia has 
to be projected so far from our ken because the world is so infected with evil. 
Thus, it acts as a speculative position from which we can scrutinise the reasons 
for the fallen state of the world. Furthermore, in denying immediate access to a 
transcendent realm, Adorno strengthens the ethical imperatives of utopian 
thinking. The absence of proxin-dty between utopia and the context of 
immanence underlines the uncompleted nature of the project to be achieved and 
Adorno (1973) p. 207/402 and (1997) pp. 23-4. 
34' Adorno (1973) p. 299. 
314 Pritchard (2002) p. 185. 
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the level of work to be done. "' 
Adorno is concerned that the Bilderverbot is often invoked as an ahistorical 
invariant and hence descends towards negative theology. " Adorno is fully 
aware of the political liability of the Bilderverbot being employed in this way, 
alluding to an unreachable utopian state, unconnected to the concrete material 
reasons underlining the absence of its proximity. His treatment of Kant, in this 
respect, is instructive. 
Adorno often treats the theological questions raised by the Bilderverbot as akin 
to the philosophical questions raided by Kant's distinction between phenomena 
and noumena. " This way of reading Kant, he shares with Walter Benjamin. It 
was no accident that Kantianism was Walter Benjamin's most fundamental 
philosophical frame of reference, far more so than Adorno whom Scholem 
described as a 'Jewish Heretic' as a consequence of his Hegelian leanings. "' For 
both Walter Benjamin and Adorno, the Bilderverbot is important in terms of the 
preservation of the transcendent (the refusal to reduce utopia to the terms of 
reference of the status quo) and a weariness at remaining within a corrupt and 
disfigured immanence. It is here where the Judaism of each seems most 
apparent. 
However, Adorno also describes the Kantian 'block' as 'terroristic'. " As I 
argued in Chapter Three, the block on transcendence is read as a contingent 
feature of a society structured by commodity fetishism. Invoking the 
345 See Pritchard (2002) p. 187. 
34' Negative theology eludes to a God which we can never discursively grasp. 
'47 Adorno (1973) p. 388. 
34' Kaufman (2000) p. 179. 
34' Adorno (1973) pp. 3 88-9. 
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Bilderverbot, thus, does not require maintaining an ahistorical ban on reaching 
the transcendent. It only underlines how far we are from reaching it. 
5. Models 
How are we then, to go beyond the image ban? The discussion so far has 
highlighted two related problems regarding the nature of the content generated 
by Adorno's version of detern-ýinate negation. Firstly, such content cannot be 
wholly discursive, bound by the logic of identity thinking, as this would bind it to 
the rationale of the exchange society and hence to the context of immanence. 
Secondly, such content cannot be 'positive, in the sense of providing a 
'blueprint' of the good, as such notions are, as yet, not wholly accessible. Below 
I look at three models which Adorno explores in order to clarify his notion of a 
'negative dialectic'. 
1) A tonalism 
As Wiggershaus documents, Adorno's 1941 manuscript for the 'Philosophy of 
Modern Music' was widely admired by Horkheimer and was to greatly inform 
their later collaborative work on philosophical matters. " Focusing largely on 
Schoenberg's determinate negation of tonality, the work gives us many clues as 
to Adorno's conception of the dialectic. 
Schoenberg, Adorno argues, takes the logic of tonality to the point of its 
dialectical reversal. Out of the extreme chromaticism of Wagner's 'Tristan and 
Isolde', Schoenberg develops a form of composition which systematically 
undermines the don-driation of the tonic. Twelve Tone composition begins with a 
'note row' comprised of a sequence of the 12 notes of the octave in which no 
note may be repeated until all others have been played. This 'note row' forms the 
350 Wiggershaus (1994) p. 298. 
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basis of the composition, subject to various forms of variation including 
inversion (where a mirror image of the 'note row' is played, retrogression (where 
the 'note row' is played backwards) and retrograde inversion (where the 'note 
row is both mirrored and reversed). 
Superficially, it may appear that what attracts Adorno to atonal music is that, in 
overcoming the domination of the tonic and allowing each note equal weight in 
musical composition, it anticipates the hoped-for end to social domination. As 
Adorno writes to Krenek, 
Doesn't this [Schoenberg's music] ... have something to do with that which in Marx is called the 
association of Free Men? 351 
If this is so, however, Adorno is surely breaking his own prescription of the 
Bilderverbot, going beyond mere ideology-critique and alluding to a blueprint of 
the good-life. In an essay on Schoenberg's 'Moses and Aron', Adorno clarifies 
his position. 
The element of truth in ... [Schoenberg's music] 
is that by defining itself as negative, his approach 
thereby assumes positivity. But its existence is not guaranteed through such postulation. It is a 
reflex action toward a false reality, an inverted reflection of that reality in consciousness; it does 
not exist in and for itself. As a chimera it remains marked by the false. 352 
Thus, the dialectical reversal achieved through Schoenberg's development of 
tonal music is only a chimerical 'inverted reflection' of a false world. It does not 
discursively map out the good nor does it present its attainability as guaranteed. 
There is, however, a more important point regarding Adorno's relationship to 
Schoenberg. It is important to remember that Adorno does not see Twelve Tone 
31' Letter to Krenek, Oct 7th 1934 quoted in Buck-Morss (1977) p. 130. 
Adomo (1992) 'Quasi una Fantasia', translated by Rodney Livingstone (Verso, London) 
236. 
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composition as good 'in-itself' and is highly disn-dssive of many of its 
proponents. "' The refusal to submit to diatonic harmonic restrictions, for 
Adorno, parallels the refusal of autonomous reason to tolerate anything outside 
itself. The proclaimed 'newness' of Twelve Tone composition is parallel to the 
claims of Enlightenment to have liberated itself from Mythology. For Adorno, 
such claims to liberation can be contested only on the grounds of the relationship 
of 'the new' to what it claims to have distanced itself from. As we have seen, in 
regards to the claims of autonomous reason, the very mediations through which 
reason itself can subsist are disavowed in this process. In Schoenberg, however, 
elements of tradition are preserved (for example classical or archaic techniques 
of variation) 354 and radically transformed rather than neglected. As Jarvis 
comments, 
What crucially distinguishes the really new from the abstract novelty ... of commodity production 
in the cultural industry is that the really new work is made in undiminished awareness of the 
possibilities afforded by tradition rather than by a simpleforgetting of tradition. "' 
Hence, in many ways, Schoenberg's relationship to diatonic and pre-diatonic 
traditions provides a model of Adorno's conception of determinate negation. 
5.2) Constellations - Benjamin's 'Epistemo-Critical Prologue' 
Outside atonal music, it the philosophy of Walter Benjamin that most inspires 
Adorno to deviate from the Hegelian model of dialectic. Both Benjamin and 
Adorno face a similar problem the possibility of using of concepts to go beyond 
353 Adorno (1973) Philosophy of Modern Music translated by A. Mitchell and W. Blornster 
(Continuum, New York) p. 70. 
35" Adorno (1992) pp. 269-322. 
311 Jarvis (1998) p. 136 (my emphasis). 
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the limitations of conceptual thinking. For Benjamin it is the 'fate of phenomena 
in the hands of concepts' "' and not the issue of conceptuality per se that 
distinguishes philosophical truth from mere cognitive knowledge. In the latter, 
concepts act as instruments to analyse phenomena and, hence, necessarily fail to 
capture their particularity. In the former, a multiplicity of concepts play a 
mediating role in (to use Benjamin's phrase) 'redeeming' "' the irreducible 
particularity of phenomena. Benjamin's notion of philosophical truth emerging 
through a constellation of concepts, I will argue, is integral to an understanding 
of Adorno's critique of Identity thinking. 
As I have suggested, Adorno's relationship to Benjamin's thought is all the 
more interesting in light of Benjamin's anti-Hegelianism. "' As Rosen notes, 
Benjamin is firn-dy within the Kantian paradigm in the broad sense of being 
interested in the 'distinctiveness of certain types of experience'. "' In other 
words, he is less interested in investigating the nature of reality in itself but in the 
way in which it is experienced. Whilst he shares this broad concern with Kant, 
he does not want to restrict the notion of experience to the formal categorising of 
sense-images under formal rules but to consider other, non-rationalistic and often 
avowedly mystical forms of experience. Fundamental to Benjamin's project is 
the notion of a tacit, 'n-ýimetic' form of shared experience. " 
Against this backdrop, Benjamin develops his notion of a constellation in the 
'Epistemo-critical prologue' to his Origin of German Tragic Drama. Benjamin 
356 Buck-Morss (1978) p. 90. 
35' Benjamin, Walter (1977) The Origin of German Tragic Drama (London, NLB) p15. 
... See Jay, Martin (1984) Adorno (Cambridge, Harvard) p. 246. 
35' Rosen (1996) p. 236. 
360 Adorno also appeals to the notion of mimesis (see Chapter Five). 
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begins with something like the Kantian distinction between 'Ideas', the Kantian 
pure concepts of reason, and 'concepts', the Kantian categories of the 
understanding. For Benjamin, the former stand on the side of 'philosophical 
truth' and the latter on the side of 'knowledge'. There is also something of Plato 
in Benjamin's discussion, the timelessness 361 of the constellations resembling 
Plato's absolute transcendental forms. Against Jameson 362 who claims that the 
heritage of such terms is a distraction to grasping Benjamin's intention, it is 
precisely this dialectical relationship to the history of philosophy that impressed 
Adorno. 363 
Firstly, what distinguishes 'concepts' and 'ideas' is that, whereas 'concepts' 
merely capture a fleeting aspect of empirical reality, 'ideas', as a cluster of 
concepts surrounding an object, can illuminate particular phenomena from many 
angles. Concepts, therefore, are not bypassed but obtain a different, mediating 
function to that employed in cognitive knowledge. 
Through their mediating role concepts enable phenomena to participate in the existence of ideas. It 
is this same mediating role which fits them for the other equally basic task of philosophy, the 
representation of ideas. I" 
36' Benjamin (1977) p. 34. 
362 Jameson (1990) Late Marxism (Verso, London) p. 53. 
363 See Buck-Morss 1977 p. 95. Benjamin later admits that he invokes Platonism for strategic 
purposes, to head off a 'lapse into immanence' (Adorno and Benjamin (1999) p261). Plato never 
reappears in his work as a significant point of reference. He does, however, often refer to 'The 
Name' for similar strategic reasons. 'The Name' is grounded in the word of God and constitutes 
the basis of all knowledge. After the fall, however, the connection between Name and word is 
split. Constellations are one way through which the original power of The Name' can be 
recuperated. 
364 Benjamin (1977) p. 34. 
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Secondly, comes the analogy with constellations. 
Ideas are to objects as constellations to stars. 71bis means that, in the first place, they are neither 
315 there concepts or their laws. 
Ideas, for Benjamin, are the network of concepts surrounding phenomena as 
opposed to the concepts themselves. 
Thirdly, whereas 'concepts' (in cognitive knowledge) impose a subjective 
conceptual framework upon disparate phenomena, 'ideas' are formed out of the 
affinities between the phenomena itself" The construction of constellations is, 
thus, radically anti-idealistic, inverting the Platonic notion of ideas: 
If Platonic ideas were absolute transcendental forms whose likeness appeared within the empirical 
objects as a pale reflection of their own eternal truth, Benjamin constituted the absolute form out 
of the empirical fragments themselves. 367 
Fourthly, given that subsumptive classification involves a structuring of 
phenomena in line with the conceptual framework of the constitutive subject, the 
construction of constellations requires that phenomena be broken up and 
reconfigured in accordance with their own internal logic. For Benjamin this 
process of disintegration motivates his interest in the seemingly small details of 
life, the layout of the 19th Parisian Arcades, for example, which are lost in 
abstract generalisation of subsumptive thinking. Hence, Benjamin favours, 
the art of interruption in contrast to the chain of deduction; the tenacity of the essay in contrast to 
the single gesture of the fragment; the repetition of themes in contrast to shallow universalism; the 
fullness of concentrated positivity in contrast to the negation of polemic. 
365 Ibid. 
166 See 3.3 for an example of such reconstruction. 
367 Buck-Morss (1978) p. 92. 
36' Benjamin (1977) p. 32. 
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As Rosen comments, it is often those details that are seemingly the most trivial 
that are often 'closest to the centre'. "' In trying to reconfigure the tacit, mimetic, 
experiential mode that underlies our knowledge of the world, such minutiae turn 
out to be fundamentally important. 
For Adorno such minutiae are also paramount, this time as a point of resistance 
against the encroachment of capital: 
In the face of the totalitarian unison with which the eradication of difference is proclaimed as a 
purpose in itself, even part of the social force of liberation may have temporarily withdrawn to the 
individual sphere. If critical theory lingers there, it is not only %ith a bad conscience. V0 
That critical theory should have no 'bad conscience' in withdrawing to the 
individual sphere is echoed in Adorno's skepticism both at the theoretical 
311 
category of totality and mass political action. On the former... 
Totality is not an affirmative term but rather a critical category. Dialectical critique seeks to 
salvage and help establish what does not obey totality, what opposes it or what first forms itself as 
the potential for a not yet existent individuation ... A liberated mankind would 
by no means be a 
totality ... 
Finally, against common notions of abstraction whereby disparate elements 
are reduced to a common denominator, constellations illuminate phenomena 
M9 Rosen (1996) p. 239. 
VO Adorno (1974) p. 16. 
371 Ibid., p. 51-52. 'Even Solidarity, the most honorable mode of conduct of socialism, is sick. ... 
It was manifested by groups of people who put their lives at stake, counting their own concerns 
as less important in the face of a tangible possibility ... they were ready to sacrifice themselves 
for 
each other ... In the course of time, however, 
Solidarity has turned into confidence that the party 
has a thousand eves, into enrollment into workers battalions - long since promoted into uniform 
- as the stronger side, into swimming with the tide of history. ' 
'72 Adorno (1976) p. 12. 
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through extremes. 7' 
The Idea is best explained as the representation of the context within which the unique and 
extreme stands alongside its counterpart 374 
It is this that seems to initiate Benjamin's interest in baroque tragic drama. The 
use of allegory, the allusion to a meaning separate to that which is immediately 
apparent in the drama, is for Benjamin a dialectical movement between 
extremeS. 375 
It should be now apparent that Benjamin's notion of constellations can be seen 
to respond to many of Adorno's concerns about Identity thinking, providing a 
'model' of contemplation which both thinks with concepts and against them. 
However, there are two important differences between Adorno and Benjamin 
which emerge at this point. Firstly, Adorno objects to the Platonic timelessness 
oftheideas. 376 In fact, Adorno's use of constellations is very different: 
Becoming aware of the constellation in which a thing stands is tantamount to deciphering the 
constellation which, having come to be, it bears within it ... The history locked in the object can 
only be delivered by a knowledge mindful of the historic positional value of the object in relation 
to other objects ... Cognition of an object in its constellation is cognition of the process stored in the 
object. As a constellation, theoretical thought circles the concept it would like to unseal, hoping 
373 At this point it should be clear that the notion of Constellation bares little resemblance to 
Oakeshott's 'conceptual coherentism' as one commentator alleges (O'Connor (1999) p. 94). 
What is distinctive about the process of constructing constellations is the extreme juxtaposition 
of concepts which have been torn from their familiar embeddedness. 
374 Benjamin (1977) p. 35. 
375 See Jay (1984) p. 246. 
37' As we shall see, in the following section, this Platonic timelessness is soon dropped when 
Benjamin comes into greater contact with Marxism. 
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that it may fly open like the lock of a well-guarded safe-deposit box: in response not to a single 
key or a single number but a combination of numbers 311 
Rather than delivering eternal truths, Adorno's constellations unseal 
'sedimented history' "' in the object. Given that the mechanism of subsumptive 
classification necessarily disavows the mediations which make knowing a 
possibility (see above), Adorno hopes that the construction of constellations can 
recover or recall such 'sedimented history'. The particularity which can be 
accessed through the constellation is necessarily time-bound, "' with 
constellations themselves shifting historically. Adorno appeals (critically) to 
Weber's 'The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism' for illustration. 
Weber's concepts are 'gradually composed' from 'individual parts to be taken 
from historic reality. ' Quoting Weber, 'The place of definitive conceptual 
comprehension cannot, therefore, be at the beginning of the inquiry, only at the 
end. ' " 
Secondly, Adorno completely avoids the use of the term 'idea' altogether. This, 
I think, is not simply because (as Jameson's suggests) Adorno is uncomfortable 
with using terms with metaphysical connotations. "' Adorno, unlike Benjamin, 
thinks that constellations point towards phenomena themselves, not merely the 
relationships between then-L Furthermore, Adorno sees 'ideas' as conceptual and 
thinks that Benjamin is reckless not to recognise them as such. "' 
A final point is of importance to both Benjamin and Adorno's notion of the 
... Adorno (1973) p. 163 my emphasis. 
311 Ibid. 
379 Jarvis (1998) p. 176. 
"0 Adorno (1973) p. 165. 
381 Jameson (1990) p. 53. 
382 Adorno (1973) p. 62. 
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constellation. Adorno takes the idea of a constellation not as something to be 
'applied' to objects but as a form of cognition, immanent to consciousness, not 
yet subordinated to classificatory thinking. The model for this is language, 
which, for Adorno, has a 'double character'. On the one hand, as a system of 
signs it attempts to say what an object comes under or what it is like, as image it 
holds a mimetic element which attempts to 'be like' the objeCt. 
383 Both these 
goals are equally false is isolation, yet the fact that language cannot be entirely 
subordinated to one or the other pole is significant for Adorno. 
Language offers no mere system of signs for cognitive functions. Where it appears essentially as a 
language, where it becomes a form of representation, it will not define its concepts. It ]ends 
objectivity to them by the relation into which it puts the concepts, centred around a thing. 
Language thus serves the intention of the concept to express completely what it means. 384 
The model for thinking in constellations is thus immanent to language itself. 
This means that constellations do not figure as a portable method to be applied to 
disparate phenomena but (in Hegelian terms) thinking in constellations is the 
detenninate negation of discursive thinking. The negation takes place through 
the disintegration of abstract categories and the reformulation of their elements. 
The concept transforms its role from an instrument of knowledge to a mediating 
element in the transmission of philosophical truth. The negation is immanent, as 
its appeal to a mimetic element in thinking, which emulates the object as 
opposed to categorising it, is inseparable from any account of what reason is like 
(see Chapter Five). 
383 See Adorno (1997) pp. 17-18. 
384 Adorno (1973) p. 162. 
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5.3) The Dialectical Image - Benjamin's Arcades Project 
Benjamin's second discussion of the constellation features in his Arcades 
Project. The project gives an account of the rise of capitalist consciousness in the 
19th century, as exemplified in Parisian culture. "' Here, he describes the 
constellation in the following, rather esoteric, terms: 
It's not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its light on the past; 
rather image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a 
constellation. In other words, image is dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the 
present to the past is a purely temporal, continuous one, the relation to what-has-been to the now 
is dialectical ; it is not progression but image, suddenly emergent. "' 
Benjamin has now seemingly abandoned the Platonic timelessness of the 
constellation' described in the Origin of German Tragic Drama. Past and 
present are now portrayed as being engaged in material conflict. As Max Pensky 
notes, 'the victors consign all that supports their vision to a harmonious past and 
all that speaks against it to oblivion. ' 387 'History' always excludes those moments 
which undermine the legitimating story of the dominant class. Benjamin seeks 
to use the method of constructing constellations to shatter the dominant narrative 
form of 'the relation to what-has-been to the now', in order that we may re- 
evaluate the present in new light. Constellations, here, figure as a method 
through which one can cultivate a particular capacity for recognising such 
4 subversive recovery' of the past. 
... Whereas London or Manchester were clearly the economic centres of Capitalist development, 
Benjamin considers Paris to be of more cultural significance. 
3" Benjamin, W. (1999) The Arcades Project translated by H. Eiland and K. Mclaughlin 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA) p. 462; N2a, 3. 
387 Pensky, M. (2004) Method and Time; Benjamin's's Dialectical Images in The Cambridge 
Companion to Walter Benjamin (CUP, Cambridge) p. 180. 
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Benjamin's focus, in this respect, is the appearance of the commodity form in 
19th century consciousness. Before examining how this fits with the notion of 
constellation, it is important to be clear as to how Benjamin understands the 
commodity form. In a revealing passage from an earlier draft to The Arcades 
Project, he claims, 
Corresponding in the collective consciousness to the forms of the new means of production, 
which at first were still dominated by the old (Marx), are images in which the new is intermingled 
with the old. These images are wishful fantasises, and in them the collective seeks both to 
preserve and to transfigure the inchoateness of the social product and the deficiencies in the social 
system of production. In addition, these wish-fulfilling images manifest an emphatic striving for 
the outmoded, which means, however, with the most recent past. 388 
Key differences, thus, emerge between Benjamin's understanding of the 
commodity form and that of Marx (and Adorno). For Marx, the commodity form 
entails a continuance of pre-modern religious consciousness in that inanimate 
objects (for example, mobile phones, cars, labelled clothing) are invested with 
subjective properties. Conversely, the producer of the commodity is objectified. 
Benjamin, however, wants to make the further claim that commodities are 'wish- 
images' of the 'collective unconscious', eluding towards some form of 
unfulfilled utopian expectation. Adorno's response is twofold. Firstly, he worries 
that the notion of a 'collective unconsciousness' is a reactionary Jungian idea. "' 
Attempting to appeal to Benjamin's Marxist sensibilities he claims that Jung 
$serves to erase the difference between classes'. " Such traces were to disappear 
from Benjamin's later works. Secondly, Adorno complains that Benjamin's 
3" Benjamin (1986) p. 148. 
3" Benjamin, W. And Adorno T. (1999) The Complete Correspondence (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge MA) p. 107. 
390 Ibid. 
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understanding of the commodity as 'wish-image' is hopelessly subjectivist: 'The 
fetish character of the commodity is not a fact of consciousness; it is rather 
dialectical in character, in the eminent sense that it produces consciousness. ' "' 
Benjamin's understanding of the appearance of the commodity form tends to 
view it as some sort of collective delusion rather than a phenomena produced 
through the objective mechanisms of capitalist exchange. 
However, in spite of such theoretical weakness, Benjamin and Adorno are in 
agreement over the constant striving for 'newness' in capitalist culture "' which 
treats discarded fads or trends 'as having been destroyed by a series of 
catastrophes'. Benjamin wants to use the constellation (or dialectical image) to 
break this momentum in 'showing' the utopian expectation invested in the 
commodity to be a continually unfulfilled cycle of repetition. Benjamin, with 
typical theological bombast, claims that in so far as the commodity is purely 
cipher of exchange value, it is an expression of 'Hell'. "' To illuminate the 
meaningless, hellishness of capitalist culture, Benjamin's work highlights those 
fashions, architectural styles, popular novels etc for which the status of 
phantasmagoria has faded. Hence, he can reveal the promise of the commodity to 
always be illusory and transient. 
To achieve this undertaking, Benjamin avoids typical Marxist method and 
instead moves towards Breton and Surrealism. This is because, like Adorno, 
Benjamin is interested in the question of how one can be receptive to the 
subversion of fetishism, given that (wholly) discursive reason inscribes into itself 
fetishist rigidity. Surrealist montage offers a powerful tool to shock by 
'9' Adorno and Benjamin (1999) p. 105. 
312 Ibid. pp. 94-106. 
313 Ibid., p. 184. 
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presenting found objects in unfamiliar contexts. In doing so it highlights the 
meaningless of signification. As Pensky claims: 
Surrealist montage means in the sense that it reveals something about the arbitrary nature of 
signification, this arbitrary character is the object of aesthetic experience itself. "' 
Benjamin thus 'removes' discarded cultural artefacts from their original context 
and elicits a new necessary interpretation of the fragments relationships with 
each other. This involves a new re-interpretation of the culture from which they 
were wrested and the relationship of that culture to the present moment' . 
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Benjamin's approach causes Adorno much concern in this respect. His 'ascetic 
refusal of interpretation', 396 the assumption that historical material in a particular 
configuration will speak for itself, is, for Adorno, the source of many of his 
shortcomings. In a letter to Benjamin, of 10th November 1938, Adorno informs 
Benjamin, '[Y]our dialectic is lacking in one thing: mediation. ' "'. Furthermore, 
'[t]he mediation which I miss and find obscured by materialist historiographical 
evocation, is simply the theory which your study has omitted. ' 398 
The question arises as to what Adorno legitimately expects of Benjamin, given 
his own sympathy towards the method of constructing constellations. Firstly, 
repeating an earlier claim, Adorno thinks that Benjamin lacks an account of the 
objective production of Phantasmagoria through particular social relations. '" 
394 Pensky (2004) p. 183. 
3" Ibid., 
3' Adorno and Benjamin (1999) p. 282. 
397 Ibid., 
391 Ibid., 283. 
399 Adorno, worried that Benjamin deals only with the appearance of Phantasmagoria, asks him to 
drop the term 'dialectical image' and replace it with his earlier term 'models' to incorporate an 
account of the generation of Phantasmagoria. (Adorno and Benjamin (1999), p. 281) 
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Benjamin engages with Phantasmagoria as some sort of deluded 'vision"' and 
lacks a proper theoretical account of their 'mediation through the entire social 
system'. " Secondly, when Benjamin does invoke some sort of materialist 
framework it is often crude and reductionist. Adorno cites Benjamin's positivist 
interpretation of Baudelaire's '12Ame du Vin' " in terms of an increase in wine 
duty as exemplary in this respect. Thirdly, Benjamin often moves in exactly the 
opposite direction in moving towards positive theology. Hence, Benjamin is at 
the 'crossroads between magic and positivism'. " 
5.4) Mediation 
An interesting question, however, arises as to Adorno's repeated use of the 
word 'mediation'. Michael Rosen, in Hegel's Dialectic and Its Criticism, claims 
that Adorno's use of Hegelian language in this respect is illegitimate, given 
Adorno's rejection of the metaphysical context within which such language 
obtains its meaning. The ontological mediation's that make up Hegel's system 
can be considered valid only from the perspective of Hegel's Absolute, a 
perspective Adorno rejects (see Chapter One, section 3.4). In response to Rosen, 
it would appear that Adorno uses mediation to mean a number of different 
things, each of which can be seen to differ markedly from its Hegelian usage. 
Firstly, 'mediation' can be used pejoratively ' to refer to the bad Absolute. 
The truth content of Hegel's system is the mediation of all human beings and the 
products of their labour through exchange (see Chapter Three). Secondly, 
'0' Ibid., p. 281. 
40' Ibid., p. 284. 
402 Ibid., p. 283. 
413 Adorno and Benjamin (1999) p. 284. 
" For example Adorno (1993) p. 25. 
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mediation refers to 'conceptual mediation' in the specific form of the 
constellation. This seems to be closest to one use of the term mediation in Hegel. 
In the Encyclopedia logic, Hegel claims: 
... [11t is quite mindless not to see that the unity of distinct determinations is not just a purely 
immediate ... unity but that what is posited in it is precisely that one of the determinations has truth 
only through its mediation by the other; or, in other words, that each of them is mediated with the 
truth only through the other. 40' 
Truth comes from overcoming the one-sided, incompleteness of concepts and 
placing them with the mediated totality. From the previous discussion, however, 
it should be clear that Hegel's understanding of 'conceptual mediation' and 
Adorno's use of the notion of a 'constellation' are markedly different. We can 
surnmarise the main differences, so far, as follows. Firstly, Hegel deals only with 
the categories of particular and universal, so mediation can never extend to 
unveiling the particular itself. Secondly, mediation in Hegel rests upon a 
teleological development towards reconciliation whereas, in Adorno, no such 
path is guaranteed. Thirdly, mediation in Hegel tends towards the resolution of 
antagonisms in the Absolute, whereas, in Adorno contradiction is held open. It is 
only through its extremes that the constellation points towards the object. 
Fourthly, the constellation only alludes to a yet unattainable good, whereas 
Hegel presents us with a discursive account of the rational in a world which has 
(largely) attained actuality. 
There is a third sense in which Adorno uses the terms 'mediation, in the sense 
of an 'affinity' between subject and object. Adorno's account of such an 
&affinity' is underpinned by an account of reason's mediation of both mimetic 
and discursive moments, which I discuss in chapter six. 
405 Hegel (199 1) pp. 117-8. 
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6) Conclusion - Constellations and Reif ! cation 
How does Adorno's use of Benjamin connect with the problems of social 
constitution and alienation with which we began? In short, we can see both the 
constellation and the dialectical image as responses to identity thinking, as 
attempts to reveal the sedimented history in seemingly immutable and fixed 
categories. Firstly, whereas the relationship of exchange abstractly identifies 
non-identical commodities through the medium of money, the process of 
constructing constellations pinpoints the 'concrete, qualitative difference 
between apparently similar phenomena'. " Buck-Morss provides two interesting 
examples of this practice. Firstly, Adorno can identify qualities positively within 
certain constellational configurations and negatively in others. So, for example, 
childlike qualities in the music of Debussy, Stravinsky and Ravel have different 
significances within different musical constellations. " Secondly, Adorno 
frequently uses terms within constellations such that they take upon a different 
significance. Hence the nature in 'natural-history' is not really natural (in a 
reductionist sense) nor the history really historical (see final chapter). It is not the 
concept itself which confers meaning but its connections with other concepts in a 
particular context. 
Secondly, whereas identity thinking conceals the antagonisms of bourgeois 
society through claiming to have reconciled concept and object in the apparatus 
of the constitutive subject, the process of constructing constellations highlights 
contradiction. As Buck-Morss comments, this process largely means revealing 
what appears as one thing to be its opposite through the juxtaposition of 
*' Buck-Morss (1978) p. 98. 
407 Adorno (1964) p. 70. 
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extremes. ' The individualism of Jazz, for example, is really stereotypical, its 
improvisation really standardised, its eroticism really repressive, its democratic 
bent really totalitarian. ' What is seemingly unconnected is shown to be 
dialectically related. 
Thirdly, whereas the exchange society disconnects the object from its process 
of production (reification), the construction of a constellation brings back the 
historical against the mythic cycle of repetition. I have already given the example 
of Benjamin's use of constellations in The Arcades Project to deconstruct the 
deternal newness' of commodity production. Likewise, Adorno uses the 
constellation to illuminate 'sedimented history' in the object. 
Finally, it must be remembered that the constellation is only a means of 
contemplating the absent good. The constellation is, therefore, merely a means to 
break down fetishised conceptions of the world. In this sense, I find it wanting, 
for the reasons I outlined in the previous chapter. Determinate negation, whilst it 
should not follow the rigidly teleological path it does in Hegel, should deliver 
more than merely a means of contemplative social criticism. Class struggle 
should be understood as a process in which human potentialities and 
spontaneities are unleashed. It should carry a utopian moment. Whilst the 
resources for such an understanding are certainly present in Adorno's thinking, I 
think they are very much compromised by the strength of his philosophical 
negativism. 
" Buck-Morss (1978) p. 100. 
" Adorno (1964) p. 85-105. 
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Reconciliation and 
Adorno 
Autonomy in 
1) Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I examined various ways in which Adorno thinks both 
with and against Hegel in developing a critique of 'identity thinking'. I now want 
to build upon two related elements of this critique, which I feel contribute 
strongly towards understanding the problem of social constitution. Firstly, I want 
to develop Adorno's claim that societal rationalisation involves a disavowal of 
the very mediations which make knowing a possibility. These, specifically, are 
responses to objects that are rooted in our animality (e. g. sense, impulse and 
desire). I will later argue that Adorno's understanding of this process of 
disavowal and abstraction has much in common with Hegel's critique of the 
enlightenment (specifically) and his notions of alienation and inversion (more 
generally). Secondly, I want to develop Adorno's notion of 'Solidarity', the key 
ethical category of his thinking, as a powerful statement of the idea of social 
autonomy. 'Solidarity' is located in our bodily capacity for empathy with the 
suffering and vulnerability of others and, as such, demands the formation of 
social relations in which human beings are no longer treated as fungible 
commodities. The common thread throughout this chapter is Adorno's 
understanding of the relationship between sense and reason (or nature and 
culture) and his affirmation of materialism contra Hegel (explicitly) and (by 
extension) Habermas, WeHmer and Honneth. Adorno's treatment of this 
philosophical dualism not only directly informs his materialist notion of social 
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constitution but is also the key to understanding his ethics, specifically the idea 
of social autonomy. 
Firstly, by way of introduction, I want to situate Adorno against both Kant and 
Habermas, on the one hand, for whom the sensible is relegated to the domain of 
causality and excluded from the realm of reason, and against Nietzsche, on the 
other hand, for whom the sensible/aesthetic orientation is to be promoted to 
counter the claims of abstract reason. Following on from this, I introduce the 
idea of a 'natural history' in Adorno as a means to undermine such an opposition 
of sense and reason or (more broadly) nature and culture. In so doing, I also 
distinguish Adorno's position on the relationship of nature and culture from that 
of Hegel. Secondly, I examine Adorno's sen-d-historical account of the unfolding 
of the domination of sensuous nature and its relationship to social domination 
though examining the excursuses on Homer's Odyssey and De Sade's 'Juliette' 
in the Dialectic of Enlightenment. Thirdly, I look more closely at Adorno's 
understanding of the relationship between the sensible or somatic and the 
rational through an account of his notion of n-dmesis. I draw on Walter 
Benjamin's notion of the 'mimetic faculty' in developing this account. For both 
Adorno and Benjamin, the modern world can be seen to profoundly damage our 
capacity to integrate experience and our ability to respond ethically to one 
another. Finally, and against this background, I turn to a discussion of Adorno's 
notions of Solidarity and social autonomy. Returning to the theme of the opening 
section, I will argue that Adorno retains both the ethical demands of Kantian 
moral autonomy (not liquidating the notion of freedom into the empirical or 
political contra Hegel) whilst simultaneously pursuing a Nietzschean critique of 
the effect that thinking about autonomy in this way has upon individuals. 
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2) Natural-History 
Undermining the philosophical dualism of sense and reason is essential to 
Adorno's philosophical project. Adorno can no more side with Kant on this 
question than with Nietzsche, both of whom insist upon a duality of sense and 
reason and yet come down on different sides. '"O For Kant, sensibility belongs to 
the causal order of things, a system of lawful regularities, whereas reason is 
ethical and hence a space of freedom. Nietzsche agrees that modern reason 
excludes sensibility but takes this to have fundamentally damaging implications 
for individuals, decapitating any motivational basis for action. Instead, Nietzsche 
promotes an aesthetic world-orientation which aff irms the values of the intuitive, 
active, self-creative individual. For Adorno, both accounts fail to grasp the 
interdependence of reason and sensibility and fail to understand the latter as a 
condition of possibility of the former, "' albeit one which is disavowed in the 
formation of enlightened reason. 
Underlying this notion of interdependence is the idea of 'natural-history', 
which Adorno develops in his Hegel excursus in Negative Dialectics. Here, the 
Kantian dualism of sense and reason is more broadly addressed in terms of a 
duality of nature (human animality) and history (humans as free, self-conscious 
beings). Adorno claims: 
The traditional antithesis of nature and history is both true and false; true in so far as it expresses 
what the moment of nature underwent; false in so far as it apologetically recapitulates, by 
conceptual reconstruction, history's concealment of its natural outgrowth. 412 
410 See Bernstein, J. 'The Dead Speaking of Stars and Stones' in Rush (ed. ) (2004) p. 139-142 
411 1 develop this claim more closely in the section on mimesis. 
412 Adorno (1973) p. 358. 
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Adorno takes the antithesis to be false because he adopts a somewhat (albeit 
non-reductionist) naturalist position, conceiving of human life and culture as 
emerging within and from nature. We must always conceive of ourselves as part 
of the natural world. Conversely, what appear to us as purely natural phenomena 
must be seen as subject to historical change, climate change, the extinction of 
species or the development of new diseases etc. '13 Adorno frequently identifies 
his position as solidly 'materialist""' whilst wanting to avoid the mechanistic, 
determinist connotations such a terms frequently carries. This insistence upon an 
open-ended dialectic of what we take to be 'natural' and what we take to be 
'social' goes someway towards addressing Adorno's understanding of what a 
non mechanistic 'materialism' might look like. Furthermore, this understanding 
of materialism makes Adorno's notion of social constitution very much 
distinctive in that Adorno clearly wants to distinguish his position from any form 
of cultural idealism (see Section 4). 
Adorno takes the antithesis between nature and culture to be true in that the 
philosophical separation of culture and nature expresses the extent of rationalised 
socialisation. The condition it expresses is one in which, as Adorno puts it in 
'Minima Moralia', 'our perspective of life has passed into an Ideology which 
conceals the fact that there is life no longer'. "' The entire nexus of modern social 
relations has become a dead, closed causal order. We are left with a life that does 
413 See Bernstein (1999) ppl88,199 
414 See, for example, Jarvis, Simon (2004) Adorno, Marx, Materialism in The Cambridge 
Companion to Adorno (CUP, Cambridge) whom also examinezs this claim at great length in 
Jarvis, Simon (1998) Adorno- A Critical Introduction (Cambridge, Polity). 
41' Adorno (1974) p. 15. 
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not live, a life composed entirely of a meaningless cycle of production and 
consumption to no apparent greater purpose. 
Adorno's dialectic of nature and history, therefore, expresses not only a 
differentiated unity of nature and history but also plays upon tensions in our 
understanding of each term. Nature, firstly, pejoratively expresses a closed, 
causal, mechanistic system outside the ethical realm of human freedom. 
However, secondly, nature is taken in a more positive, almost romantic sense to 
refer to spontaneity, passion and aesthetic sensibility. History, likewise, both 
positively denotes the collective, self-conscious shaping of the future, the realm 
of freedom as opposed to the realm of necessity, and to a series of seemingly 
inexorable laws, against which we feel powerless. Adorno, here, follows Marx's 
lead in identifying the naturalistic appearance of the laws of capitalism: 
Much as this motion appears as a social process, much as the single moments of this motion take 
their departure from the conscious will and from particular purposes of individuals, the totality of 
the process does appear as an objective context arising by natural growth. It is indeed due to the 
interaction of conscious individuals, but neither seated in their consciousness nor subsumed under 
them as a whole. "' 
Furthermore, for Adorno, it is the very disavowal of sensuous nature (in the 
positive sense) in the process of societal rationalisation which leads to social 
processes assuming naturalistic properties (in the negative sense). 
The more relentlessly socialisation commands all moments of human and inhuman immediacy, 
the smaller the capacity of men to recall that this web has evolved, and the more irresistible its 
natural appearance. The appearance is reinforced as the distance between human history and 
nature keeps growing: nature turns into an irresistible parable of imprisonment. "' 
416 MarX (1953) p. I 11. 
"' Adorno (1973) p. 358. 
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The notion of 'natural-history' not only pits Adorno against Kant and Nietzche 
but also against Hegel. For Hegel, nature is ultimately reducible to Spirit, 
whereas for Adorno it is a differentiated substratum (see Chapter Three, section 
three). Furthermore, whereas for Hegel all of reality is ultimately knowable in 
terms of the rational concept, for Adorno, as I have argued, conceptual 
knowledge is limited in terms of its ability to grasp the particular. 
3) From the Odyssey to Juliette 
Adorno and Horkheimer famously document the historical emergence of 
societal rationalisation and its impact upon sensuous nature in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. This process, although accelerated and intensified in the 
development of modern capitalism, has its roots in human pre-history. In 
declaring 'myth' as 'already enlightenment' "' they understand seemingly 
irrational belief systems as attempts to explain and thus control the unknown (see 
below). Attempts to control and manipulate external nature are always bound up 
with both internal repression and societal domination. The two excursuses in the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, firstly 'Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment' and, 
secondly, 'Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality', evidence a significant 
historical shift in the form of such domination. Although Adorno and 
Horkheimer consider Odysseus to be a proto-typical bourgeois subject, 
repressing his own drives and instincts (and even his own identity) in order to 
overcome the many obstacles he is confronted with, Odysseus only goes as far 
as is necessary to maintain his material existence. Self-mastery is not an end in 
itselL Furthermore, Odysseus's desire to return home and be reunited with 
Penelope holds out the final promise of reconciliation. Juliette, on the other hand, 
represents a world with no substantive goals, governed by random and 
41' Adorno (1997) p. xvi. 
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impersonal mechanisms whose only rationale is efficiency and organisational 
power. Both societal and internal domination, though such mechanisms, have 
become an overr iding imperative. "' Drawing upon a constellation of literary and 
philosophical motifs from Kant's transcendental subject to de Sade's orgies, 
Adorno and Horkheimer describe the culmination of Enlightenments dark side: 
Reason is the organ of calculation, of planning; it is neutral in regards to its ends; its element is 
coordination. What Kant grounded transcendentally, the affinity of Knowledge and planning, 
which impressed the stamp of inescapable expediency on every aspect of a bourgeois existence 
that was wholly rationalised, even in every breathing space, Sade realised empirically more than a 
century before sport was conceived. The teams of modern sport, whose interaction is so precisely 
regulated that no member has any doubt about his role, and which provide a reserve for every 
player, have their exact counterpart in the teams of Juliette, which employ every moment usefully, 
neglect no human orifice and carry out every function. Intensive, purposeful activity prevails in 
Spirit as in all branches of mass culture, while the inadequately initiated spectator cannot divine 
the difference in the combinations, or the meaning of variations by the arbitrarily determined rule. 
"Me architectonic structure of the Kantian system, like the gymnastic pyramids of Sades orgies 
and the schematicised principles of the early bourgeois freemasonry, which has its cyclical mirror- 
image in the strict regimentation of the libertine society of the 120 Journ6es, reveals an 
organisation of life as a whole which is deprived of any substantial goal. .. 
419 
4'0 Adorno (1997) p. 88 my emphasis. I think that the shift between the Odyssey and Juliette 
demonstrates that Adorno's critique is not primarilly directed at instrumental reason per se but at 
the availibility of unconditional ethical ends. In this way, I think he can absorb Christine 
Korsgaard's claim that instrumental reason is a 'constitutive norm of willing' (see Korsgaard, 
Christine (1997) 'The Normativity of Instrumental Reason' in Ethics and Practical Reason Eds. G. 
Cully and B. Gaut (Oxford: Clarendon Press)). In willing an end, one is prescribing a law for 
oneself. My causality is already thought in the very act of willing an end. It is not the case that to 
will an end is to allow some impulse or desire to operate in me but to "consciously pick up the 
reins and make myself the cause of an end" (Korsgaard, 1997 p247). For Korsgaard, however, 
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To understand the emergence of such conditions, as described in the Dialectic 
of Enlightenment, we have to return to Adorno and Horkheimer's reading of the 
Odyssey, as a nascent stage of Enlightenment. As I have claimed, Odysseus, for 
Adorno, is the prototypical bourgeois subject right down to his predisposal 
towards MY. " Each encounter he has is a potential threat to his autonomy and 
each time he allows instinct or desire to rule his behaviour he is faced with 
annihilation. His only option is to pursue a strategy of self-mastery through 
which he can manage each situation: 
The nimble witted survives only at the price of his own dream, which he wins only by 
demystifying himself as well as the powers without. He can never have everything; he always has 
to wait, to be patient, to do without; he may not taste the lotus or eat the cattle of the sun God 
Hyperion, and when he steers between the rocks he must count on the loss of the men whom 
Scylla plucks from the boat. He just pulls through; struggle is his survival; and all the fame that he 
and the others win in the process serves only to confirm that the title of the hero is only gained at 
the price of the abasement and mortification of the instinct for complete, universal and undivided 
happiness. "" 
Key to Odysseus' success is the rational calculation of sacrifice. Sacrifice, for 
Adorno, constitutes a primitive form of exchange whereby the external powers 
are seen to be controlled or appeased at the expense of ones own renunciation, 
'barter is the secular form of sacrifice ... a device of men by which the Gods may 
be mastered'. " Odysseus' ability to utilise this form of rational exchange 
instrumental action must be motivated by unconditional ethical ends and it is the unavailability of 
such ends within the 'Iron Cage' that is Adorno's prime concern. 
4" Ibid., pp. 74-5. 
422 Ibid., p. 57. 
423 Ibid., p. 49. 
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overthrows the Gods 'by the very system by which they are honoured'. "" By 
establishing how many men he can afford to lose or how much he can postpone 
instant gratification, Odysseus can get one up on the Gods. 
However, Odysseus' cunning is always self-undermining. For example, when 
he meets the Cyclops Polyphemus he tells him that his name is 'no-man'. 
Offered wine and then blinded by Odysseus, the Cyclops cries out that 'no-man' 
injured him. As no one is responsible Odysseus escapes unharmed. However, his 
self-assertion is secured at the cost of the renunciation of his own identity. 
The subject denies his own identity which makes him a subject, and keeps himself alive by 
imitating the amphorous. "" 
No episode better illustrates the relationship between renunciation and 
dornination as Odysseus' encounter with the Sirens: 
There is no homecoming for the man who draws near them unawares and hears the Sirens voices; 
no welcome from his wife, no little children brightening at their fathers return. For their high clear 
song the Sirens bewitch him, as they sit there in a meadow piled high with the mouldering 
skeletons of men, whose withered skin still hangs upon their bones. "" 
Warned of the sea creatures that lure sailors to their doom by the Goddess 
Circe, Odysseus instructs his crew to put beeswax in their ears so as to be 
immune from their spell. 
Ibe labourers must be fresh and concentrate as they look ahead, and must ignore whatever lies to 
one side. "" 
424 Ibid., 
42' Ibid., p. 67. 
426 Homer (1986) The Odyssey (Oxford, OUP) p. 147. 
427 Adorno (1997) p. 34. 
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Odysseus himself asks to be bound to the ship's mast. He listens but cannot act 
on his temptation. The more he begs to be freed; the tighter he is to be bound. 
The prisoner is present at a concert, an inactive eavesdropper like later concertgoers, and his 
Spirited call for liberation fades like applause. 
What is most interesting about the example is that it draws together three forms 
of domination above, domination over external nature (or external threats), 
domination over ones own instincts and domination over other men and women, 
in one single schema. By binding himself, Odysseus attempts to remain free 
from the Siren's allure yet party to their music. His cunning, however, does not 
bring fulfilment as he is reduced to a mere passive consumer of the sirens song. 
On the other side of the class divide, Odysseus's 'men know only of the songs 
danger and nothing of its beauty, and leave him at the mast in order to save him 
and themselves. They reproduce the oppressors' life together with their own, and 
the oppressor is no longer able to escape his social role. ' "" 
4) Natural and Social Domination 
What we find in the Dialectic of Enlightenment is a strong conflation between 
the domination of nature and social domination. This (initially) appears 
problematic from the perspective of social constitution, as we tend to think of 
imposition upon the natural world in very different terms to that of the 
domination of other human beings. The former has the structure of subject-object 
domination whereas the latter has the structure of subject-subject domination. 
This conflation is the source of much criticism of Adorno and Horkheimer's 
position, particularly from Axel Honneth. However, as I will argue, such 
428 Ibid., p. 34. 
429 Ibid., 
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criticism often fails to understand Adorno's dialectical construction of natural- 
history and tends to fall back upon the very reified distinctions that Adorno 
wants to move beyond. 
Honneth's concern is that Adorno interprets the formation of an individual's 
ego identity purely in terms of the relationship between the individual subject 
and her natural environment. Like Habermas and Wellmer, Honneth claims that 
Adorno can only offer an 'aesthetic' model of ego identity that is formed 
independently of 'social recognition by other subjects'. What Adorno is seen to 
ignore is the intra-psychic processes that govern ego formation, the socialising 
process in which subjects' 'motive energies' are shaped by the demands of 
labour and the process through which instincts superfluous to such demands are 
sublimated and suppressed. In other words, there is a qualitative difference 
between the formation of the ego in relation to nature and in relation to society. 
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Adorno, Honneth claims, seems to be suggesting that the social domination of 
one class over another is a kind of 'intra-social extension of the human 
domination of external nature. ' He is, Honneth claims, crudely inserting a notion 
of social domination into his theory 'modelled upon' their prime concern, the 
domination of both internal and external nature: 
Adorno and Horkheimer are so strongly fixated on the model of the instrumental control of nature, 
which is the real interest of their philosophy of history, that they also want to conceive the manner 
of functioning of intra-social domination according to this model. 43' 
This, for Honneth, means that Adorno must conceive of a suppressed class as 
an unresisting object of the mechanisms of technical control in the same way as 
Honneth, A. (199 1) The Critique of Power (MIT, Cambridge) p. 43. 
431 Ibid., p. 48. 
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nature. ' Honneth sees Adorno as making the claim that domination can only be 
exercised in a one way fashion, either though direct force of though persuasion, 
manipulation and deception, 'It seems as if the procedures of control shape 
individuals without running into attempts at social resistance and cultural 
opposition'. "" Adorno is unable to comprehend social forms of resistance that do 
not have an analogue in 'nature' nor can he comprehend any kind of 
consensually secured social domination. Relations of domination, for Honneth, 
can only be explained by reference to the intersubjective recognition of such 
social structures forged in relation to a particular, culturally established, ethical 
framework. They cannot be conceived as being analogous to subject-object (or 
man and nature) relations, hence, the instigation of the communicative turn. 
Simon Jarvis' 'Adorno, A Critical Introduction, makes a number of criticisms 
of Honneth's position. In relation to the broader dispute between first and second 
generation critical theorists, Jarvis sees the difference as follows. Honneth wants 
to ground a model of social conflict in a theory of communication, 'the theory of 
communication is the grounding element, the model of social conflict is what is 
grounded'. "' Adorno, conversely, develops a theory of the entanglement of 
communication and domination, which cannot itself be grounded in a theory of 
communication. Thus, Adorno cannot accept a separation (even for analytical or 
procedural purposes) between communication and social conflict. This argument 
mirrors the claims made against Habermas in the previous chapter. 
On the question of whether Adorno sees social dornination as analogous to the 
domination of nature, Jarvis' answer is similar. Adorno wants to challenge 
'cultural idealism', the idea that there is a 'pure' realm of culture or society and 
432 Ibid., p. 52. 
433 Jarvis (1998) p. 36. 
196 
a 'pure' realm of nature. Human beings are seen as being (at least) part nature so 
that domination over other human beings is already domination over nature. As 
he remarks 
Only a theory which itself presupposes mastery of nature can regard intersubjectivity as a separate 
sphere which has somehow separated itself from the natural. "' 
Again, a fixed separation between nature and culture (even procedural) is taken 
by Adorno to presuppose the domination of nature. 
Whilst I think Jarvis is right about the very different assumptions underlying 
first and second generation critical theory, Honneth raises an interesting set of 
issues in arguing that Adorno, if he wants to make an analogy between social 
domination and the domination of nature, must see those subjected to social 
domination as an 'unresisting object'. Of course, it is precisely this passive 
concept of nature that Adorno wants to challenge (see above). This challenge can 
be seen to stem back to the late Kant. Kant, in the Third Critique, attributes to 
nature an ideal puporsiveness, 'a puporsiveness without purpose'. Natural 
beauty, for Kant, is attributed to the capacity of nature to 'form itself, in its 
freedom, also in an aesthetically purposive way, according to chemical laws. 9435 
In contradistinction to the first and second critiques, nature does not now figure 
as something to be 'mastered' but as a subject, without teleology, plan or 
intention. 
Herbert Marcuse can be seen to develop such a notion, seeing nature as 'an ally 
in the struggle against the exploitative societies in which the violation of nature 
aggravates the violation of man'. "' Nature is seen not as an object but as a 
'subject in its own right'. Like Adorno, Marcuse identifies a radical change in 
434 Ibid p. 35. 
435 Kant (1987) § 58 
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the nature of experience itself as being necessary for human emancipation. Also, 
like Adorno, Marcuse considers the Kantian separation of concept and intuition 
and the subsequent prioritising of the former over the later as encompassing a 
fundamentally emaciated structure of human experience. Marcuse's notion of 
'radical sensibility ... stresses the active, constitutive role of the senses in shaping 
reason'. 437 In other words, the 'senses' become the 'source' of a new socialist 
rationality. Given this transformation, 'Nature will have lost its mere utility, it 
would not appear merely as stuff, organic or inorganic matter, but as life force in 
its own right, as subject-object; the striving for life is the substance common to 
man and nature. "" 
It must be emphasised that Marcuse's account is non-teleological; that nature 
only becomes congenial for human emancipation to the extent that 'natures own 
gratifying forces and qualities are recovered and released'. "' Those elements of 
nature which have been damaged through rationalisation must be redeemed in 
order to achieve liberation. There is no intention in nature itself. However, 
Marcuse's conception of nature differs significantly from Honneth's implication 
that nature must be an 'unresisting object'. To 'violate nature' is to 'violate' 
certain innate qualities which are essential to the fulfilment of life. 
5) The Mimetic Faculty 
Adorno does not share Marcuse's sensuous utopianism in many ways. Adorno 
is keen to challenge many romantic notions of nature, instead arguing that much 
436 Marcusse, H. Nature and Revolution in (2000) Cazeaux, C. (ed. ) The Continental Aesthetics 
Reader (Routledge, London). 
437 Ibid., p. 259. 
43a Ibid., p. 260. 
439 Ibid., p. 261. 
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of what we falsely see as free and spontaneous in nature is actually a function of 
self-preservation. Birdsong, for example, is not 'song' but bound up with the 
self-preservation of the species. However, Adorno can still be seen to pursue this 
notion of nature as a source of potentiality and promise, particularly in the idea 
of mimesis. Understanding the notion of mimesis is essential in developing the 
critique of identity thinking that I began to outline in the previous chapter. 
Understanding the mimetic response and its disavowal in and through identity 
thinking is key to understanding the seemingly closed and reified nature of the 
iron cage. 
Adorno's account of mimesis can only really be understood as a development 
of the notion of the mimetic faculty found in the work of Walter Benjamin. It is 
here where we can see the roots of some of Adorno's concerns about the 
emaciated nature of modern experience. Before analysing the role mimesis plays 
in Adorno's philosophy, I will first give a brief account of its roots in Benjamin. 
As Michael Rosen argues, Benjamin's concern with the mimetic faculty can be 
seen as arising from his Kantian concern with the nature of experience, albeit a 
concern with a far broader notion of experience than the cataloguing of sense 
images under formal rules. ' Benjamin's key concern is the flattening of 
experience in modernity. Individuals in the modern world suffer from both a loss 
of emotional richness and a reduced capacity to integrate experience. Against 
this rationalist, scientific notion of experience, which has come to historical 
prominence, Benjamin appeals to a mode of experience that is based upon the 
ability to form non-sensible resemblances. This he describes as the Mirrictic 
faculty: 
Rosen (2004) p. 44. 
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The highest capacity for producing similarities ... is mans. His gift of seeing resemblances is 
nothing other than a rudiment of the powerful compulsion in former times to behave and become 
like something else. Perhaps there is none of his higher functions in which his mimetic faculty 
does not play a decisive role. " 
Benjamin, here, is interested, firstly, in a form of response to otherness which 
attempts to assimilate the self to the other and, secondly, a capacity for 
perceiving resemblances. Such a capacity arises in ritual, astrology and 
divination but does not fade with the collapse of such activities. Instead, for 
Benjamin, it 'migrates' into language: 'It is to language that clairvoyance has, 
over the course of history, yielded its old powers. ' " 
In terms of our everyday experience, mimesis refers to the identification of 
correspondences transmitted by society's members at the deepest level of their 
consciousness, without them being rationally aware of making such 
connections. ' Benjamin sets himself the task of reawakening or uncovering 
such a form of experience. However, as he claims in his essay, 'On Some Motifs 
in Baudelaire', ' our capacity for experience has been damaged through the 
onset of industrial capitalism. Appealing to Proust's memoire involontaire 
Benjamin sees the increasing atrophy of experience in terms of the loss of 
richness and pleasure gained from direct and involuntary experience of an object, 
which is quickly covered over by the voluntary memory in the service of the 
intellect. This memoire involontaire arises, for Proust, 'somewhere beyond the 
reach of the intellect, and unmistakably present in some material object (or in the 
"' Benjamin (1979) p. 333. 
442* Ibid., p. 68. 
443 Rosen (2004) p. 46. 
Benjamin (1999) pp. 152-97. 
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sensation which such an object arouses in us), though we have no idea which one 
it is. As for that object, it depends entirely on chance whether we come upon it 
before we die or whether we never encounter it. "' 
For Benjamin, however, this is not a matter of chance but historically tied up 
with the onset of modern capitalism. The overwhelming, sensational shock 
character of modern life causes a 'retreat of inner life so that it can only be 
disclosed as memoire involontaire. " The involuntary aspects of memory cannot 
support and enrich the voluntary as they are buried deep within the mind in 
response to the tumultuous character of modern life. Experience takes the form 
of erlebnis (immediate and fleeting) rather than erfiahrung (rich and continuous). 
In Benjamin, therefore, we can see the development of a critique of rationalism, 
whereby rationalism is defined solely in terms of an increase of the discretionary 
powers of the individual. In its place, he appeals to a receptive abandonment to 
impulse and desire and to a shared, tacit form of mimetic experience. Such an 
appeal, however, does not take our understanding of desire and spontaneity from 
within industrial capitalism as paradigmatic. The domination of voluntary 
memory as a self-defence mechanism against the threatening nature of modern 
capitalism results in involuntary memory being disclosed in an often violent and 
exceptional manner, in Baudelaire's response to the crowd, for example. 
Benjamin's appeal to spontaneity and mimesis presupposes a transformation of 
our social relations and our relationship with nature such that such a defence 
mechanism is less necessary. I shall now develop these themes further through 
Adorno. 
44' Quoted in Benjamin (1999) p. 155. 
446 Rosen (1996) p. 244. 
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Adorno retains Benjamin's understanding of mimesis as a type of response to 
an object in which the subject attempts to assimilate itself to the object by 
mimicry and, more broadly, as a type of experience which is capable of drawing 
similarities and connections in forms which are non-conceptual or non- 
discursive. Adorno's anthropology is highly dubious but his notion of mimesis 
philosophically suggestive. 
The mimetic response, for Adorno, originates from a primeval fear of nature, in 
a world governed by the principle of mana. For Adorno, approaching objects as 
seats of mana is a consequence of the weakness of human beings in the face of 
nature. From this point, the distinction of subject and object and the development 
of language arises: 
The separation of the animate and the inanimate, the occupation of certain places by demons and 
deities, first arises from ... pre-animism, which contains the 
first lines of the separation of subject 
and object. When the tree is no longer approached merely as tree, but as evidence for an Other, as 
the location of mana, language expresses the contradiction that something is itself and at one and 
the same time something other than itself, identical and not identical. ' 
The rnimetic response, thus, is occasioned by fear of unknown nature and gives 
rise to the attribution of supernatural properties to the object. The status of this 
response is highly complex. Firstly, mimesis originates as a distancing 
mechanism in response to feared nature, an attempt to, firstly, appease and, 
secondly, control the unknown through imitation. Primitive magic frequently 
involves a complex set of rituals involving the imitation of natural forces. The 
same urge behind this primal mode of controlling nature gives rise to the 
conceptual mapping of the external world. The naming of animistic deities and, 
eventually, the use of grand mythological stories to explain and, thus, control the 
44' Adorno (1997) p. 15. 
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unknown are all rooted in a negative flight of fear. Secondly, however, the 
mimetic response to an object stands more closely to the object which generates 
it than conceptual identification. As I argued in the previous chapter, conceptual 
identification involves three features, the explanation of every event as 
repetition, the separation of knowing subject from object and the principle of 
instrumentality. The particular is made fixed and immutable by subsumption 
within the universal. The mimetic response, in contradistinction, more intimately 
captures the object that occasions it. I shall develop this claim later. Thirdly, both 
forms of response can be seen to be complexly interrelated in the example 
Adorno provides above. The tree is both identified, under the concept 'tree', 
whilst attributed with a non-identical excess, it is not merely a 'tree' but a 
location of mana. This latter idea of an anthropomorphic projection of ends and 
'life' upon objects in the external world fits well with the notion of 'discerning 
similarities' involved in Benjamin's notion of rnimesis. The world is invested 
with meaning though a shared, felt and tacit network of associations. 448 
Mimesis, therefore, is a primal mode of attempting to appease feared nature 
through imitating it, to be Re the object rather than classifying it or saying what 
it is like. As I have said, this response is gradually supplanted by the 
manipulative intervention into natural processes (whereby subsumptive 
classification becomes the mode of thinking most appropriate). It is not, 
however, extinguished. 
44' This sense of investing others and the natural world with a sense of being ends in themselves 
(as opposed to being objects to manipulate) is something Adorno wants to recapture - in a non- 
mythological form. See below. 
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The ratio which supplants mimesis is not simply its counterpart. It is itself mimesis, mimcsis unto 
death. ' 
We can understand this claim in two ways. Firstly, Adorno could be making the 
hyperbolic claim that the development of the iron cage (the nexus of cold, 
calculating, instrumental social relations and institutional structures) is a mimetic 
response to ward off what human beings fear most, death. This is what Simon 
Jarvis seems to suggest that Adorno is arguing, "' adding that military and 
industrial self-destructiveness can be seen to emanate from a misguided sense of 
self-preservation which attempts to ward off death 'an indistinguishable 
reminder of the nature in culture'. 451 Secondly, and perhaps, more convincingly, 
we could interpret Adorno as suggesting that the mimetic response to nature has 
become dead and rigid in response to the disavowal of living nature through 
societal rationalisation. 
The subjective Spirit which cancels the animation of nature can master a deSpiritualiscd nature 
only by imitating its rigidity and deSpiritualising itself in turn. "' 
I shall return to this thread of Adorno's thinking later when discussing 
'Bourgeois Coldness'. 453 
44' Adorno (1997) p. 57. 
450 Jarvis (1998) p. 3 1. 
451 Ibid., 
412 Adorno (1997) p. 57. 
453 This claim is also given a Marxist gloss in Mininw Aforalia, in relation to the shift in 
proportion of variable (living labour) and constant (means of production) capital. 
'That which determines subjects as means of production and not as living purposes, incroscs 
with the proportion of machines to variable capital' Adorno (1974) p. 229. 
The shift in the composition of capital towards dead labour is reflected in an increasing rigidity 
and coldness in social relations. 
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6) Mimesis and Non-identity thinking 
Having outlined Adorno's historical and anthropological account of societal 
rationalisation and the disavowal of mimetic experience I want to turn to its 
philosophical significance. At this level, the Hegelian structure of Adorno's 
argument becomes more apparent. In Negative Dialectics, as I have argued 
previously, the critique of societal rationalisation is addressed at the level of the 
concept. One of the central claims of Negative Dialectics is that to think 
conceptually is to disavow the content of that concept. To identify a particular 
we do not say what it is but what category or law it comes under. Adorno thinks 
that by 'identifying' an object we render it fixed and intransigent and leave it 
open to manipulation. The concept is, thus, an instrument of domination. 
I have already distinguished between two interpretations of this claim. Firstly, 
there is the Habermas-Wellmer interpretation (which I rejected in the previous 
chapter) that Adorno is engaging in a critique of the concept itsetf and, thus 
bends towards irrationalism and mysticism. He leaves us only with some notion 
of 'aesthetic rationality' which is the other of discursive reason. A more 
sympathetic reading of Adorno, however, which I have pursued in this thesis, 
takes Adorno to be claiming that there is nothing wrong with conceptualism per 
se.. Such abstraction is integral to all acts of cognition. The problem arises only 
when the concept claims cognitive self-sufficiency in relation to what stimulates 
it, its content. It is disavowal of the somatic or intuitive moment in cognition, 
through the mechanisms of repetition, objective distance and instrumentality that 
leads to reason's turn to the irrational. Identity thinking (best expressed in 
Kantian epistemology, but also in a range of modern philosophical positions 
from logical positivism to utilitarianism) is problematic once it claims to be the 
whole of reason. 
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This argument, as I have suggested, takes upon a very Hegelian character. 
Hegel's speculative approach, the process of demonstrating that two elements 
that appear radically opposed to each other are actually intrinsically related, can 
be seen to be at work in Adorno. This motif can be seen most visibly in the 
resemblance between Adorno's account of Myth and Enlightenment in the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment and the section on Faith and Pure Insight in Hegel's 
Phenomenology. Hegel's famous discussion of Faith and Pure Insight, 
conceptually reconstructing the clash between Enlightenment and Religious 
faith, argues that each is equally dogmatic without the other. Pure insight treats 
faith as a mere projection of human consciousness into the outside world, with 
the object of faith not existing outside the subjective consciousness of the 
believer. However, in doing so, it falls into an empty scepticism with no content 
of its own: 
We have therefore to see how pure insight and intention behaves in its negative attitude to that 
other which it finds confronting it. Pure insight and intention which takes up a negative attitude 
can only be, since its Notion is all essentiality and there is nothing outside it, the negative of 
itself. As insight, therefore, it becomes the negative of pure insight, becomes untruth and 
unreason, and, as intention, it becomes the negative of pure intention, becomes a lie and 
insincerity of purpose. "' 
Adorno and Horkheimer can be seen to be generalising such an account in their 
understanding of Myth and Enlightenment. The irrationality of Enlightenment 
thinking arises when it moves beyond the critique of irrational mythological 
belief patterns into a critique of all anthropomorphic projection. The ideal of 
enlightenment becomes knowledge stripped of all anthropomorphic connection. 
As Jay Bernstein argues, 
454 Hegel (1977) p. 154. 
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The final picture of a disenchanted world [for Adorno] is ... a world without the 
human, the human 
becoming only a distorting perspective on a world wholly and forever independent of it. 455 
Although Bernstein tends to impose his own ethical vocabulary onto Adorno's 
work, his interpretation is generally productive and demonstrates a level of 
critical engagement with Adorno's concerns that is missing from Habermas... 
and Wellmer. The underlying claim, that, for Adorno, successful cognition is 
dependent upon a certain degree of anthropomorphism, is important to stress. We 
do not merely catalogue objects in the world according to formal rules but invest 
them with certain properties in terms of how they affect us somatically or what 
connections or associations they pre-consciously bring to mind. However, the 
richness of our capacity for experience, as in Benjamin, is seen to have become 
increasingly atrophied in the midst of industrial modernity. Adorno, like 
Benjamin, seeks to open up space for a form of experience, which involves 
receptive abandonment to the object. In the form of abandonment to the object 
we see a retreat from the (logical) domination of the object and (physical) 
domination of nature within and without. 
7) Individual Freedom in Adorno 
Where does this complex account of the interplay between reason and the 
somatic get us in terms of the main themes of the thesis? So far, I have argued 
that the idea of social constitution is closely bound up with a commitment to 
social autonomy. I have argued that the Hegelian concept of reconciliation, in 
which the idea of social autonomy can be seen to rooted, is heavily compromised 
4" Bernstein (2001) p. 92. 
456 For example, see Robert Hullot-Kentor's 'Back to Adorno' in Delanty (ed. ) (2004) for an 
account of how Habermas's critique of Adorno is closely related to his political manoeuvrings 
within the German philosophical establishment. 
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both by Hegel's idealist metaphysics and his conservative politics. However, in 
Adorno's hands, the idea of reconciliation becomes a powerful response to the 
problem of alienation. Like Hegel (and by extension Kant), Adorno is concerned 
with the development of social relations in which human beings are recognised 
as ends and not means. It is only within such social relations that human beings 
can be 'at home' in the world. In Hegel, this is expressed through the idea of 
mutual recognition (see Chapter Two) in which his primary concern is the nature 
of the social roles occupied by individuals. Adorno's emphasis is very different, 
however. As Adorno interprets the problem of alienation primarily in terms of a 
narrowing of what we take to be reason, reconciliation can be seen to refer not 
only to the nature of social relations but also to a less oppositional relationship 
between the rational and the somatic. 
The key problem for Adorno, however, is how to approach the idea of 
reconciliation in a way that avoids both the empty and formal moralism of Kant 
and the limited historicism of Hegel. Adorno, expounds this dialectic of critique 
clearly in the 'Marginalia to Theory and Practice'. 
Kant's moral philosophy and Hegel's Philosophy of Right represent two dialectical stages of the 
bourgeois self-consciousness of practice. Split as they are between the particular and the universal, 
the two poles which tear that consciousness apart, both are also false; each stage is right in 
opposition to the other so long as no possible higher figure of practice is revealed in reality. "" 
Kantian moral freedom is a 'conception incompatible with any empiricism', "" 
anticipating (in a distorted form) a free form of socialisation amongst 
individuals. It is false, however, in so far as it fails to connect with the real, 
457 Adorno (1997) Marginalien zu Iheorie und Praxis p. 765. Quoted in Schweppenhäuser (2004) 
p. 343. 
459 Ibid., 
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historical experience of social heteronomy. It is ideological in the sense 
discussed in Chapter Four. The Hegelian project, on the other hand, expresses 
the real experience of the domination of the universal yet, in doing so, 
conceptually liquidates the spontaneity of the individual. "' 
Furthermore, although Adorno takes Kantian thought to anticipate an end to 
social heteronomy, theform of Kantian moral freedom undermines and truncates 
our ability to imagine such a prospect. Whilst Kantian moral freedom points 
beyond current social heteronomy, its abstract and formalistic character fails to 
identify the basis of moral action itself Adorno's criticism of Kantian moral 
thinking specifically, and modern moral philosophy more generally, is that moral 
action stems not from following universalisable moral laws but from a far more 
basic principle of Solidarity. Adorno alludes to this notion in reference to Brecht. 
The impulse, naked physical fear, and the sense of Solidarity with what Brecht called 
tormentable bodies is immanent in moral conduct and would be denied in attempts at ruthless 
rationalisation. ' 
Adorno wants to argue that the motivation for ethical action should always 
be the direct experience of vulnerability or neediness, the response to which is 
spontaneous and immediate. What is attested to in much modern moral 
philosophy is the displacement of the experience of each other as unique and 
vulnerable living individuals with an 'externalist' appeal to putatively universal 
moral laws (for example moral principles or the categorical imperative). In 
contradistinction, it is our needy and vulnerable animality (our ability to 
4'9 See Schweppenhauser in Huhn (ed. ) (2004) The Cambridge Companion to Adorno (CUP, 
Cambridge) p342-344 for an incisive account of this dialectic. 
460 Adorno (1973) p. 286. 
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experience hurt, pain and want) that Adorno sees as the locus of our ability to 
respond ethically. Importantly, it is this form of somatic reaction to suffering 
which is disavowed in the process of societal rationalisation. The displacement 
of the mimetic component of reason is, as I have argued, coordinated with the 
fungible and instrumental world of the iron cage. If Kantian moral philosophy is 
seen as expressing such displacement and hypostasising it, then, for Adorno, it 
must be seen as being partially complicit in human unfreedom. 
In an important passage from Negative Dialectics Adorno furthers this claim: 
No man should be tortured; there ought to be no concentration camps, while all of this continues 
in Asia and Africa and is repressed merely because, as ever, the humanity of civilisation is 
inhumane towards the people it shamelessly brands as uncivilised. 
But if a moral philosopher were to seize upon these lines and to exult at having caught the critics 
of morality at last, caught them quoting the same values that are happily proclaimed by the 
philosophy of morals, his cogent conclusion would be false. The lines are true as an impulse, as a 
reaction to the news that torture is going on somewhere. They must not be rationaliscd; as an 
abstract principle they would fall promptly into the bad infinities of derivation and validity. "' 
Later on in the text, this claim is raised in relation to Auschwitz, which, for 
Adorno, is exemplary of reason's instru mentalisat ion. " Auschwitz, as I have 
argued, is not treated by Adorno as a historical anomaly but an exemplary 
instance of human evil, which takes place within a broader context of 'Bourgeois 
"' Adorno (1973) p. 285. 
462 'That the individual [Individuum] no longer died in the concentration camps, but rather the 
exemplar, has to affect the dying of those who escaped the administrative measures. Genocide is 
the absolute integration, which is everywhere being prepared, where human bLings are made the 
same, polished, as the military calls it, until they are literally cancelled out, as deviations from the 
concept of their complete nullity. Auschwitz confirms the philosopheme of pure identity as 
death. ' (Adorno, 1973 p335) 
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coldness'. Such indifference to human life can only arise in a culture in which 
human beings, at a broad level, are recognised only in terms of being cogs within 
a machine. 
Adorno, as I have argued, claims that Auschwitz demands a 'new categorical 
imperative'. It is worth quoting this paragraph at length, as it is crucial to 
understanding what the demand for 'Solidarity' amounts to: 
Ifider has imposed a new categorical imperative upon humanity in the state of their unfrecdom: to 
arrange their thinking and conduct, so that Auschwitz never repeats itself, so that nothing similar 
ever happen again. This imperative is as unmanageable vis-h-vis its foundation as the given fact 
formerly was to the Kantian one. To treat it discursively would be heinous: in it the moment of the 
supplementary in what is moral can be bodily felt. Bodily, because it is the abhorrence, become 
practical, of the unbearable physical pain inflicted on individuals, even after individuality, as an 
intellectual form of reflection, is on the point of disappearing. Only in the unvarnished 
materialistic motive does morality survive. 13 
Note that Adorno's use of the term 'categorical imperative' appears to be an 
ironic inversion of Kant's. Firstly, the impulse behind the imperative is a 
particular, empirical, historical event. It is the experience of the fact of 
Auschwitz and our collective interest in preventing anything like this happening 
again that is the force of the imperative. Secondly, the imperative derives its 
force from the somatic, a bodily reaction of utter abhorrence to the event. This 
reaction is causal, an involuntary 'shudder' of disgust. Therefore, the force of 
Adorno's demand is not only that we organise our actions and thoughts to avoid 
the recurrence of genocide but that we reject fonnal notions of morality which 
are seen to be intrinsically bound up with the instrumental isatio n of reason. If 
Auschwitz is the culmination of identity thinking then the only appropriate 
immediate response is somatic revulsion. 
46' Adorno (1973) p. 365. 
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7) Some Critical Issues 
Whilst I think Adorno provides a rather compelling historicavanthropological 
diagnosis of a world in which we have become largely unable to respond to the 
neediness and suffering of others, the extent to which he provides any substantial 
insight into how we can practically and theoretically re-orientate ourselves away 
from such a world is unclear. I have already gone through the arguments for 
Adorno's philosophical negativity in Chapter Four and his refusal to allude to 
the good positively. In light of the discussion of mimesis above, we can now 
understand the practical and moral form that such negativity takes as being 
somatic Solidarity with the suffering of others. However, as suggestive and 
powerful as such a notion is, it seems to face a number of obvious questions. 
Firstly, whereas, it would appear easy to make the claim that someone who seeks 
to derive the evilness of Auschwitz from a process of discursive moral argument 
is responding in a way which is morally flawed, this seems to be a far less 
obvious claim in cases where, for example, there are competing moral claims, 
twin evils or shades of grey. It is, surely, in such circumstances that moral and 
political philosophy comes into its element. Adorno, like Hegel, seems 
uninterested with the arduous attention to detail involved in moral philosophy 
and works in broad-brush strokes. For example, he argues, in his Lectures on 
Moral Philosophy that, within the context of radical evil, the only ethical path 
open is: 
... the determinate negation of everything that has been seen through, and thus the ability to focus 
upon the power of resistance to all the things imposed on us, to everything the world has made of 
us, and intends to make of us to a vastly greater degree. '" 
'64 Adorno (2000) p. 168. 
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Such a claim seems to resist notions of their being lesser evils or pragmatic 
compromises and focuses attention solely on a seemingly utopian critique of the 
'false whole'. I discuss the philosophical reasons for such negativity and 
minimalism in more detail below, but it is, perhaps, worth mentioning one 
thought at this point which is more tactical and political. Part of Adorno's 
concern would appear to be that over strenuous moral deliberation often tends to 
limit itself within choices which are proscribed by a world of 'radical evil' and 
fails to challenge the nature of this world itself. For example, we could take 
recent characterizations of current world events as a conflict between Islamic 
fundamentalism/totalitarianism and liberal democratic capitalism in which we all 
must take sides as indicative of the sort of 'false choices' which serve to ring- 
fence broader criticism of the status-quo. " Certainly, Adorno's own comments 
. 
in the preface to Negative Dialectics, where he proclaims himself prepared to 
'face the rancor' of 'both camps' ' (that is Western Capitalism and Soviet 
Communism) can be seen in a similar light. It is not that Adorno is naive enough 
to identify 'both camps' as the same or that he is ignorant enough to take the 
form of Soviet totalitarianism as identical to the forms of mass control in western 
consumerism. It is that the demand to 'takes sides' is an ideological gesture 
which serves to constrain or bury more radical social criticism. Adorno is 
dissatisfied with any position that does not take the critique of the exchange 
society to be central and this generates a certain disinterest in the notion of 
politics as a pragmatic balancing of unsavory options. 
See Zizek's preface to 'Welcome to the Desert of the Real' for a witty elucidation of such 
tactics. 
466 Adorno (1973) p. I 
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A second question is that, again, whereas it may be obvious that Auschwitz was 
an act of evil, and that such a judgment requires no further rationalization, such a 
judgment is less obviously applied to seemingly trivial phenomena such as the 
culture industry or astrology, " which Adorno wants to argue are intrinsically 
bound up with the world of 'radical evil'. Adorno expects us to take our 
revulsion at Auschwitz (as an exemplary act of evil) as a starting point from 
which to critically distance ourselves from the underlying context of evil that 
provides the conditions of possibility for such genocide. Adorno's remarks on 
seemingly innocent aspects of popular culture are often stark in terms of their 
explicit references to totalitarianism or Nazism. Describing the 'Jitterbug' dance 
craze, Adorno laments, 
They call themselves jitterbugs, as if they simultaneously wanted to affirm and mock their loss of 
individuality, their transformation into beetles whirring around in fascination. " 
Describing a Jazz performance he comments, 
What is common to the Jazz enthusiast of all countries, however, is the moment of compliance, in 
parodistic exaggeration. In this respect their play recalls the brutal seriousness of the masses of the 
followers of totalitarian states... 469 
467 See Adomo (1994) The Stars Down to Earth (Routledge, London) p. 46-172. 
46' Arato (ed. ) (1985) p. 292. 
Adorno (1988) p. 122. 
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Clearly, these assertions are not merely meant solely for rhetorical effect" but 
are meant to make us reflect upon the sort of culture we inhabit and its 
complicity in forming and sustaining the cold, strategic social relations which are 
indifferent to barbarism. In this sense, the uniformity and conformity engendered 
by mass culture is seen as analogous to the uniformity and conformity of labour 
within the context of capitalist exchange and, subsequently, analogous to the 
absolute indifference to particular individuals within totalitarian regimes. They 
are only analogous in that they all engender a certain disposition towards the 
particular. Furthermore, such a disposition is taken to be a necessary 
precondition of the unleashing of totalitarian violence. " 
The emphasis on the context of 'bourgeois coldness' raises a third question as 
to whether or not the perpetrators of evil acts are made less culpable by being 
4'0 Adorno certainly, in my view, means what he says and takes the extremity of many of his 
aphorisms and statements to be justified by the extremity of the circumstances in which they are 
composed. Having said this, it is important to understand the rhetorical strategies used by Adorno 
in order to understand his work. One of the most commonly used devices in Adorno's 
presentation is parataxis - the positioning of often extreme propositions in a manner which does 
not indicate relations of integration or subordination between them. This means of presentation 
evades (or circumscribes) the conceptual domination of the object by positioning concepts in a 
4constellation' whereby each exists unsubordinated to the other. 
471 It may well be that we dispute some of the specific cultural criticisms made by Adorno, often 
more the result of a latent conservatism or inadequate breath of knowledge, but this does not 
necessarily undermine the general ethical force of his social criticism, that we understand 
genocide not as a unique aberration but as part of a broader context of 'bourgeois coldness'. For 
considered and critical views on Adorno's interpretation of mass culture which remain 
sympathetic to his project see, for example, Kellner, D in Gibson, N and Rubin, A (eds. ) (2004) 
'Theodor W. Adorno and the Dialectics of Mass Culture' and Hullot-Kentor in Huhn (ed) (2004) 
'Right Listening and a New Type of Human Being (especially p. 195-6) 
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situated within such a culture. If, as I have previously argued, Adorno thinks that 
there are no models available for living a good life, does this mean that the 
perpetrators of evil are excused? Adorno takes this to be a genuine aporia, not 
something to be 'settled by superior logic'. " Commenting on the 1965 
Auschwitz trials in Frankfurt, Adorno claims that 'acquittal would be a barefaced 
injustice'. " Adorno, unusually for a Marxist, unflinchingly uses the term 'evil', 
firstly, to apply to a certain cold, instrumental disposition towards other human 
beings and, secondly, to refer to the context within such a disposition emerges. 
Adorno does not want to sympathise with the perpetrators of evil in any way but 
does not want critical enquiry to stop at mere condemnation. He is also 
concerned that the formal, universalism of legal judgement fails to capture the 
scale and depth of evil at issue in genocide. This concern with the abstract 
generality of legal judgement echoes remarks made previously in the Dialectic 
of Enlightenment. Quoting Francis Bacon, 
'Is not the rule, 'Si inaequalibus aequalia addas, omnia erunt inaequalia, an axiom of justice as 
well as of the mathematics? And is there not a true coincidence between commutative and 
distributive justice, and arithmetical and geometrical proportion? Bourgeois society is ruled by 
equivalence. ' It makes the dissimilar comparable by reducing it to abstract quantities. ""' 
Fourthly, it is ambiguous as to whether Adorno thinks there is something 
wrong with discursive moral argument per se We could take Adorno to be 
making the strong claim that attempts of moral rationalization in the face of evil 
472 Adorno (1973) p. 287. 
473 Ibid., p. 286. 
474 Adorno (1997) p. 7. As Julian Roberts points out, however, it is difficult to know exactly what 
Adorno and Horkheimer's target is here as responding to the particularity of individual cases is 
built into the nature of common law, in practice in both the US and UK. Julian Roberts (2005) 
The Dialectic of Enlightenment in The Cambridge Companion to Adorno (CUP, Cambridge). 
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are always somehow complicit in the suffering they respond to or the weaker 
claim that there is nothing wrong with forming moral rules, grounds or principles 
per se (for example constructing second order moral rules regarding what counts 
as treating someone as an end-in-itself and what counts as treating someone as a 
means-to-an-end). On the second view, it is only when we take such rules to be 
constitutive of what morality is, when the motivating somatic response to 
suffering is somehow forgotten or disavowed, that morality becomes complicit 
in human suffering and unfreedom. I take the second reading to be most 
plausible, although it is clear that Adorno thinks that there is something 
'blasphemous' about a formal moral response to suffering. As Schweppenhauser 
puts it, '[t]o dissolve the imperative into a chain of justifications is to laugh in 
the face of human dignity'. " 
Finally, there is the question as to why theoretical grounding always results in a 
'bad infinity'. " Schweppenhduser puts the problem as follows. Adorno wants to 
claim that discursive arguments necessarily end up in the form of some sort of 
'ethical philosophy of principles' ' and seemingly wants to resist such 
rationalisation and universalisation in favour of a materialist form of morality 
whose only recourse is to the moral impulse. However, Adorno does seem to 
imply, for example, in the demand never to let Auschwitz reoccur, that moral 
propositions are universally ethically binding. In depriving moral propositions of 
415 Huhn (ed. ) (2004) p345 n44. 
V6 Hartnack defines bad infinity, following Hegel, as 'an endless series of finite items, that is, of 
items that, by necessity, are finite and also, by necessity, must continue to the next item. From 
the very fact that its continuation is logically built into it, it follows that there is a conflict 
between what the series requires, namely, its continuation to completion, and the logical 
impossibility of such a completion' (Hartnack, 1998 p2 1). 
4'" Schweppenhauser in Huhn ed. (2004) p. 346. 
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their theoretical grounds, he seemingly undermines his own project which seeks 
(however tentatively) the good and right life through the critique of moral 
philosophy. "' However, that the demand never to let Auschwitz reoccur is 
formulated negatively suggests that Adorno does not intend to produce a fully- 
fledged moral philosophy. More precisely, Adorno does not think that such an 
attempt is possible in current circumstances; we can only say what should not be. 
The first step in the pursuit of the good life, and the only step Adorno believes to 
be currently available, is the negative recognition of what should not be, which 
stems from feelings of pain, neediness and empathy with the suffering of others. 
Hence, as Gunzelin Schmid Noerr suggests, Adorno does not seek to ground 
morality altogether but instead seeks 'a minimal morality of respect for 
unafflicted life'. "' 
This recognition, however, forms the positive, redemptive element of 
Adorno's thinking. That we still have the capacity to respond in terms of this 
minimal morality rules out total despair and opens up possibilities for thinking of 
a world in which such suffering is vanquished. This is what Adorno seems to be 
claiming in one of his more obscure metaphors in Negative Dialectics 
Greyness could not fill us with despair if our minds did not harbour the concept of different 
colours, scattered traces of which are not absent from the negative whole "' 
8) Conclusion 
Through this discussion, I have attempted to make Adorno's tentative notion of 
social autonomy qua Solidarity less opaque. The 'Iron Cage' of modernity is 
characterised by a certain type of rigid and instrumental thinking towards one 
47'lbid., 
' Quoted in SchweppenhAuser in Huhn ed. (2004) p. 347. 
4'0 Adorno (1973) p. 378. 
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another, the natural environment and our internal nature, which is complicit in 
social heteronomy. Human beings are viewed solely in terms of their fungibility, 
as cogs in a machine and not as needy and vulnerable ends in their own right, 
with such ftingibility rooted in the relationship of exchange. Whereas Kantian 
moral freedom points beyond such circumstances of unfreedom, defined in terms 
of homogenisation and commoditisation (see Chapter Four), it is also complicit 
in such a process due to the abstract form it assumes. Solidarity, which Adorno 
implicitly contrasts with moral freedom, demands a materialist turn, whereby it 
is the spontaneous response to suffering inflects moral reflection. However, 
rather than simply privilege the somatic or the intuitive over the rational, Adorno 
indicts reason with having lost all substantive ends, for becornýing irrational, as a 
consequence of its abstract form. This process, although understood as historical 
and social, is explored indirectly in Adorno, largely through its expression in 
philosophical texts. The idea of 'reconciliation', tentatively posits the 
reconciliation of sense and reason, or, more broadly, nature and culture. As I 
have argued, it is when 'identity thinking' takes itself to be self-sufficient from 
disavowed nature that it becomes irrational. In current circumstances, however, 
the notion of reconciliation can only be understood in the negative, as a reaction 
to what should not be. 
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Conclusion 
1) Introduction 
By way of conclusion, I first want to summarise a number of key areas that 
have been investigated in the thesis in order to clearly identify the sense in which 
Adorno's attempts to move beyond Hegel contribute to understanding the 
problems of reconciliation and social constitution. In so doing, I want to also 
underline why remaining within the Hegelian trajectory of thought is so 
important to Adorno and why this gives him something of a critical edge over his 
second generation critics. Firstly, I look at the source of critique in each thinker, 
highlighting the employment of immanent as opposed to transcendent critique by 
both Hegel and Adorno. Following from this, I identify a common problem, 
alienation, which can be said to link both the issues of reconciliation and social 
constitution. Next, I re-examine the responses to this problem, concentrating 
upon Adorno's attempts to put Hegel back on his feet. 
2) Sources of Critique 
Adorno, as I have argued, constantly vacillates between presenting Hegel as a 
radical thinker and a reactionary apologist for Prussian despotism. In respect of 
the former, I have drawn attention to the close relationship between Hegel and 
Adorno's understanding of immanent critique. I have taken the take the essential 
characteristics of both Adorno and Hegel's understanding of immanent critique 
to be as follows. 
(1) Immanent critique proceeds only from within the norms and 
presuppositions of a particular social form. 
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(2) Immanent critique aims to illuminate tension between 'essence"" and 
'existence', that is, the gaps between the conspicuous ethical claims 
societies use to legitimate themselves and the reality of those societies. 
(3) If there is a divergence between 'essence' and 'existence' then the historical 
genesis of such legitimating norms will be interrogated. 
(4) We could take three different positions on what this process delivers, the 
latter of which I associate with Hegel and Adorno. (a) The governing norm 
is redundant, utopian or idealistic and we are deceiving ourselves if we 
genuinely believe that it could be attained. We need to be realists and 
abandon ethical baggage. (b) Society must develop to the point where it 
'fits' with its legitimating norms. (c) It is not only societal change that is 
needed. The governing norms themselves are deficient in such a way that 
inhibits the development of their full ethical capacity. We need to retrieve 
the ideational content of such norms from their contingentform, which may 
48' The use of the 'Hegelese' here can potentially obscure the point. Recall that, for Hegel, 
essence refers to the final-formal cause of a thing or concept. However, understanding something 
in terms of its essence is prior only in terms of explanation and not existence. The formal-final 
cause of a thing or concept is only realised through its coming into existence and is understood 
retrospectively. Hence, in terms of immanent critique, we may not immediately apprehend what 
the 'essence' of a norm is, for example freedom, equality, justice etc. as such an apprehension, 
from the point of view of those embedded in the society, only comes about in highlighting 
whether or not the norm is legitimately appealed to in terms of the real operation of that society. 
This may, furthermore, raise issues of coherency or consistency in the way the norm is 
understood. 'Iberefore, the point of immanent critique is not to appeal to some 'essential' or 
foundational criteria that societies fail to live up to. Instead it is about illuminating the 
incompleteness of certain ethical standards in their own terms in order to point towards radical 
societal transformation. 
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be complicit in their failure to 'fit' with the society they legitimate. This is 
what I take to be Hegel and Adorno's approach. 
(5) In terms of (c), which I take to be Hegel and Adorno's position, the 
understanding and interpretation of the norms in question will qualitatively 
change. 
We could take the Marxist critique of 'bourgeois freedom' as a simple 
example. (1) Freedom is a key legitimating norm within modern capitalist 
societies. (2) Capitalism, however, requires that we are all forced to sell our 
labour power unless, that is, we are in the minority that have control of the 
means of production. Furthermore, capitalism relies upon the immiseration and 
disempowerment of vast sections of the global population. As such, the 
legitimating claim of freedom falls short of reality. (3) The modern notion of 
freedom historically arises alongside the inception of capitalism and is bound to 
the legitimation of the current social order. (4) This indicates a problem with the 
way the concept of freedom is constructed. On the one hand, the norm of 
'freedom' has ideational content, appealing to ideals of self- determination, 
spontaneity and autonomy, which point beyond social heteronomy. On the other 
hand, the form which the norm of 'freedom' assumes within the context of 
capitalism limits this ethical capacity. The modern notion of freedom, it is 
argued, relies upon a separation between the economic and the political, i. e. 
between narrow legalistic freedom and a more substantial sense of freedom 
rooted in economic equality, which serves to conceal existing heteronomy. (5) 
An understanding of freedom, to bring existence into line with its essence, must 
incorporate notions of empowerment and redistribution. 
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Adorno's most explicit acknowledgement of his debt to Hegel in this respect 
comes in the 'Three Studies: 
The most questionable, and therefore the best known, of Hegels teachings, that what is [actual] is 
rational, was not merely apologetic. Rather, in Hegel reason finds itself constellated with freedom. 
Freedom and reason are nonsense without one another. The [actual] can be considered rational 
only in so far as the idea of freedom, that is, human beings genuine self-determination, shines 
through it. 482 
By claiming that Hegel's formulation here is not 'merely' apologetic, Adorno 
clearly differentiates himself from Karl Popper's allegations of 'moral and legal 
poSitiViSMI. 41' However, Adorno does think that Hegel's version of detern-dnate 
negation, or immanent critique, is ultimately apologetic for the status quo, that 
Hegel cuts dialectics 'short'. "' There are two reasons why Adorno thinks this, 
one which is more historically contingent and one which is more philosophical. 
The first reason is that Adorno takes Hegel's advocacy of a capitalist economy 
to be hugely problematic in terms of Hegel's own project. Firstly, Hegel 
underestimates the ability of capitalist exchange to ruthlessly undermine ethical 
norms. For example, the exchange society damages both the norms of love and 
fidelity in the family"' and, in the public sphere, makes instrumentalism, 
egotism, consumption and profitability the highest values. "' Secondly, the 
governing concept of capitalism is that of providing for the economic needs of 
the populace and yet it intrinsically produces mass social inequality and poverty. 
This means that not only does capitalism fail to live up to its concept but that a 
4" Adorno (1993) p. 44. 
493 Popper (1969) p. 41. 
4"Adorno (1973) p. 344. 
485 See, for example, Adorno (1974) pp. 30-2. 
486 See, for example, Adorno (1973) pp. 35-37. 
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significant proportion of the populace are unable to participate in the benefits of 
ethical life. This is something that Hegel accepts, yet has no real answer for: 
The poor still have the needs common to civil society, and yet since society has withdrawn from 
them the natural means of acquisition and broken the bond of the family - in the wider sense of 
487 
the clan - their poverty leaves them more or less deprived of all the advantages of society... 
Thirdly, the alienating nature of wage labour undermines the possibility of 
mutual recognition (I deal with this point in more detail below). All these 
objections do not challenge the philosophical structure of Hegelian determinate 
negation but simply take Hegel to task for not pursuing his critique further. 
Instead of rather stoically accepting the failings of capitalism, Hegel should have 
made the move made by many of the Young Hegelians in arguing that 
transcendence of capitalism is essential to fully realise ethical life. 
Adorno's philosophical challenge to Hegelian determinate negation revolves 
around the notion of the negation of the negation, the idea that to negate a 
negative generates a positive. Critique always progresses from lower to higher - 
states, with each successive negation guaranteeing a synthesis at a higher level. 
Adorno rejects such teleology, with its associated progressive conception of 
human history. 
No universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the 
411 
slingshot to the mcgaton bomb. 
For Adorno, critique is open ended and does not follow a teleological path. 
Furthermore, Adorno challenges the fact that negation, for Hegel, comes to rest 
in the Absolute. Not only does Adorno think that critique is unending, but he 
deems the structure of Hegel's Absolute to be analogous to the structure of 
Hegel (1991) p. 265. 
488 Adorno (1973) p. 320. 
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capital. What is presented in Hegel as the culmination of human reason and 
freedom is, in effect, identical in structure to the domination of particularity 
within the universal, characteristic of the exchange society. 
Fundamentally, Adorno thinks that the negation of the negation, in Hegel, is a 
form of positivism. For example, to critique the necessity state (the state as a 
mere guarantor for market transactions in civil society) in terms of its tendency 
to promote societal atomism, Hegel moves to the notion of the universal state, 
which represents the general interest and can supposedly mitigate the 
contradictions of civil society. Hegel cannot move outside the form of the state 
itself. To take a more contemporary example, we could think of liberal feminism 
as embodying this form of negation of the negation. The liberal feminist, for 
example, would take the solution to large scale inequality in female 
representation in senior management to be found in more women developing the 
skills and personality attributes needed to 'get by 'at this level. If the negation of 
the negation is taken to be the negation of negative conditions, however, the 
problem is viewed in broader terms. One can begin to challenge the sort of 
expectations of what one is to be in order to 'get by' for both men and women in 
modern society. I have already questioned the extent to which Adorno's 
interpretation of the negation of the negation is accurate. For example, I have 
mentioned Dunayevskaya's suggestion that the Absolute constitutes a 'new 
beginning' rather than an end point. and looked at interpretations of Hegel's 
logic which leave room open for retrogression as well as progression. 489 in a 
sense, however, this is a moot point given that I have argued that what gives 
Adorno's understanding of negation its radical force is the commitment to social 
constitution and the possibility of radical societal transformation. Adorno's 
489 See the discussion in Chapter Three, section three. 
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radical social critique is made possible by his refusal to interpret social forms as 
anything other than the constructs of flesh-and-blood human beings. This is 
something that is ultimately denied in Hegel's metaphysics. 
3) Alienation 
Having examined the basis of critique in both Hegel and Adorno, the next 
question is whether they identify the same problem? At one level, we can argue 
that both see alienation as the central problem of political philosophy, not 
pluralism, justice, or liberty. Are they talking about the same thing, however? 
Firstly, there is the question of historical genesis. In Hegel, alienation comes to 
the fore following the break up of the Greek polis. With the arrival of the 
principle of subjectivity, introduced though Christianity, a series of diremptions 
open up, between man and nature, reason and desire, individual and society and 
self-determination and fate. In the aftermath of the French Revolution, Hegel 
believes, the conditions are in place such that the wholeness of the Greek polis 
can be recovered in a form that can accommodate the principle of subjectivity. 
He sees it as his job to convince his contemporaries that this is the case. For 
Adorno, alienation is bound up with societal rationalisation, a process which is 
intensified with the growth of modern capitalism but has far deeper primordial 
origin in the attempt to know and manipulate nature. I will address the 
significance of this difference in the next section. 
Secondly, there is the question of what is understood by alienation. For Hegel, 
alienation refers to the three divisions outlined in Chapter One, of man and his 
own nature, external nature and society, all of which contribute to a sense of 
atomisation, anxiety and unhappiness amongst subjects. We can see a similar 
usage of the term in Marx's early writings, ' although anchored in the 
490 See Marx (1975) pp. 322-334. 
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relationship of wage labour and not in the self-externalisation of Spirit. This 
sense of alienation is alluded to in Adorno's notion of 'damaged life'. For 
Adorno, following Lukacs, we are also talking about alienation in terms of 
reification. Reification refers to the attribution of immutability to social and 
historical processes, literally translated as 'to make thing-like. Adorno, 
however, makes the further move of understanding reification in terms of 
'identity thinking' by which he means a form of conceptualisation which takes 
reason to have self-sufficiency above and beyond what it increasingly takes to be 
contingent, for example language, tradition, sense and intuition. Concepts, like 
the social relations of modern capitalism, are rendered fixed and immutable. 
How are we to make sense of this apparent plurality of understandings? At one 
level, it would appear that Adorno and Hegel identify a similar problem, that of 
atomisation, anxiety and unhappiness. Furthermore, both Hegel and Adorno are 
concerned with the conflicts between man and nature, reason and desire and 
individual and society and treat such conflicts as integral to understanding the 
problem of alienation. However, there is a shift in emphasis in Adorno towards 
an understanding of alienation in terms of the objectification of social processes 
and the consequent objectification of human subjects. "' The critique of 
alienation is closely bound to the problem of social constitution. However, as I 
have argued, Adorno advances such a critique in Hegelian language, describing 
the processes of inversion and objectification in modern capitalism via analogy 
with Hegel's concept of Spirit (see Chapter Three). Furthermore, the critique of 
identity thinking as a form of reason that disavows the very mediations which 
make it possible takes upon a Hegelian form (see Chapter Four). 
"" This is something Hegel is also concerned with - see for example the section on the principle 
of utility in the Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel (1977) p587). 
227 
4) Recognition 
In terms of envisaging a resolution to the problem of alienation we are given 
two seemingly opposing answers. For Hegel, alienation can be alleviated (1) at 
the level of objective Spirit through participating in the institutions and practices 
of ethical life and (2) at the level of absolute Spirit, where, though religion, 
philosophy and art, one comprehends oneself as a vehicle of Spirit. In Adorno, 
however, the pursuit of reconciliation takes the form of a ceaseless refusal to 
play along with current forms of heteronomy. What are we to make of such a 
divergence? Leaving aside the political differences raised above, we can, on one 
level, see similarities in the type of resolution being sought. Both Adorno and 
Hegel seek the overcoming of alienation and mutual indifference though the 
establishment of social relations in which individuals are awarded moral status as 
autonomous beings by one another. In Hegel, mutual recognition entails 
recognising individuals as 'something that has an independent existence of its 
own, which, therefore, it cannot utilize for its own purposes, if that object does 
not of its own accord do what the first does to it'. "' This Kantian.. thought is 
also strongly evident in Adorno's notion of 'Solidarity ... with tormentable 
bodies'. " What motivates the bodily expression of Solidarity is precisely the 
treatment of human beings as objects and not as moral, autonomous individuals. 
The impulse of Solidarity demands that we value human life, in the context of its 
debasement. In so doing, we must attribute an excess to the other, a sense of 
independence or self- deterrrýinatio n that is inviolable. 
492 Hegel (1977) p. 112. 
4" 'So act that you use your humanity, whether in your own person in the person of another, 
always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means' Kant (1990) p. 80. 
494 Adorno (1973) p. 286. 
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In addition, there seems to be a double-move which is common to both Hegel's 
notion of mutual recognition and Adorno's notion of Solidarity. Because the 
attribution of autonomy to the other is established mutually, i. e. one's sense of 
autonomy is contingent upon its recognition by the other and visa versa; it is also 
simultaneously a bounding of autonomy. That senses of autonomy are 
interdependent debars one party from developing its own sense of autonomy, or 
discretionary powers, at the expense of the other. In other words, because of the 
nature of the conditions necessary for realising a genuine sense of autonomy, 
autonomy is necessarily bounded by ethical obligation. In Hegel's master-slave 
dialectic, for example, the master's failure to recognise the slave as an 
autonomous being debases his own sense of autonomous identity. In Adorno, a 
similar though is expressed in terms of two key ethical principles, autonomy 
(Miindigkeit) and humility (Bescheidenheit), " each of which keeps the other in 
check. In the dialectic of Solidarity, autonomy is both asserted and bounded in 
the desire 'to do justice to what is other'. ' 
Hegel's discussion of the French Revolution also raises an interesting point of 
comparison in this respect. Recall that Hegel attributes the 'fury of destruction' 
of the revolutionary terror" to a certain conception of the will, which takes all 
determination and particularisation as a compromise to the will's universality. 
Hegel conceives of the will in terms of two components, the particular will, 
which commits to determinate choices, and the universal will, which is the 
capacity to rise above the determinate position of the individual and consider that 
one could have always chosen differently. In the revolutionary terror, any 
495 See Finlayson (2002) for a more detailed discussion of such ethical terms in Adomo. 
49' Adorno (2000) p. 25 1. 
497 Hegel (1977) p. 359. 
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particular determination of the will (for example in terms of a social or 
constitutional role) is not tolerated. This unbounded, universal will begins to 
loose any sense of recognition of the particularity of other individuals, i. e. what 
they have determinately made of themselves. The abstract will, unchecked in this 
way, has no discernable subject. 
Is there not a strong connection here with Adorno's description of the cold, 
instrumental modern subject? In the process of societal ratio nalisatio n, the 
subject acts so as to eliminate any residue of mutual obligation, social 
boundedness and natural compulsion in seeking to master itself, others and 
external nature. In the attempt to eliminate any sense of ourselves as bounded, 
natural beings, subjects come to treat other people ever more strategically and 
instrumentally. Such indifference to the particularity of others reaches its apogee 
in genocide. As in the revolutionary terror, Nazi genocide treats its victims not as 
individuals but as anonymous specimens. Such extreme indifference to 
individuality is movingly conveyed by Primo Levi: 
Their life is short, but their number is endless; they, the Muselmdnner, the drowned, form the 
backbone of the camp, an anonymous mass, continually renewed and always identical, of non- 
men who march and labour in silence, the divine spark dead in them, already too empty to already 
suffer. One hesitates to call them living: one hesitates to call their death death, in the face of which 
they have no fear, as they are too tired to understand. 
They crowd my memory with their faceless presence, and if I could enclose all the evil of our time 
in one image, I would choose this image which is familiar to me: an emaciated man, with head 
dropped and shoulders curved, on whose face and in whose eyes not a trace of thought is to be 
seen. 499 
Such a characterisation of the death camps is echoed in Adorno: 
Levi, P. (1961) Survival Translated by Stuart Woolf (Macmillan, New York) p. 90. 
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That the individual [Individuum] no longer died in the concentration camps, but rather the 
exemplar, has to affect the dying of those who escaped the administrative measures. Genocide is 
the absolute integration, which is everywhere being prepared, where human beings are made the 
same, polished, as the military calls it, until they are literally cancelled out, as deviations from the 
concept of their complete nullity. 499 
Compare this to Hegel on the revolutionary terror: 
The sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore death, a death too which has no inner 
significance or filling, for what is negated [i. e. the individual] is the empty point of the absolutely 
free self. It is the coldest and meanest of all deaths, with no more significance than cutting off a 
head of cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of water. " 
So far both Hegel and Adorno appear to be appealing to a notion of 
reconciliation which fits the core structure that I outlined in the introduction, of a 
sense of autonomy which consists in 'being- in-oneself- in- another'. In so doing, 
one does not loose ones personal autonomy but gains a fuller and more 
fundamental sense of autonomy. However, in terms of the question of 'what is to 
be done' the answers they give are radically different. For Hegel, mutual 
recognition is already instantiated into the fabric of ethical life and hence the 
subject can attain its autonomy through reconciliation. For Adorno, however, 
although the demand for recognition shares a similar structure to his notion of 
Solidarity, autonomy, given the current state of the world, demands a refusal to 
play along, rather than reconciliation: 
The single genuine power standing against the principle of Auschwitz is MUndifteit, if I might 
use the Kantian expression: the power of self-determination, of not cooperating. "' 
4'9 Adorno (1973) p. 335. 
"Hegel (1977) p. 360. 
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The difference in strategy is not solely reducible to the fact that Hegel was 
broadly optimistic about the direction that the world was taking, whereas Adorno 
was an abject pessimist. Again, the issue of social constitution is central? Recall 
the classical distinction made between Marxists and Hegelians, that between 
'materialism' and 'idealism'. Adorno accepts much of the classical Marxist 
'materialist' critique of Hegel, in terms of his characterisation of the Absolute. 
Firstly, Hegel mistakenly attributes historical change to the self-development of 
Spirit rather than human agency. Secondly, even if we interpret Hegel's notion 
of Spirit as really alluding to social relations, Hegel is mistaken in identifying 
the final or highest form of society with capital relations, which are historically 
transitory. 
There is a further 'materialist' turn relating to the Hegelian insistence that the 
world is accessible to conceptual understanding all the way down and that the 
concept can grasp the particularity of objects. Unlike Kant, for whom the 
categories of the understanding grasp objects only as phenomena and not as they 
are in-themselves, Hegel thinks that the essential structure of the world is 
ultimately identical to that of the rational concept. As I explained in Chapter 
Two, the rational concept comprises immediate unity, difference and mediated 
unity and is the structure of the Absolute, which, for Hegel, is the unity of both 
subject and substance. For Adorno, as I have previously argued, the insistence on 
the inherent conceptuality of objects means that Hegel is not really grasping the 
particular at all, only the concept of particularity: 
'0' Adorno (1998) Critical Models translated by Henry Pickford (Columbia University Press, 
New York) p. 195. 
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His logic deals only with particularity, which is already conceptual. Thus established, the logical 
primacy of the universal provides a fundament for the social and political primacy that Hegel is 
opting for. " 
For Adorno, particularity cannot be fully captured conceptually. There is 
always an excess which is progressively disavowed in the process of concept 
formation. Adorno thinks that this excess is registered in a different way from 
conceptualisation, in terms of the somatic or attitudinal effects generated by the 
object. This is what Adorno means by the transition to the 'priority of the object' 
and it is this understanding of 'materialism' which separates Adorno not only 
from Hegel but also from his second generation critics. 
From this point, many of the criticisms of Adorno made by the second 
generation critical theorists can be viewed as relying upon precisely the sort of 
hypostasised distinctions that an account of social constitution seeks to 
undermine. Rather than, as in Habermas, begin with a procedural separation of 
norm and historical genesis, Adorno gives us an account of the formation of 
social norms which elucidates their contamination by being situated within the 
exchange society and yet refuses to relinquish the possibility of its overcoming. 
Furthermore, the 'materialist' dimension of Adorno's account of social 
constitution can be seen to respond to two further accusations made by the 
second generation critical theorists. Firstly, there is the accusation that Adorno 
remains within the 'philosophy of consciousness' in focusing only on the 
subject-object relation in the discussion of reconciliation. I have argued that, 
whilst this is certainly not Adorno's sole focus, Adorno, unlike Habermas, 
believes that reconciliation cannot be understood solely in terms of a theory of 
inter-subjectivity. It is Habermas's thinking, which is left wanting in attempting 
"Adorno (1973) p. 326. 
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to dissolve such problems. Secondly, there is the attribution to Adorno of an 
extreme philosophical negativism, which advances social critique only from the 
standpoint of an 'aesthetic rationality'. Again, I have argued that this is not the 
case (see the account of immanent critique above) and that, furthermore, 
Adorno's account of experience demonstrates that the resources for 
reconciliation are immanent to the structure of experience itself. 
Interpreting Adorno in this way also helps answer some of the criticisms 
levelled by Michael Rosen. Recall that Rosen takes Adorno to be faced with a 
dilemma. On the one hand, in the 'transition to the priority of the object' Adorno 
wants to give objects a greater role in cognition. However, being a materialist 
thinker, he cannot claim that the world of objects has any inherent meaning. 
Meaning is only something that we impose upon nature. Rosen sees Adorno's 
claim that objects are 'sedimented history' as amounting to a claim that objects 
have a kind of inherent meaningftilness. This claim could only be advanced by 
relying on the sort of metaphysical schema advanced by Hegel as, for Hegel, the 
world is inherently meaningful only because it is ultimately identical with the 
meta-subject, Spirit. "' I have, however, argued that Rosen moves too quickly in 
making such an assertion. What Adorno means by 'sedimented history' is the 
idea that we grasp the external world through meanings which are created in and 
through the 'social totality'. Such socially and historically constituted meanings 
have objectivity in that they are not reducible to any individual. " They are, 
however, a product of human agency and not of the evolution of Spirit so it is 
difficult to describe the position as idealist unless one is defining materialism in 
a very different sense to how it is employed in the Marxist tradition. 
103 See Rosen (1993) p. 104-5. 
'04 See 0' Connor (2005) p. 170-173 for a good discussion of 'sedimented history' 
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Furthermore, I have argued that there is no reason to think that the stress on the 
somatic role in cognition involves awarding any inherent meaningfulness to 
objects. What Adorno is doing is making the claim that we experience objects in 
terms of two dimensions of cognition, one which registers the object in terms of 
what concept it comes under and one which registers the object in terms of the 
attitudinal effects it generates. This, as I have argued, gives Adorno a richer 
account of experience than many of his critics. 
6) Concluding Remarks 
Whilst I have argued that Adorno's account of reconciliation is neither 
incoherent (contra Habermas) nor established upon some of the more 
questionable theses of German Idealism (contra Rosen), I still take it to be 
unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is difficult not to think of 
Hegel's famous description of the 'beautiful soul' when thinking about Adorno's 
response to endemic suffering and injustice: 
It [the beautiful soul] lacks force to externalize itself, the power to make itself a thing, and endure 
existence. It lives in dread of staining the radiance of its inner being by action and existence. And 
to preserve the purity of its heart, it flees from contact with actuality, and steadfastly perseveres in 
a state of self-willed impotence to renounce a self which is pared away to the last point of 
abstraction, and to give itself substantial existence, or, in other words, to transform its thought into 
being, and commit itself to absolute distinction [that between thought and being]. The hollow 
object, which it produces, now fills it, therefore, with the feeling of emptiness. Its activity consists 
in yearning, which merely loses itself in becoming an unsubstantial shadowy object, and, rising 
above this loss and falling back on itself, finds itself merely as lost. In this transparent purity of its 
moments it becomes a sorrow-laden beautiful soul, as it is called; its light dims and dies within it, 
and it vanishes as a shapeless vapour dissolving into thin air. " 
Hegel (1977) p. 658. 
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Was Adorno's refusal to 'join in' with the establishment, coupled with his 
equally adamant refusal to take part in organised political resistance, not 
evidence of a stubborn refusal to contemplate difficult compromises, even if 
such pragmatism could achieve tangible if tainted benefits for humankind? 
Worse still, was Lukacs not right that Adorno's philosophical negativism was an 
indulgence available only to the wealthy and that his taking up residence at the 
'Grand Hotel Abyss""' demonstrated an utter disinterest in making concrete 
gains for the poor and vulnerable? On the one hand, Lukacs' remarks appear 
wholly unfair, given his own bourgeois background and the several- 
compron-dses-too-far he later made as part of the leadership of the Hungarian 
Communist Party. Furthermore, given what much of the organised left had 
become as a consequence of the Soviet Union, it is easy to interpret Adorno's 
scepticism as warranted. However, it is difficult to be as charitable as regards his 
dismissive attitude towards the upheavals of 1968. Adorno seems to have little 
interest in moving beyond mere negation and considering how to harness the 
potentialities opened up in the struggle against capital. 
Has Adorno, therefore, anything of substance to offer to contemporary 
radicals? I have already argued that there are tensions in his position between 
resignation and resistance. On the one hand, these tensions relate to the 
movement between a strong and a weak negativism or, in other words, to a 
conflict between the view that the world is wholly devoid of goodness and the 
view that the world contains pockets of goodness in resistance to the false whole. 
On the other hand, Adorno seems tom on the question as to whether negation 
merely terminates at knowledge of the bad or whether it delivers a more positive 
5' Lukacs, Georg (1971) Theory of the Novel translated by Anna Bostock (London, Merlin Press) 
P. ii. 
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potential for societal transformation. These tensions have to be understood as 
arising from the dire political circumstances of his times. 
Adorno's sense of resistance, however, tends to be restricted to the areas of 
aesthetics and education if it is articulated at all. As regards to the former, even if 
we are to accept Robert Hullot-Kentor's" suggestion that Adorno's aesthetic 
critique should not essentially limit us to a small number of works in 
Schoenberg's free atonal period, it still appears too limited to have a broad 
import. Whilst I strongly reject the idea that the narrowness of Adorno's 
aesthetic critique is driven by elitism, as opposed to stringent and scholarly 
aesthetic criteria"', its implications are surely severely restricted in terms of the 
numbers of those with the time available or educational opportunities to develop 
an interest in, for example, atonal music. This said, in challenging the 
subjugation of art to politics and, instead, insisting upon art as a source of 
political insight in its own right, Adorno awards the aesthetic with a role in 
political resistance that Marxist orthodoxy had stripped it of. 
It is in the area of education where Adorno makes some of his seemingly more 
practically focused suggestions. In, Education for Autonomy, " for example, he 
argues for an egalitarian educational system in which talent is treated as 
something to be learnt in free play and not assumed to be a natural property. He 
'07 Hullot-Kentor in Huhn (ed) (2004) 'Right Listening and a New Type of Human Being 
(especially p. 195-6) 
508 Ibid., It is important to remember that Adorno did not just hate Jazz and popular culture but 
also most of what passed for high-culture, e. g. Dvorak, Sibelius, Stravinsky (and most of 
Schoenberg's non free-atonal repitoire) 
508 
5"' Adorno, T. And Becker, H. (1983) Education for Autonomy. Translated in Telos; Vol. 55-6 p 
103-10. 
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advocates student lead learning, strongly criticising restrictive curricular 
prescription, as a means to motivate a non-instrumental love of knowledge and, 
overall, sees education as a bedrock of critical and autonomous thinking in a 
context in which such faculties are very much restricted. 
If such moves appear rather modest, then we need not restrict the reading of 
Adorno to his own self- interpretation. "' Many in the 'Open Marxist' tradition.. 
have used Adorno's thought to address modern forms of struggle and resistance. 
For John Holloway, for example, it is to emerging movements in the developing 
world where inspiration is to be found. The Zapatisda struggle in Chiapas, 
Mexico, for example, provides an interesting model of an open-ended, non- 
vanguardiSt512 struggle which evolves in accordance with its own ends of 
participatory democracy and the realisation of human dignity against its denial. 
The form of political organisation of movements such as the Zapatisda's offers 
much pron-dse in demonstrating what an Adornian politics might look like 
although, however, the restriction of such models to indigenous struggles in 
developing communities is a severe limitation upon their import for the 
industrialised west. 
I think, however, that the two themes stemming from Adorno's Hegelian 
Marxism with the most enduring relevance are those I have developed in this 
thesis. Firstly, there are the ethical implications of interpreting freedom as 
5 '0 As Adorno does not in relation to reading Hegel. See Chapter Three. 
511 See, for example, Holloway, J. (2002) Changing the World Without Taking Power (Pluto, 
London) and Bonefeld and Tischler (ed. ) (2002) What is to be Done - Leninism, Anti-Leninist 
Marxism and the Question of Revolution Today (Ashgate, Burlington) for two Open Marxist 
works which examine the question of political practice. 
512 It does not rely upon an enlightened revolutionary leader ship but is rooted in discussion at 
every level of the community. 
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reconciliation or social autonomy. As I have argued, I take Adorno to continue in 
an ethical tradition which runs from Kant's conception of human beings as to be 
treated as 'ends in themselves', though Hegel's notion of 'mutual recognition' 
through Marx's critique of alienation and fetishism. If anything, such ethical 
imperatives are more pressing in the light of 20' century history than in the 
lifetime of those thinkers. Widespread human rights abuses, the persistence of 
extreme global poverty and starvation, the degrading and banal nature of modern 
labour and the global prevalence of violent conflict fuelled by grubby self- 
interest can all seen as attesting to a deep-seated problem of alienation and 
mutual indifference. Adopting the notion of 'Solidarity' as a response to such 
barbarism requires the adoption of tight ethical constraints and a rejection of the 
cold instrumentalism of Marxist-Leninism and the apologia for barbarism 
commonplace amongst many orthodox Marxists. "' If the aim of socialism is the 
abolition of human suffering and the realisation of human dignity then the means 
to deliver it must be consistent with such an end. 
Finally, there is the question of Adorno's contribution to the idea of social 
constitution. The seemingly most unattractive feature of Adorno's thought, its 
utopian refusal to adopt a 'realistic' or 'pragmatic' stance towards the plethora of 
problems facing the modern world, can also be read as its greatest strength. 
Recall that Adorno invokes the Judaic image ban as a tool not to self- indulgently 
disconnect utopia from the immediate problems of the here and now but to 
starkly highlight how hellish the world has become and how deep seated such 
"3 See, for example, Lenin, V. I. (1966) 1920 Speech at the 3rd Komosal Congress, 2 Oct 1920 in 
Collected Worls Vol. 31 (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Progress Publishing, Moscow) 
and Trotsky, L., Dewey, J. And Novach, G. (1982) Their Morals and Ours (New York, 
Pathfinder). 
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problems are. It is only though his understanding of social constitution, 
developed through Hegel, that he can so uncompromisingly lambaste the world 
of 'universal fungibility' and yet refuse to relinquish the possibility of its 
overcoming. 
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